State v. Reynolds

• Decision Date: 19 November 1954
• Docket Number: No. 36372,36372
• Citation: 243 Minn. 196,66 N.W.2d 886
• Parties: STATE of Minnesota, Plaintiff, v. Harold J. REYNOLDS, Defendant.
• Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

Page 886

66 N.W.2d 886

243 Minn. 196

STATE of Minnesota, Plaintiff, v. Harold J. REYNOLDS, Defendant.

No. 36372.

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

Nov. 19, 1954.

Syllabus by the Court.

1. The disorderly conduct statute of this state, L.1953, c. 661 (M.S.A. § 615.17) which provides that 'Every person who engages in brawling or fighting, shall be guilty of disorderly conduct, herein defined to be a misdemeanor, and upon conviction thereof, shall be punished by a fine of not to exceed $100 or by imprisonment in the county jail for not to exceed 90 days' does not violate the federal and state constitutional guarantee of due process of law because of vagueness or indefiniteness.

2. The question as to whether a particular act is disorderly depends largely on the facts in the particular case, and in the determination of such question, not only the nature of the particular act should be considered but also the time and place of its occurrence as well as all the surrounding circumstances.

3. Conduct is disorderly in the ordinary sense when it is of such nature as to affect the peace and quiet of persons who may witness it and who may be disturbed or provoked to resentment thereby. However, to come within the prohibition of the statute, the annoyance caused by the act must be both offensive and disorderly.

4. The conduct and the acts must be such as are of a nature to corrupt the public morals or to outrage the sense of public decency. The probable and natural consequences of the conduct or the acts committed must at all times be considered and given weight as an important element.

5. Where a charge of disorderly conduct is made under § 615.17 it must be shown, in order to convict, that the act complained of is within the words of the statute, or in lieu thereof, the pleader must set forth the facts constituting the same.

6. An actual intent to provoke a breach of the peace may or may not be an important element under the terms and provisions of § 615.17, dependent on the nature of the act. See, State v. Shelby, 95 Minn. 65, 103 N.W. 725.

7. Where a statute does not require that the disorderly conduct or act be committed in a public place or a specified place, then it is sufficient if the act is committed within the confines of the jurisdiction of the court, and, dependent upon facts and circumstances, it may be enough if the peace of only one member of the public or of one person is disturbed.

J. A. A. Burnquist, Atty. Gen., Charles E. Houston, Asst. Atty. Gen., Wm. T. Johnson, Stillwater, for plaintiff.

Neumeier, Harrigan & Eckberg, Stillwater, for defendant.

NELSON, Justice.

The appellant was convicted of the crime of disorderly conduct in the municipal court of Stillwater, Washington county, Minnesota. He appealed the conviction to the district court of Washington county. Before the commencement of the trial the defendant moved the court to dismiss the action on the ground that the statute upon which the complaint was based, L.1953, c. 661, M.S.A. § 615.17, was void and unconstitutional because of vagueness and indefiniteness. The court denied this motion but stated that the question raised by it was important and doubtful and at the request of defendant's counsel in open court certified the question to this court pursuant to § 632.10.

The complaint stated that on June 30, 1953, the defendant attempted to enter the home of Stanley Gilbertson, where the complainant's 13-year-old daughter was a baby sitter, and engaged in brawling conduct toward her. The statute under which the complaint was made is § 615.17, and it provides that:

'Every person who engages in brawling or fighting, shall be guilty of disorderly conduct, herein defined to be a misdemeanor, and upon conviction thereof, shall be punished by a fine of not to exceed $100 or by imprisonment in the county jail for not to exceed 90 days.'

The theory of defendant's motion to dismiss the proceedings before the district court appears to be that the complaint does not charge a crime and, therefore, the defendant should not be put on trial; that § 615.17 does not meet the requirements of U.S.Const. Amend. XIV and Minn.Const. art. 1, § 7, M.S.A., since it denies due process of law. The title to § 615.17 when enacted read:

'An act prescribing that certain defined conduct shall constitute disorderly conduct and a misdemeanor and prescribing penalties for the violation thereof.'

The body of the act consisted of but the single section set out above.

The defendant, in making the point that the statute is vague and indefinite and, therefore, unconstitutional, contends that it is not limited to public places and that there are no limitations upon the words 'brawling' and 'fighting.' He claims that these terms, due to the vagueness and the indefiniteness of the statute, include many innocent acts which it cannot have been the intention of the legislature to make a crime.

The question is: Does the statute, which defines disorderly conduct to consist in brawling or fighting, meet the test as a criminal statute? Is the prohibited conduct, as defined in § 615.17, stated in language sufficiently explicit so that men can know what is being prohibited thereby and what it is their duty to avoid?

1. We are unable to agree with the defendant's contention that § 615.17 is violative of the constitution. Neither can we reach the conclusion that the statute as a whole fails to declare what specific conduct may be disorderly and constitute a misdemeanor subject to a specific penalty under the criminal code of the state.

The term 'disorderly conduct' is a more comprehensive term than breach of the peace. It is broader and more inclusive than breach of the peace or nuisance. The word 'disorderly' is a word that is almost self-explanatory as it is ordinarily used. When used in a legal sense it has a well-established meaning relating to the public peace and good order. When the term is used in relation to public offenses it means that a situation over which the individual has control is not being regulated by the restraint of morality; that compliance with the restraints of good order and law is lacking. 'Disorderly conduct' generally means some act which tends to breach the peace or to disturb those people who may hear or see it. For a person to be guilty of disorderly conduct the public or some member thereof must be disturbed. It is generally considered that disorderly conduct embraces certain minor offenses defined by statute or ordinance to consist in disturbances of the peace and quiet of the public, the community, families, or a class of persons, or in conduct which tends to provoke breach of the peace or to corrupt public morals.

2--3. There is authority for holding that a wilful or unlawful purpose is not an element of the offense of disorderly conduct unless made so by statute. See, 27 C.J.S., Disorderly Conduct, § 1, note 41. In State v. Shelby, 95 Minn. 65, 66, 103 N.W. 725, 726, this court, in discussing the question of intent where the defendant was charged with the use of abusive language, intended and naturally tending to provoke an assault and breach of the peace, said:

'* * * We are of the opinion that the language so conceded to have been used was not, under the circumstances shown by the evidence, such as to justify a conviction, in the absence of an evil intent. If the language charged by the complainant, including the particularly offensive words, was in fact used, it would warrant a conviction, without reference to the intention of defendant, for it was such as might reasonably tend to provoke a breach of the peace.'

This court thereby indicated that a statute or ordinance sometimes makes intent an element of the offense in connection with the doing of certain acts and dispenses with it in connection with others, depending on the nature of the conduct or the act. See, also, 18 C.J., Disorderly Conduct, § 3, note 28.

Our court has defined 'disorderly conduct' as follows: Conduct is 'disorderly' in the ordinary sense when it is of such nature as to affect the peace and quiet of persons who may witness it and who may be disturbed or provoked to resentment thereby. State v. Perry, 196 Minn. 481, 265, N.W. 302; State v. Zanker, 179 Minn. 355, 229 N.W. 311; State v. Cooper, 205 Minn. 333, 285 N.W. 903, 122 A.L.R. 727.

4. In State v. Korich, 219 Minn. 268, 17 N.W.2d 497, this court held that the evidence failed to sustain defendant's conviction under a Minneapolis ordinance and clearly laid down the rule that mere annoyance is insufficient to support a finding of disorderly conduct because not every annoyance is born of culpable conduct. But it adhered to the rule already established in this state that conduct is disorderly in the ordinary sense when it is of such a nature as to affect the peace and quiet of the persons who may witness it and who may be disturbed or provoked to resentment by it--the probable and natural consequences of the conduct, however, being always an important element.

While it is impossible to state with accuracy just what may be considered in the law as amounting to disorderly conduct, we hold that to come within the prohibition of our statute the annoyance caused by the act must be both offensive and disorderly. The acts and the conduct must ordinarily be such as are of a nature to corrupt the public morals or to outrage the sense of public decency, whether committed by words or by acts. 17 Am.Jur., Disorderly Conduct, § 1. ¹

It has been held that the offense may be committed by doing any act whereby a breach of the peace may be occasioned. ²

We believe the rule applicable to § 615.17 to be that to be guilty of disorderly conduct the accused must have committed one of the acts prohibited by the statute relating to disorderly conduct and the act or acts must have been committed under circumstances likely to cause a breach of the peace or be of such a nature as to affect the peace and quiet of persons who may witness...