State v. Wooden
| Decision Date | 02 December 2015 |
| Citation | 478 S.W.3d 585 |
| Parties | State of Tennessee v. James D. Wooden |
| Court | Tennessee Supreme Court |
James R. Stovall, Knoxville, Tennessee, for the appellant, James Wooden.
Herbert H. Slatery III, Attorney General and Reporter; Andrée S. Blumstein, Solicitor General; Rachel E. Willis, Senior Counsel; Steven Bebb, District Attorney General; and Carl Petty, Assistant District Attorney General, for the appellee, State of Tennessee.
OPINION
We granted this appeal to determine whether a party filing a motion under Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1 (" Rule 36.1") states a colorable claim for relief for correction of an illegal sentence by alleging that the trial court increased his sentence above the statutory presumptive minimum sentence but failed to find enhancement factors justifying the increase. Answering this question requires us to determine the meaning of two terms used in Rule 36.1 —"colorable claim" and "illegal sentence." We hold that the definition of "colorable claim" in Rule 28, section 2(H) of the Rules of the Tennessee Supreme Court applies to the term "colorable claim" in Rule 36.1. Additionally, we conclude that the definition of "illegal sentence" in Rule 36.1 is coextensive with, and actually mirrors, the definition this Court has applied to the term for purposes of habeas corpus proceedings. Compare Tenn. R. Crim. P. 36.1(a), with Cantrell v. Easterling, 346 S.W.3d 445, 452 (Tenn. 2011). Taking the allegations of the Rule 36.1 motion in this case as true and viewing them in the light most favorable to the moving party, we conclude that the moving party has failed to allege a colorable claim for correction of an illegal sentence. Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals affirming the trial court's denial of the Rule 36.1 motion is affirmed.
The following facts are derived from the single-volume technical record included in the record on appeal. On August 12,1996, James D. Wooden ("Mr. Wooden") pleaded guilty to aggravated burglary, a Class C felony, and theft of property valued over $1,000, a Class D felony, in Bradley County Criminal Court ("Criminal Court") case number 96297. Based upon this plea, the Criminal Court classified Mr. Wooden as a Range I standard offender and imposed a three-year sentence for the aggravated burglary conviction and a two-year sentence for the theft conviction. The Criminal Court ordered these sentences served concurrently but suspended the sentences upon Mr. Wooden's service of thirty days in jail.
On September 23, 1997, Mr. Wooden was tried in the Criminal Court in case number 97–133 on the charge of aggravated robbery. The charged offense allegedly occurred on January 15, 1997. A jury convicted Mr. Wooden of the lesser-included offense of facilitation of aggravated robbery, a Class C felony. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39–13–402(b) (2014); id. § 39–11–403(b) (2014).1 The Criminal Court classified Mr. Wooden as a Range I standard offender, which placed him in a three-to-six-year sentencing range, see id. § 40–35–112(a)(3) (2014), with the statutory presumptive sentence established as "the minimum sentence in the range if there are no enhancement or mitigating factors," see id. § 40–35–210(c) (Supp. 1996).2 Mr. Wooden received a five-year sentence in case number 97–133. Additionally, the Criminal Court revoked Mr. Wooden's probation, reinstated the sentences he had received in case number 96–297, and ordered all sentences served concurrently, for an effective five-year sentence.
Almost seventeen years later, on May 1, 2014, Mr. Wooden filed pro se in the Criminal Court a motion under Rule 36.1. Mr. Wooden alleged that his sentences in case numbers 96–297 and 97–133 were illegal because the sentences were "raised above the presumptive sentence without enhancement factors being placed on the record [by the Criminal Court] as required by statute." Mr. Wooden alleged an additional illegality as to his sentence for case number 97–133, arguing that the Criminal Court should have ordered it served consecutively to the sentences in case number 96–297 because a statute required consecutive service of a sentence for an offense committed while on probation. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 40–35–115(b)(6) (2014) ().
On May 14, 2014, the Criminal Court denied Mr. Wooden's Rule 36.1 motion. The Criminal Court did not appoint counsel, hold a hearing, or wait for a response to be filed. The Criminal Court explained that, "[a]fter review of the corresponding court files," it had determined that Mr. Wooden's sentences had expired and had concluded that it had no jurisdiction to rule on Rule 36.1 motions relating to "expired cases."
Mr. Wooden appealed, still proceeding pro se. On appeal, he contended that the Criminal Court erred by dismissing his motion for lack of jurisdiction based on his sentences having expired and reiterated the claims stated in his Rule 36.1 motion regarding the illegality of his sentences. The State argued in its brief that the trial court's dismissal should be affirmed because Mr. Wooden had failed to present a colorable claim for relief under Rule 36.1.3
The Court of Criminal Appeals agreed with the State's argument. Specifically, the intermediate appellate court concluded that Mr. Wooden had failed to state a colorable claim regarding his sentences in case number 96–297 because he had received the minimum sentences for each offense. The Court of Criminal Appeals further explained that any error the Criminal Court made by increasing the sentence in case number 97–133 above the statutory presumptive minimum would have resulted in ... a voidable judgment rather than an "illegal sentence" and was therefore not enough to establish a colorable claim for relief under Rule 36.1. State v. Wooden, E2014–0169–CCA–R3–CD, 2014 WL 7366984, at *2 (Tenn. Crim. App. Dec. 26, 2014). The Court of Criminal Appeals also rejected Mr. Wooden's claim that his sentence in case number 97–133 was illegal because the Criminal Court ordered it served concurrently, rather than consecutively to the sentences in case number 96–297. The intermediate appellate court explained that the statute on which Mr. Wooden relied, Tennessee Code Annotated section 40–35–115(b)(6), permitted but did not require consecutive service of sentences imposed for offenses committed on probation. Id. Based on its conclusion that Mr. Wooden had failed to state a colorable claim for relief under Rule 36.1, the intermediate appellate court declined to determine "whether the expiration of his sentences ha[d] rendered his claim moot." Id.
Mr. Wooden timely filed in this Court an application for permission to appeal. See Tenn. R. App. P. 11. This Court granted Mr. Wooden's pro se application and appointed counsel to represent him before this Court. State v. Wooden, No. 2014–01069–SC–R11–CD (order granting the application, appointing counsel, and providing instructions for the scheduling of oral arguments).4
Whether Mr. Wooden's motion states a colorable claim for correction of an illegal sentence under Rule 36.1 is a question of law, to which de novo review applies. See Summers v. State, 212 S.W.3d 251, 255 (Tenn. 2007) (citing State v. Livingston, 197 S.W.3d 710, 712 (Tenn. 2006) ) (applying de novo review to determine whether a sentence is illegal for purposes of habeas corpus relief); Arnold v. State, 143 S.W.3d 784, 786 (Tenn. 2004) (citing Burnett v. State, 92 S.W.3d 403, 406 (Tenn. 2002) ) (reviewing de novo the issue of whether a post-conviction petition states a colorable claim for relief). De novo review also applies to our construction and interpretation of Rule 36.1. State v. Johnson, 342 S.W.3d 468, 471 (Tenn. 2011) (citing State v. Ferrante, 269 S.W.3d 908, 911 (Tenn. 2008) ). In construing rules of procedure, such as Rule 36.1, we apply generally the same rules of construction that are used to construe statutes. Id. (citing State v. Crowe, 168 S.W.3d 731, 744 (Tenn. 2005) ). As is true of statutory construction, our primary objective is to effectuate the intent of the rule "without broadening or restricting the intended scope of the rule." Fair v. Cochran, 418 S.W.3d 542, 544 (Tenn. 2013) (citing Owens v. State, 908 S.W.2d 923, 926 (Tenn. 1995) ).
In this Court, Mr. Wooden asserts that his allegations that the Criminal Court contravened a statute by increasing his sentence in case number 97–133 above the presumptive minimum without finding enhancement factors to justify the increase were sufficient to state a colorable claim for relief under Rule 36.1. He also argues that the Court of Criminal Appeals disregarded Rule 36.1's unambiguous language and conflated motions under Rule 36.1 with habeas corpus petitions when it concluded otherwise.5 The State asserts that the Court of Criminal Appeals correctly concluded that Mr. Wooden's allegations were not sufficient to state a colorable claim for relief under Rule 36.1. A review of the development of Tennessee law regarding the correction of illegal sentences is helpful to a proper understanding of Rule 36.1.
In 1978, this Court recognized that, "[a]s a general rule, a trial judge may correct an illegal, as opposed to a merely erroneous, sentence at any time, even if it has become final." State v. Burkhart, 566 S.W.2d 871, 873 (Tenn. 1978). Nevertheless, when we announced this principle in Burkhart, we did not simultaneously establish a procedure for requesting correction of an allegedly illegal sentence. Moreover, the Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure, which became effective in 1979, only...
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