State v. Rife, 52231
| Citation | 260 Iowa 598,149 N.W.2d 846 |
| Decision Date | 04 April 1967 |
| Docket Number | No. 52231,52231 |
| Parties | STATE of Iowa, Appellee, v. Marion RIFE, Appellant. |
| Court | United States State Supreme Court of Iowa |
Anthony M. Critelli, Des Monies, for appellant.
Richard C. Turner, Atty. Gen., David A. Elderkin, Asst. Atty. Gen., and Ray A. Fenton, County Atty., for appellee.
Marion Rife was charged with the crime of forgery as defined in section 718.1, Code of Iowa, 1962, by the Polk County Grand Jury on October 28, 1965. At his trial on January 19, 1966, after the close of the State's case, he entered a plea of guilty in open court, and on February 3, 1966, was sentenced to imprisonment in the State Penitentiary for a period of not to exceed ten years. Being displeased with his sentence, he asked for and received a court-appointed counsel to aid him in an appeal and in preparing and presenting further motions in the matter. Pursuant thereto on February 18, 1966, he filed a Motion in Arrest of Judgment contending his plea of guilty was not freely and voluntarily entered but was the product of undue influence, coercion, mistake, misinformation, promises and fraud. The State resisted and, upon a hearing on February 24, 1966, before a judge other than the one who presided at his trial, his motion was overruled, and he appeals. We sustain the trial court's ruling.
I. Appellant lists four propositions in support of his claim of error in denying his motion. They are: (1) a judgment and sentence based on a plea of guilty cannot stand unless the plea is voluntarily given; (2) a plea of guilty given as a result of coercion, undue influence and fraud, cannot support a judgment and sentence thereafter imposed, under the due process provisions of the federal and state constitutions; (3) a court has no jurisdiction to enter a judgment or pronounce sentence on a defendant if a plea of guilty is not voluntarily given; and (4) an accused may at any time challenge his conviction under a plea of guilty not voluntarily given or which has been obtained by duress, coercion, fraud, or undue influence. The State finds no fault with these propositions, and neither do we. We have so held. See State v. Bastedo, 253 Iowa 103, 111 N.W.2d 255, and citations.
The issue presented here is whether appellant has carried his burden to show his plea of guilty was not voluntarily entered but resulted from duress, coercion, fraud, or undue influence, as alleged in his motion. Under the record he entered this plea in open court after being carefully informed of the charge against him and the meaning of his plea. The plea was accepted only after the court had, by questions put to the defendant and his counsel, indicated it was fully understood and no cause appeared why it should not be accepted. No contention is made that either the judge or the counsel for the State in any way induced the plea or exercised any fraud, coercion, duress, or undue influence upon the accused to obtain the plea, and it affirmatively appears defendant was well aware of the maximum penalty prescribed by the code upon conviction of the crime of forgery. Section 718.1, Code 1962. He had previously been tried and convicted in at least two felony cases and, by his own admission, had 'been around quite a bit in criminal matters.'
II. Defendant's sole contention is that he entered a plea of guilty because of acts and statements of his self-employed attorney which led him to believe he would receive a jail sentence rather than a penitentiary sentence.
Section 718.1 provides in part that upon conviction of this offense 'he shall be imprisoned in the penitentiary not more than ten years or imprisoned in the county jail not exceeding one year, or fined not exceeding one thousand dollars.'
Pursuant to this hearing in which testimony was given by defendant, his wife, their attorney, the original trial judge, and the assistant county attorney who represented the State in those proceedings, the trial court found defendant had failed to sustain his allegations, overruled his motion, and remanded him to the custody of the sheriff in order that the judgment be carried out according to law.
Both defendant and his wife testified that when they conferred with their own retained counsel just before entering the plea, counsel told them he thought defendant would get from 9 to 18 months, that it was their 'understanding that an arrangement was to be made for me to plead guilty and receive a sentence of 9 to 18 months in jail.' How under the statute defendant could get a jail term of over one year was not explained. Defendant further testified that 'When he (the attorney) mentioned jail time and how I could take these checks off my wife, I decided to plead guilty.' Mrs. Rife, also charged with the crime of uttering a forged instrument under section 718.2, said she also agreed to plead guilty when counsel told her he thought she would receive a year's sentence and a bench parole. That was what she received.
Counsel denied telling defendant and his wife they would receive any specific sentence, but said he told them, after consultations with the judge and the assistant county attorney, that defendant could not get less than the maximum sentence, with little hope of any future parole recommendations, and that he hoped and expected Mrs. Rife, who had five small children to care for, would only receive a year's sentence, with a bench parole.
III. The decision how to plead, of course, is one for the defendant. The ultimate decision must be his, but of course before he can do so intelligently he is entitled to advice on the law of the crime charged and enlightened on the probable outcome of the trial, as well as the punishment he may receive. Since the plea of guilty effectively waives all defenses and objections, inadequacy of advice at the pleading stage cannot be later cured. An experienced appraisal of the available evidence frequently indicates that the chance of a successful defense is negligible. A defense attorney may then be serving his client best by advising him to plead guilty and strive for the most lenient treatment possible. To counsel this strategy is not to advise inadequately even if the expectation of leniency is subsequently disappointing. Monroe v. Huff, 79 U.S.App.D.C. 246, 145 F.2d 249.
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State v. Sisco
...States. (274 U.S. 220, 47 S.Ct. 582, 71 L.Ed. 1009)' (Emphasis supplied). Recently we voiced approval of the foregoing in State v. Rife, Iowa, 149 N.W.2d 846, 848, with this statement: 'The better procedure in accepting a plea of guilty, as found in Rule 11, Federal Rules of Criminal Proced......
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Rhoades v. State
...McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459, 463–64, 466, 89 S.Ct. 1166, 1169, 1171, 22 L.Ed.2d 418, 423–25 (1969) ); see also State v. Rife, 260 Iowa 598, 602, 149 N.W.2d 846, 848 (Iowa 1967) (stating an involuntary plea renders any judgment based thereon is void). Thus, if we took the interpr......
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Fryer v. Scurr, 65969
...210 N.W.2d 656 (Iowa 1973); State v. Bell, 210 N.W.2d 423 (Iowa 1973); State v. Sisco, 169 N.W.2d 542 (Iowa 1969); State v. Rife, 260 Iowa 598, 149 N.W.2d 846 (1967). I. Fryer cites opinions from six federal courts of appeals which have required federal trial judges to inform defendants in ......