State v. Sisco

• Citation: 169 N.W.2d 542
• Decision Date: 24 July 1969
• Docket Number: No. 53349,53349
• Parties: STATE of Iowa, Appellee, v. Thomas Eugene SISCO, Appellant.
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

Page 542

169 N.W.2d 542

STATE of Iowa, Appellee, v. Thomas Eugene SISCO, Appellant.

No. 53349.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

July 24, 1969.

Michael J. Sexton, Ames, for appellant.

Richard Turner, Atty. Gen., William A. Claerhout, Asst. Atty. Gen., Charles E. Vanderbur, County Atty. and William Gibbons, Asst. County Atty., for appellee.

RAWLINGS, Justice.

Defendant, Thomas Eugene Sisco, found guilty by trial court on his plea of guilty to rape, (section 698.1, Code, 1966), as charged by county attorney's information, was sentenced to ten years in the Men's Reformatory at Anamosa.

On appeal from that judgment defendant contends, in urging reversal, the court erred in failing to ascertain, before judgment, the guilty plea was entered, (1) voluntarily; (2) with an understanding of the charge; and (3) with knowledge of the penal consequences of the plea. We reverse.

Defendant is one of nine children, and at age 14 was committed to the Iowa Training School for Boys.

Psychological testing disclosed he had an I.Q. of 84, with a 5.3 grade equivalent.

Ultimately defendant was assigned to the Nevada Half Way House. He and Mrs. Groth, the rape victim, became acquainted during her visits at that institution, Mr. Groth being there employed.

February 4, 1968, defendant, apparently without permission, went to the Groth home in Ames where, it is charged, the offense with which we are here concerned was committed.

Subsequent to arrest of accused, counsel was assigned to represent him. On request, trial court ordered a psychiatric examination of defendant. The resultant report states, in material part:

'Our diagnosis is sociopathic personality disorder, antisocial reaction. This diagnosis is based on our interviews with the patient, observation of his behavior while in the hospital and phychological testing. We find no evidence of any psychiatric problem other than the above diagnosis. Sociopathic personality disorder, anti-social reaction, refers to individuals who are always in trouble, profiting neither from experience nor punishment, and maintaining no real loyalties to any person, group, or code. They are frequently callous and hedonistic, showing a marked emotional immaturity, with lack of sense of responsibility, lack of judgment, and an ability to rationalize their behavior so that it appears warranted, reasonable, and justified. This is a disorder which has been found not to benefit from psychiatric treatment.

'We find no evidence of brain damage on the basis of neurological examination and electroencephalogram. We furthermore find that this individual can distinguish the difference between right and wrong, recognize the consequences of his behavior and is competent to stand trial and cooperate with his attorneys in his defense. We do not advise further hospitalization or psychiatric treatment for this individual because his particular diagnosis has been found not to respond to psychiatric treatment and we furthermore find no evidence of other psychiatric problems in this individual.'

April 8, 1968, defendant appeared with counsel before trial court for arraignment.

Approximately 35 pages of the record before us are devoted to a presentation and court-counsel discussion of the factual situation here involved.

Among other things, however, defendant's assigned counsel stated to the court at one point: 'Your Honor, I have a defendant who was 16 years old at the time he committed this crime. He is now 17 years of age, turning 17 in March. I have made recommendation to the defendant, in view of the facts of the case, that he enter a plea of not guilty. The defendant, after several conferences--and of course he has had considerable time to think about this matter since he has been confined, since arrest--has unequivocally made up his mind apparently to enter a plea of guilty. And at the request of the defendant and at his discretion, I enter a plea of guilty to the charge contained in the county attorney's information. We will waive the three-day waiting period for sentencing, and ask that sentence be pronounced immediately, if that is the desire of this Court. However, Your Honor, prior to sentencing being pronounced I would like to make a statement on behalf of the defendant.'

This attorney then concluded with this comment: '* * * Mr. Sisco is competent to stand trial, according to the report. He recognizes the consequences of his behavior; and I guess he feels--with the report--competent to make a decision in this case. He has made it, but I felt the Court should know the circumstances of the case. I'm not looking strictly at his background, which isn't--it is enlightening but I don't suppose it's that beneficial--but so Your Honor can be fully aware. The facts of this crime have bothered this attorney, but the decision of the defendant is final and he has made it. And so that's all I have, Your Honor.'

Thereupon trial court, for the first time, addressed defendant personally, and, to the extent here relevant, this followed:

'THE COURT: Well, will you rise, Mr. Sisco. Do you have anything more you would like to tell me?

'MR. SISCO: No, Your Honor.

'THE COURT: Is it your desire to plead guilty?

'MR. SISCO: Yes.

'THE COURT: Do you plead guilty?

'MR. SISCO: Yes, Your Honor.

'THE COURT: Do you have any reason why sentence should not now be pronounced?

'MR. SISCO: No, sir.

'THE COURT: Well, it will be the sentence of the Court that you be confined in the Men's Reformatory at Anamosa, Iowa, ten years, and that you pay the costs of the prosecution. And your appeal bond, if you desire to appeal, will be $2,500.00.'

It is at once evident the question presented on this appeal does not go to the matter of guilt or innocence. Rather, we are here called upon to determine whether a guilty plea may be accepted and judgment entered thereon, absent any prior determination by trial court, the defendant understands both the charge made against him and criminal consequences of a guilty plea, and that it is voluntarily entered.

I. As stated in Kercheval v. United States, 274 U.S. 220, 223--224, 47 S.Ct. 582, 583, 71 L.Ed. 1009: 'A plea of guilty differs in purpose and effect from a mere admission or an extrajudicial confession; it is itself a conviction. Like a verdict of a jury it is conclusive. More is not required; the court has nothing to do but give judgment and sentence. Out of just consideration for persons accused of crime, courts are careful that a plea of guilty shall not be accepted unless made voluntarily after proper advice and with full understanding of the consequences. When one so pleads he may be held bound. United States v. Bayaud (C.C.) 23 F. 721. But, on timely application, the court will vacate a plea of guilty shown to have been unfairly obtained or given through ignorance, fear or inadvertence. Such an application does not involve any question of guilt or innocence.' (Emphasis supplied).

In the same vein this court held in State v. Krana, Iowa, 159 N.W.2d 413, 416: 'The rule is now clear that if a defendant, with full knowledge of the charge against him and of his rights and the consequences of a plea of guilty, enters such a plea understandably and without fear or persuasion, the court may without abusing its discretion refuse to permit its withdrawal. State v. Bastedo, 253 Iowa 103, 111, 112, 111 N.W.2d 255, 260; 21 Am.Jur.2d, Criminal Law, section 505, pages 497, 498; Anno. 66 A.L.R. 638.' See also Machibroda v. United States, 368 U.S. 487, 493, 82 S.Ct. 510, 513, 7 L.Ed.2d 473; State v. Delano, Iowa, 161 N.W.2d 66, 72; and State v. Vaughn, Iowa, 159 N.W.2d 447, 448.

II. Furthermore, it appears most courts now hold, even in the absence of a statute or rule so directing, sentencing judges, before accepting a guilty plea, must first determine it is voluntarily entered, with an understanding of the charge, knowledge of the criminal consequences, and there exists a factual basis supporting it. See editor's statement, 97 A.L.R.2d 549, 552.

At the outset we refer to McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459, 89 S.Ct. 1166, 22 L.Ed.2d 418. Although the court was there dealing primarily with Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, it gave voice to some constitutional standards inherent in that rule, as demonstrated by this statement, loc. cit., 89 S.Ct. 1170--1171: '* * * the Government argues that since petitioner stated his desire to plead guilty, and since he was informed of the consequences of his plea, the District Court 'could properly Assume that petitioner was entering that plea with a complete understanding of the charge against him.' (Emphasis added.)

'We cannot accept this argument, which completely ignores the two Purposes of Rule 11 and the reasons for its recent amendment. First, although the procedure embodied in Rule 11 has not been held to be constitutionally mandated, it is designed to assist the district judge in making the constitutionally required determination that a defendant's guilty plea is truly voluntary. Second, the Rule is intended to produce a complete record at the time the plea is entered of the factors relevant to this voluntariness determination. Thus, the more meticulously the Rule is adhered to, the more it tends to discourage, or at least to enable more expeditious disposition of, the numerous and often frivolous post-conviction attacks on the constitutional validity of guilty pleas.

'Prior to the 1966 amendment, however, not all district judges personally interrogated defendants before accepting their guilty pleas. With an awareness of the confusion over the Rule's requirements in this respect, the draftsmen amended it to add a provision 'expressly requiring the court to address the defendant personally.' This clarification of the judge's responsibilities quite obviously furthers both of the Rule's purposes. By personally interrogating the defendant, not only will the judge be better able to ascertain the plea's voluntariness, but he also will...