State v. Reuter
| Decision Date | 26 October 2021 |
| Docket Number | ED 109731 |
| Citation | 637 S.W.3d 478 |
| Parties | STATE of Missouri, Appellant, v. Jeffrey REUTER, Respondent. |
| Court | Missouri Court of Appeals |
Evan J. Bechheim, Shaun J. Mackelprang, Assistant Attorney General, P.O. Box 899, Jefferson City, MO 65102, for appellant.
Anne R. Legomsky, Jordan Cohen, 1114 Market Street, Room 602, St. Louis, MO 63101, for respondent.
The State of Missouri (State) appeals from the trial court's suppression of Jeffrey Reuter's (Defendant) statements to a crisis negotiator during a barricaded standoff with police and to detectives while en route to the police station. We reverse.
The State charged Defendant with three counts of tampering with a judicial officer, alleging that Defendant engaged in conduct reasonably calculated to harass or alarm three circuit court judges by delivering a threatening manifesto to each judge's residence. St. Louis County police officers travelled to Defendant's house in Bonne Terre to execute an arrest warrant. Officers approached his front door, announced their presence, and requested that Defendant exit the house. Defendant stated that he would protect himself if the officers came through the door. The police retreated and surrounded Defendant's house.
Detective Chris Koester (Detective Koester) was assigned to "crisis intervention and crisis negotiations," and spoke with Defendant over the telephone during an hour-long standoff. Over the course of their conversation, Defendant frequently alluded to his willingness to defend himself against officers who might enter his house. Defendant was very upset about how "judges don't follow the law," and how judges did not treat him fairly. Defendant claimed he had exhausted every avenue to challenge his perceived judicial bias, but nothing worked. Detective Koester repeatedly asked him to surrender, suggested it would be in the best interest of his child, and enlisted Defendant's mother to speak with him to effectuate a peaceful resolution.
When Defendant surrendered, he was handcuffed and placed into a police vehicle, but he was not advised of his Miranda1 rights. Three detectives accompanied Defendant while he was transported to the police station. The detectives engaged in casual conversation with Defendant about topics such as football and dentistry. One detective thanked Defendant for his peaceful surrender. Defendant asked the detectives if they would have eventually made entry into his house, and a detective answered "yes." Defendant then volunteered he was glad they did not because he had a firearm, but he took the magazine out of it prior to exiting the residence.
Defendant filed a motion to suppress his statements to police, including the statements through the door, over the telephone, and in the police vehicle, arguing they were obtained by custodial interrogation in violation of Miranda . After a hearing, the trial court granted Defendant's motion to suppress on all his statements to police.
This appeal follows.
The State raises three points on appeal. First, the State argues the trial court clearly erred in finding a Miranda violation and suppressing the statements Defendant made to police while he was in the residence because he was not "in custody." Second, the State argues the trial court clearly erred in finding a Miranda violation and suppressing the statements Defendant made to police while he was in the residence because neither the questioning through the door nor the telephone crisis negotiation were an "interrogation." Third, the State argues the trial court clearly erred in finding a Miranda violation and suppressing the statements Defendant made to police while he was being transported because the officers did not conduct an "interrogation."
"The State has ‘the burden at [a] suppression hearing to show by a preponderance of evidence that [a] motion to suppress should be denied and the evidence should be admitted.’ " State v. Wright , 585 S.W.3d 360, 367 (Mo. App. W.D. 2019) (quoting State v. Brooks , 185 S.W.3d 265, 272 (Mo. App. W.D. 2006) ). "[A] trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress will be reversed only if it is clearly erroneous." Id. "[A] trial court's ruling is clearly erroneous if this court is left with a definite and firm belief that a mistake has been made." Id.
In applying this standard of review, we defer to the trial court's factual findings and credibility determinations, and consider all evidence and reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the trial court's ruling. Id. ’ " Id. (quoting State v. Stricklin , 558 S.W.3d 54, 61 (Mo. App. E.D. 2018) ).
In Point I, the State argues the trial court clearly erred in finding a Miranda violation and suppressing the statements Defendant made to the crisis negotiator while he was inside the residence during his standoff with law enforcement. The State asserts Defendant was not yet in custody because (1) Defendant did not submit to the officers’ authority when they informed him that they had come to arrest him; (2) Defendant did not open the door and instead avoided arrest and said he would protect himself if the officers entered the house; (3) while armed, Defendant remained inside the residence out of reach of the officers, with complete freedom of movement; (4) Defendant only talked to the police through the door and over the telephone; and (5) the officers did not arrest or physically seize Defendant or subject him to arrest-like restraints until after he exited the residence.
The prosecution may not use statements stemming from custodial interrogation of the defendant unless it demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards effective to secure the privilege against self-incrimination. Miranda v. Arizona , 384 U.S. 436, 444, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). "Custodial interrogation has two components: custody and interrogation." State v. Little , 604 S.W.3d 708, 716 (Mo. App. E.D. 2020). "Custodial interrogation" means "questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way." Miranda , 384 U.S. at 444, 86 S.Ct. 1602. Here, both parties agree Defendant was not informed of his Miranda rights before he made statements to police through the door of his house and over the telephone. The question is whether Defendant was in custody when he made such statements.
"Whether a suspect is in custody is determined by examining the totality of the circumstances." State v. Little , 604 S.W.3d 708, 716 (Mo. App. E.D. 2020). Our Supreme Court has identified several factors relevant to determine whether the totality of the circumstances establish that a suspect was in custody at the time of questioning: (1) whether the suspect was informed at the time of questioning that the questioning was voluntary, that the suspect was free to leave or request the officers to do so, or that the suspect was not under arrest; (2) whether the suspect possessed unrestrained freedom of movement during questioning; (3) whether the suspect initiated contact with authorities or voluntarily acquiesced to official requests to answer questions; (4) whether strong arm tactics or deceptive stratagems were employed during questioning; (5) whether the atmosphere was police dominated; or, (6) whether the suspect was placed under arrest at the termination of questioning. State v. Werner , 9 S.W.3d 590, 595 (Mo. banc 2000). "Although determining custody is not limited to applying the factors listed above, their presence and absence guide courts in assessing the totality of the circumstances surrounding interrogations." Id. at 596.
This is a case of first impression because we find no Missouri cases addressing whether a suspect in a barricaded standoff with police officers is in custody for purposes of Miranda . However, this is not a novel issue, as courts from many other jurisdictions have addressed whether Miranda requires the suppression of statements by barricaded suspects who have not been informed of their rights. Regardless of how these courts reach their decisions, all appear to arrive at the same conclusion: Miranda does not mandate suppression. See e.g. , U.S. v. Mesa , 638 F.2d 582, 588-89 (3d Cir. 1980) (no custody); West v. State , 923 P.2d 110 (Alaska App. 1996) (no custodial interrogation); State v. Stearns , 178 Wis.2d 845, 506 N.W.2d 165 (Wis. App. 1993) (); State v. Pejsa , 75 Wash.App. 139, 876 P.2d 963 (1994) (no custodial interrogation); Atac v. State , 125 So.3d 806 (Fla. App. 2013) (no custody); State v. Cooper , 124 N.M. 277, 949 P.2d 660 (1997) (no custodial interrogation); People v. Brewer , 720 P.2d 583 (Colo. App. 1985) (no custodial interrogation); State v. Reimann , 19 Kan.App.2d 431, 870 P.2d 1346 (1994) (no interrogation); People v. Treier , 165 Misc.2d 665, 630 N.Y.S.2d 224 (Monroe Cty. Ct. 1995) (no custody; no interrogation; and fell within exception to Miranda ); Com. v. Jones , 546 Pa. 161, 683 A.2d 1181 (1996) (); State v. Bowen , 491 N.E.2d 1022 (Ind. App. 1986) (no custodial interrogation); State v. Leonard , 802 A.2d 991 (Me. 2002) (no custody); State v. Patton , 2001 WL 112074 (Del. Sup. Ct. 2001) (no interrogation); State v. Finch , 137 Wash.2d 792, 975 P.2d 967 (1999) ().
In analyzing custody for the purpose of Miranda in a standoff situation, the courts consider whether a suspect: (1) can prevent law enforcement officials from exercising...
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