State v. Reyes
| Decision Date | 03 February 2022 |
| Docket Number | Docket No. 48628 |
| Citation | 169 Idaho 797,503 P.3d 997 |
| Parties | STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Mario A. REYES, Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | Idaho Supreme Court |
Eric D. Fredericksen, State Appellate Public Defender, Boise, for appellant, Mario A. Reyes. Andrea W. Reynolds argued.
Lawrence G. Wasden, Idaho Attorney General, Boise, for respondent, State of Idaho. Andrew V. Wake argued.
SUBSTITUTE OPINION,
THE COURT'S PRIOR OPINION DATED OCTOBER 19, 2021 IS HEREBY WITHDRAWN
Mario Reyes appeals a jury verdict convicting him of domestic battery, attempted strangulation, and aggravated assault. Reyes appealed to the Idaho Court of Appeals, which affirmed his convictions. Reyes petitioned for review by this Court, which we granted.
On appeal, Reyes requests that his convictions be vacated. Reyes first argues that several evidentiary issues, including the admission of irrelevant and prejudicial evidence, rendered his trial unfair. Reyes next argues that the district court abused its discretion when it found that the victim was unavailable to testify at trial under Idaho Rule of Evidence 804(a)(5) and allowed her preliminary hearing testimony to be read into the record. Additionally, Reyes argues that the prosecutor's closing argument impermissibly implied that the victim did not testify because she feared Reyes. Finally, Reyes argues that these errors, when taken together, deprived him of his right to due process and a fair trial. For the reasons set forth below, we vacate Reyes’ convictions.
On July 16, 2017, two officers with the Caldwell Police Department were dispatched to Reyes’ residence after receiving a 911 "hang up" call. When the first officer arrived, he observed Reyes and another individual on the front porch of the residence. The officer ordered them to stop moving. Reyes attempted to re-enter the residence, but the officer followed him and placed him in handcuffs. An officer then placed Reyes in the back of a police vehicle, where another officer interviewed him several minutes later. The second officer asked Reyes what had happened, to which Reyes responded that he did not know. Reyes repeatedly denied harming his wife.
Inside the residence, officers found Marina Reyes (Marina)1 lying on the floor with her head resting on a blood-soaked pillow. When asked whether Reyes had hit her, Marina told officers that she did not remember what had occurred. There were two witnesses present in the home: Marina's niece and her niece's husband. Both witnesses told officers that Reyes and Marina had been fighting, and that Reyes had beaten her. Officers then placed Reyes under arrest.
Reyes was charged with domestic battery, attempted strangulation, aggravated battery, and malicious injury to property. A preliminary hearing was held, at which both Marina and her niece testified that Reyes had beaten her. Specifically, Marina testified that Reyes had hit her "all over," "choked her," and had thrown a clothes iron at her. She also testified that as she was trying to leave with her niece, Reyes pulled her to the ground by her hair and then kicked her in the nose. Reyes’ counsel cross-examined Marina. The testimony provided by Marina's niece at the preliminary hearing was consistent with Marina's. Reyes was bound over to the district court, and a criminal information was filed.
A three-day jury trial was held from May 2 through 4, 2018. Marina's niece and her niece's husband testified that they had heard a fight occurring in Reyes’ bedroom. They were eventually able to open the bedroom door, where they saw Reyes with one hand around Marina's neck and holding a clothes iron in the other. The two witnesses testified that they separated Reyes and Marina, and as they exited the bedroom, Reyes pulled Marina down to the ground by her hair and kicked her in the nose. At trial, Reyes testified in his own defense, during which the State was permitted to describe a police report to the jury that "allege[d Reyes had] committed the criminal offenses of attempted strangulation, domestic battery, malicious injury to property, and witness intimidation[ ]" which involved previous charges. The State also elicited testimony at trial that Reyes was on probation on the night in question, and therefore was prohibited from consuming alcohol and being present in a bar, which Reyes had been prior to the incident with Marina.
After the State rested, the district court dismissed count four of the information—malicious injury to property. The jury convicted Reyes of domestic battery, attempted strangulation, and aggravated assault. The district court imposed an aggregate sentence of five years fixed, followed by five years indeterminate. Reyes appealed to the Idaho Court of Appeals, which affirmed his convictions. See State v. Reyes , No. 46439, 2020 WL 3496329 (Idaho Ct. App. June 29, 2020). This Court granted Reyes’ petition for review.
"When reviewing a case on petition for review from the Court of Appeals this Court gives due consideration to the decision reached by the Court of Appeals, but directly reviews the decision of the trial court." State v. Chernobieff , 161 Idaho 537, 539, 387 P.3d 790, 792 (2016) (quoting State v. Lute , 150 Idaho 837, 839, 252 P.3d 1255, 1257 (2011) ). "This Court is not merely reviewing the correctness of the Court of Appeals’ decision; rather, this Court is hearing the matter as if the case were on direct appeal from the trial judge's decision." Gilpin-Grubb v. State , 138 Idaho 76, 79, 57 P.3d 787, 790 (2002).
Marsalis v. State , 166 Idaho 334, 458 P.3d 203, 208 (2020).
"The question of whether evidence is relevant is reviewed de novo, while the decision to admit relevant evidence is reviewed for an abuse of discretion." State v. Hall , 163 Idaho 744, 781, 419 P.3d 1042, 1079 (2018) (quoting State v. Shutz , 143 Idaho 200, 202, 141 P.3d 1069, 1071 (2006) ).
To determine if a trial court abused its discretion, this Court considers whether the trial court (1) perceived the issue as one of discretion, (2) acted within the outer boundaries of that discretion, (3) acted consistently with the legal standards applicable to the specific choices available to it, and (4) reached its decision by an exercise of reason.
State v. Abramowski , 164 Idaho 857, 860, 436 P.3d 678, 681 (2019) (citing Lunneborg v. My Fun Life , 163 Idaho 856, 863, 421 P.3d 187, 194 (2018) ).
On appeal, Reyes contends that multiple errors occurred during his trial, two of which were conceded by the State. Because these multiple errors rendered Reyes’ trial unfair, we vacate his convictions under the cumulative error doctrine.
We begin by noting that the State has acknowledged that two substantive errors occurred at trial. First, the State concedes that it was error for the prosecutor to list previous charges brought against Reyes during Reyes’ testimony at trial. Second, the State also concedes that "the district court erred when it allowed the prosecutor to question Reyes about his felony probation and the probation conditions that he not be present in a bar or drink alcohol." While acknowledging these errors, the State maintains they were harmless.
At trial, Reyes testified in his own defense. On cross-examination by the State, the prosecutor questioned Reyes regarding a 2015 incident with his wife as follows:
The State concedes that it was error for the prosecutor to have read aloud the charges from the 2015 police report involving Reyes in the presence of the jury. Idaho Rule of Evidence 404(b) prohibits the use of evidence of "a crime, wrong, or other act" "to prove a person's character." I.R.E. 404(b)(1)-(2). Rule 404 clearly aims to prevent a jury from making the impermissible assumption that if a defendant acted in a certain way in the past, he is likely to have acted accordingly in the present. See WRIGHT & MILLER, FED. PRAC. & PROC. EVID. § 5243 (2d ed. 2021) () (italics added). Three of the prior allegations against Reyes were identical to the charges he faced at trial, creating an even greater likelihood that the jury would infer that he must have acted similarly in the case at bar. As such, the State's listing the prior crimes with which Reyes had been previously charged created a high likelihood of unfair prejudice and was therefore obviously error as conceded by the State.
Also during the State's cross-examination of Reyes, the following exchange took place:
The State concedes "that the district court erred when it allowed the prosecutor to question Reyes about his felony probation status and the probation conditions that he not be present in a bar or drink alcohol." The State also concedes that it was error for the district court to allow the prosecutor to inquire about Reyes’ status as a probationer. All relevant evidence may be admitted at trial. See I.R.E. 401, 402. The bar for relevancy is typically low, requiring only that the disputed evidence have "any tendency to make a fact more or less probable." I.R.E. 401 (italics...
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