State v. Stone
| Decision Date | 11 December 1997 |
| Docket Number | C2-96-1293,Nos. C9-96-1291,W,C8-96-1296,C4-96-1294,C1-96-1298,CX-96-1297,C0-96-1292,C6-96-1295,s. C9-96-1291 |
| Parties | STATE of Minnesota, petitioner, Appellant, v. Joshua Carl STONE, C9-96-1291, Cheryl Florine Graff, C0-96-1292, Kenneth Morgan Coleman, Jr., C2-96-1293, Charles William Zornes, C4-96-1294, Simon Dean Zornes, C6-96-1295, Margaret Mary Myhre, C8-96-1296, Voncille Marie Alvarado,endy Sue Littlewolf, C1-96-1298, Jamie Lynn Sargent, C3-96-1299, Respondents. , and C3-96-1299. |
| Court | Minnesota Supreme Court |
Syllabus by the Court
1. Minnesota's laws regarding speeding (Minn.Stat. § 169.14 (1996)); driver licensing (Minn.Stat. §§ 171.02, 171.27 (1996)); vehicle registration (Minn.Stat. § 168.09 (1996)); seat belt use (Minn.Stat. § 169.686 (1996)); child restraint seats (Minn.Stat. § 169.685, subd. 5 (1996)); motor vehicle insurance (Minn.Stat. § 169.797 (1996)); and proof of insurance (Minn.Stat. § 169.791 (1996)) are civil/regulatory for purposes of Public Law 280.
2. Minnesota lacks jurisdiction under Public Law 280 to enforce civil/regulatory laws against members of an Indian tribe for conduct occurring within the boundaries of the tribe's reservation.
3. There are no exceptional circumstances justifying the state's enforcement of these laws against members of an Indian tribe for on-reservation conduct in the absence of a federal grant of jurisdiction.
Hubert H. Humphrey III, Atty. Gen., Peter R. Marker, Asst. Atty. Gen., St. Paul, Eric O. Boe, Mahnomen County Atty., for appellant.
Zenas Baer & Associates, Zenas Baer, Hawley, for respondents Stone, Graff, Coleman, C. Zornes, S. Zornes, Myhre, Alvarado, and Sargent.
Hellerud & Larson, Regina A. Larson, Ada, for respondent Littlewolf.
Jacobson, Buffalo, Schoessler, & Magnuson, Steven G. Thorne, Joseph F. Halloran, Minneapolis, for amicus curiae Leech Lake Band of Chippewa Indians.
BlueDog, Olson & Small, P.L.L.P., Kurt V. BlueDog, Vanya S. Hogen-King, Greg Paulson, Minneapolis, for amicus curiae Shakopee Mdewakanton Sioux (Dakota) Community and Grand Portage Band of Chippewa.
Heard, considered and decided by the court en banc.
This case calls into question the state of Minnesota's jurisdiction to enforce certain traffic and driving-related laws against members of an Indian tribe within the boundaries of the tribe's reservation. The respondents, members of the White Earth Band of Chippewa Indians, were cited for the following violations within the boundaries of the White Earth Reservation: no motor vehicle insurance and no proof of insurance; driving with an expired registration; driving without a license; driving with an expired license; speeding; no seat belt; and failure to have child in a child restraint seat. The district court dismissed these charges for lack of jurisdiction. 1 The court of appeals affirmed, finding that the state lacked jurisdiction under Public Law 280 because the traffic and driving-related laws at issue were civil/regulatory rather than criminal/prohibitory. State v. Stone, 557 N.W.2d 588, 591-92 (Minn.App.1996). The court of appeals also found that the state lacked exceptional circumstances to justify enforcement of the laws without an express federal grant of jurisdiction. Id. at 593. We affirm.
Each of the respondents in this consolidated case is a member of the White Earth Band of Chippewa Indians. Between August, 1995 and March, 1996, each of the nine respondents was charged with violating one or more of the following laws while within the boundaries of the White Earth Reservation:
1. Failure to provide motor vehicle insurance (Minn.Stat. § 169.797 (1996));
2. No proof of insurance (Minn.Stat. § 169.791 (1996));
3. Driving with an expired registration (Minn.Stat. § 168.09 (1996));
4. Driving without a license (Minn.Stat. § 171.02 (1996));
5. Driving with an expired driver's license (Minn.Stat. § 171.27 (1996));
6. Speeding (Minn.Stat. § 169.14 (1996));
7. Driving with no seat belt (Minn.Stat. § 169.686 (1996)); and
8. Failure to have child in a child restraint seat (Minn.Stat. § 169.685, subd. 5 (1996)).
The respondents stipulated that they would be guilty of the violations charged if the state had jurisdiction to enforce the traffic and driving-related laws against them.
The parties also stipulated to the inclusion in the record of the Reciprocity Agreement between the State of Minnesota and the White Earth Band of Chippewa Indians regarding the registration and insurance of vehicles and White Earth Band Ordinance No. 87-001 governing registration of vehicles. At the time that these citations were issued, the White Earth Band did not have a comprehensive set of traffic laws. However, in April 1996, the Band adopted a Motor Vehicle Code for the regulation of traffic and driving on the reservation.
State court jurisdiction over matters involving Indians is governed by federal statute or case law. Gavle v. Little Six, Inc., 555 N.W.2d 284, 289 (Minn.1996). The Supreme Court has consistently recognized that Indian tribes retain "attributes of sovereignty over both their members and their territory." California v. Cabazon Band of Indians, 480 U.S. 202, 207, 107 S.Ct. 1083, 1087, 94 L.Ed.2d 244 (1987) (citing United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544, 557, 95 S.Ct. 710, 717, 42 L.Ed.2d 706 (1975)). This sovereignty is "dependent on, and subordinate to, only the Federal Government, not the States." Cabazon, 480 U.S. at 207, 107 S.Ct. at 1087 (citing Washington v. Confederated Tribes of Colville Indian Reservation, 447 U.S. 134, 154, 100 S.Ct. 2069, 2081, 65 L.Ed.2d 10 (1980)). However, it is established that state laws may be applied to tribal Indians on their reservations if Congress has expressly so provided. Cabazon, 480 U.S. at 207, 107 S.Ct. at 1087.
Jurisdiction over Indian matters is a function of territory, subject matter, and race. See Felix S. Cohen, Handbook of Federal Indian Law 281 (1982 ed.). We note here that members of Indian tribes do not subject themselves to state jurisdiction over on-reservation conduct simply by maintaining a mailing address outside of their reservation. On this basis, we explicitly reverse State v. Jackson, 558 N.W.2d 752 (Minn.App.1997), pet. for rev. granted (Minn. March 18, 1997).
In Public Law 280, Congress granted Minnesota broad criminal and limited civil jurisdiction over all Indian country within the state, 2 with the exception of Red Lake Reservation. 3 Pub.L. No. 83-280, 67 Stat. 588-89 (1953) (). Section 2(a) of the Act provided Minnesota "jurisdiction over offenses committed by or against Indians * * * and the criminal laws of [the] State * * * shall have the same force and effect within such Indian country." Pub.L. No. 280 § 2(a), 67 Stat. 588 (1953) (). The purpose of this grant was to combat the problem of lawlessness on certain reservations and the lack of adequate tribal law enforcement. Bryan v. Itasca County, 426 U.S. 373, 379, 96 S.Ct. 2102, 2106, 48 L.Ed.2d 710 (1976). Section 4(a) grants Minnesota jurisdiction over private civil litigation involving reservation Indians and arising out of Indian country. Pub.L. No. 280 § 4(a), 67 Stat. 589 (1953) (). However, this section does not grant the state general civil regulatory authority. Bryan, 426 U.S. at 384-8, 96 S.Ct. at 2108-11.
In order for a state law to be fully applicable to a reservation under the authority of Public Law 280, it must be a criminal law. Cabazon, 480 U.S. at 208, 107 S.Ct. at 1088. There is no bright-line rule which separates a criminal law from a civil law. Id. at 210, 107 S.Ct. at 1089. However, in Cabazon, the Supreme Court adopted the following test:
[I]f the intent of a state law is generally to prohibit certain conduct, it falls within Pub.L. 280's grant of criminal jurisdiction, but if the state law generally permits the conduct at issue, subject to regulation, it must be classified as civil/regulatory and Pub.L. 280 does not authorize its enforcement on an Indian reservation. The shorthand test is whether the conduct at issue violates the State's public policy.
Id. at 209, 107 S.Ct. at 1088. In Cabazon, the Supreme Court applied this test to determine whether a California gambling law, which limited the operation of bingo games to charitable organizations, constituted a criminal law under Public Law 280. Id. at 210-11, 107 S.Ct. at 1088-89. The Court relied on the state's sponsorship of a lottery and allowance for various kinds of gambling, as well as the exceptions to the bingo statute, to find that California generally permits and regulates gambling, in general, and bingo, in particular. Id.
The Cabazon test admits of some ambiguity. The Supreme Court did not clearly state whether the "conduct at issue" to be analyzed is the broad conduct, such as gambling, or the narrow conduct, such as bingo. This distinction becomes crucial when the broad conduct is generally permitted, but the narrow conduct is generally prohibited, or vice versa. As a result of this ambiguity, there has been a split of authority among courts across the country, including the Minnesota court of appeals, regarding the application of the Cabazon test. Those courts which have interpreted "conduct" to refer to the broad activity have focused on this aspect without regard to the particularities of the narrow conduct. Those courts which have interpreted "conduct" to refer to the narrow activity have focused primarily on whether the narrow conduct is categorically prohibited or whether the statute controlling the conduct contains exceptions. Compare State v. Johnson, C5-96-1854, 1997 WL 104577 (Minn.App. March 11, 1997) (unpublished opinion)(laws regarding motor vehicle insurance, registration, driving after license revocation found to...
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