State v. Roberts, 2010 Ohio 1436 (Ohio App. 4/1/2010)
| Decision Date | 01 April 2010 |
| Docket Number | No. 93440.,No. 93439.,93439.,93440. |
| Citation | 2010 Ohio 1436 |
| Parties | State of Ohio, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Lesean (Leshan) Roberts, Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | Ohio Court of Appeals |
Shondra C. Longino, 6809 Mayfield Road, Suite N275, Mayfield Heights, Ohio 44124, Attorney for Appellant.
William D. Mason, Cuyahoga County Prosecutor, By: Matthew E. Meyer, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, The Justice Center, 1200 Ontario Street, Cleveland, Ohio 44113, Lesean Roberts, Inmate No. 30825-160, U.S.P. McCreary, P.O. Box 3000, Pine Knot, Kentucky 42635, Also Listed, Attorneys for Appellee.
Before: Celebrezze, J., Rocco, P.J., and Kilbane, J.
JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION
{¶ 1} In these two consolidated appeals, appellant, Lesean Roberts, wishes to withdraw his guilty pleas after more than a decade and after his sentences in both cases have been served. After a review of the record, appellant's motions and affidavits, and the pertinent case law, we affirm the determination of the trial court denying appellant's motions without hearing.
{¶ 2} In 1993, appellant was arrested and indicted on charges of felonious assault, aggravated assault, and possession of criminal tools. On October 4, 1993, appellant, represented by counsel, pled guilty to one count of aggravated assault with a violence specification, for which he received one to one-and-one-half years in prison. Appellant was released from prison on February 23, 1995. This concluded Cuyahoga County Common Pleas Case No. CR-295492 (the "1993 Case").
{¶ 3} Then, in 1996, appellant was arrested and indicted on charges of possession of cocaine in an amount greater than one hundred grams and possession of criminal tools. On April 23, 1997, he pled guilty to one count of possession of cocaine in an amount greater than 25 grams but less than 100 grams. He was sentenced to seven years of incarceration. Appellant has since served the entirety of his prison sentence and has been released, concluding Cuyahoga County Common Pleas Case No. CR-342752 (the "1996 Case").
{¶ 4} On May 20, 2009, appellant submitted motions to the trial court in these two cases to withdraw his guilty pleas, some 16 and 12 years, respectively, after those pleas had been entered. Appellant attached poorly drafted affidavits to his petitions, claiming various violations of his rights that made his pleas unintelligent, unknowing, and involuntary. The trial courts rejected appellant's arguments and denied his request to withdraw his pleas without holding a hearing. Appellant then filed the instant appeals, claiming the same error occurred in each case; namely that "[t]he trial court erred when it denied appellant's motion to vacate his guilty plea and request for a hearing."
{¶ 5} After a defendant's sentence has been imposed, his guilty plea may be withdrawn only if he is able to show manifest injustice. Crim.R. 32.1; State v. Xie (1992), 62 Ohio St.3d 521, 526, 584 N.E.2d 715; State v. Smith (1977), 49 Ohio St.2d 261, 361 N.E.2d 1324, paragraph one of the syllabus. Whether a defendant has shown manifest injustice is within the sound discretion of the trial court. Smith, supra, paragraph two of the syllabus. Accordingly, an appellate court will review a trial court's denial of a motion to withdraw a guilty plea using an abuse of discretion standard. State v. Nathan (1995), 99 Ohio App.3d 722, 725, 651 N.E.2d 1044. To constitute an
abuse of discretion, the ruling must be more than legal error; it must be unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable. Blakemore v. Blakemore (1983), 5 Ohio St.3d 217, 450 N.E.2d 1140. "`The term discretion itself involves the idea of choice, of an exercise of the will, of a determination made between competing considerations.'" State v. Jenkins (1984), 15 Ohio St.3d 164, 222, 473 N.E.2d 264, quoting Spalding v. Spalding (1959), 355 Mich. 382, 384-385, 94 N.W.2d 810. In order to have an abuse of that choice, the result must be "so palpably and grossly violative of fact and logic that it evidences not the exercise of will but the perversity of will, not the exercise of judgment but the defiance thereof, not the exercise of reason but rather of passion or bias." Id.
{¶ 6} Crim.R. 32.1 governs motions to withdraw guilty pleas and states that "[a] motion to withdraw a plea of guilty or no contest may be made only before sentence is imposed; but to correct manifest injustice the court after sentence may set aside the judgment of conviction and permit the defendant to withdraw his or her plea." Although "presentence motions to withdraw guilty pleas should be freely granted, a defendant `does not have an absolute right to withdraw a plea prior to sentencing.'" State v. McGregor, Cuyahoga App. No. 86165, 2005-Ohio-5561, ¶3, quoting Xie, supra, at 527. "Instead, the trial court `must conduct a hearing to determine whether there is a reasonable and legitimate basis for the withdrawal of the plea.'" Id. However, "[a] trial court need not hold an evidentiary hearing on a postsentence motion to
withdraw a guilty plea if the record indicates the movant is not entitled to relief and the movant has failed to submit evidentiary documents sufficient to demonstrate a manifest injustice. State v. Russ, Cuyahoga App. No. 81580, * * * 2003-Ohio-1001, at ¶12." State v. Mays, 174 Ohio App.3d 681, 2008-Ohio-128, 884 N.E.2d 607, ¶6. Additionally, "it has been held that an undue delay between the occurrence of the alleged cause for withdrawal and the filing of the motion is a factor adversely affecting the credibility of the movant and militating against the granting of the motion." Smith at 264, citing Oksanen v. United States (C.A. 8, 1966), 362 F.2d 74.
{¶ 7} In regard to appellant's 1993 Case, he claims in his affidavit attached to the motion that he did not want to take a plea deal and that his attorney failed to advise him of the rights he was giving up by pleading guilty.1
{¶ 8} "[T]he good faith, credibility and weight of the movant's assertions in support of the motion are matters to be resolved by court."
Smith, supra, at paragraph two of the syllabus. This court has held that State v. Stedman, Cuyahoga App. No. 83531, 2004-Ohio-3298, ¶29. See, also, State v. Brown, 167 Ohio App.3d 239, 244, 2006-Ohio-3266, 854 N.E.2d 583 ().
{¶ 9} Appellant supports his motion to withdraw solely with his affidavit. This affidavit is troubling for its lack of clarity and is, frankly, poorly drafted. The affidavit purports to be that of appellant, but it is sworn to be that of appellant's attorney-in-fact. Also, it is signed by one Tiffiney Cleveland-Roberts without any explanation as to who this person is. Some parts of the affidavit are in the third-person perspective, naming appellant, while others are written in a first-person narrative, as if written by appellant himself.
{¶ 10} Even if we were to take this affidavit to be that of appellant, it does not show a manifest injustice occurred when the trial court accepted
appellant's guilty plea in the 1993 Case. Being unfamiliar with criminal proceedings is not grounds for withdrawing a guilty plea. Appellant also claims his attorney did not inform him of the rights he was giving up by pleading guilty. This also does not demonstrate such an injustice that would make appellant's plea unknowing or unintelligent, necessitating its withdrawal.
{¶ 11} Before accepting a plea of guilty or no contest, a trial court must satisfy itself that any accused person is aware of his constitutional rights and that by pleading guilty he is waiving a number of those rights. Crim.R.11(C)(2). When accepting appellant's plea, the trial court, through its docket, stated: "Now comes * * * the defendant, Leshan Roberts, in open court with his counsel present and was fully advised of his constitutional rights. * * * said defendant retracts his former plea of not guilty heretofore entered, and for plea to said indictment says he is guilty." (Emphasis added.) Because appellant has not provided this court with a transcript from this hearing, this court must assume that the trial court engaged appellant in a valid plea colloquy where those rights were discussed. State v. Harris, Cuyahoga App. No. 89911, 2008-Ohio-2044, ¶16, quoting Bambek v. Catholic Diocese of Cleveland, Cuyahoga App. No. 86894, 2006-Ohio-4883. See, also, Middleburg Hts. v. Brown (1986), 24 Ohio St.3d 66, 68, 493 N.E.2d 547.
{¶ 12} Appellant has not demonstrated any impropriety or other factor that would necessitate a trial court to allow him to withdraw his plea. The trial court acted properly in denying appellant's motion, filed some 16 years after his plea was entered, to withdraw his 1993 guilty plea without holding a hearing.
{¶ 13} With regard to appellant's 1996 guilty plea, the affidavit provided in support of his motion to withdraw his plea is similarly troubling. Again, although different in content from the affidavit in the 1993 Case, this affidavit purports to be from appellant, but made by appellant's attorney-in-fact. Again, it is signed by Tiffiney Cleveland-Roberts without specifying exactly who she is or what personal...
To continue reading
Request your trial