State v. Robertson, No. A03-962 (MN 5/25/2004), No. A03-962.
| Decision Date | 25 May 2004 |
| Docket Number | No. A03-962. |
| Parties | State of Minnesota, Respondent, v. Paul Gerard Robertson, Appellant. |
| Court | Minnesota Supreme Court |
Appeal from the District Court, Stevens County, File No. K8-02-231.
Mike Hatch, Attorney General, Thomas R. Ragatz, Assistant Attorney General, and Charles C. Glasrud, Stevens County Attorney, for respondent.
John M. Stuart, State Public Defender, and Mark D. Nyvold, Special Assistant Public Defender, for appellant.
Considered and decided by Minge, Presiding Judge; Toussaint, Chief Judge; and Kalitowski, Judge.
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
Appellant challenges his conviction of conspiracy to commit first-degree controlled-substance crime. Because we conclude that the trooper had a reasonable and articulable suspicion to justify appellant's seizure, and because we find that the district court did not violate appellant's right to a unanimous verdict, we affirm.
While on patrol, a state trooper observed a car stopped at an intersection. As the trooper passed the intersection, he saw that the vehicle's two occupants were leaning over the center console. Having passed the intersection, the trooper felt the vehicle had been stopped for an inordinate amount of time and decided to turn his car around to see if the vehicle's occupants were in need of assistance.
The trooper pulled up to the vehicle, exited his squad car, approached the driver's side, and asked if the occupants were in need of assistance. This is commonly known as a "welfare check." The driver, appellant Paul Robertson, indicated that they were not in need of help. The trooper noticed that appellant was very nervous, was making a lot of movements with his hands, was unable to look him in the eye, and was instead looking down at the floorboards. When the trooper asked the passenger if he was okay, the passenger would not make eye contact or answer direct questions.
As the trooper was making this inquiry, he observed several items in plain sight in the back seat of the vehicle. These included a white tub that contained four or five packages of Sudafed, marked as containing 24 caplets each. The trooper testified that from his training and experience he was aware that Sudafed contains ephedrine, a precursor chemical for the manufacturing of methamphetamine, that for this reason many retailers limit the purchase of Sudafed to two packages, and that appellant's possession of at least four or five packages was therefore suspicious.
The trooper asked appellant if he had a driver's license, to which appellant replied "no." Appellant also indicated that the car belonged to a friend and that he and his passenger had driven from Fergus Falls. The trooper then requested both appellant's and his passenger's names and birth dates and returned to his squad car to perform a warrant check. This check revealed the existence of arrest warrants for both individuals.
The trooper returned to the vehicle to arrest the individuals. As appellant exited the car, the trooper observed a clear plastic pipe located on the floor of the car. The pipe was later found to contain residue common to the smoking of methamphetamine. The trooper, without consent from appellant or a search warrant, searched the vehicle. The search yielded a total of seven Sudafed packages, over 100 cardboard matchbook covers, which contained red phosphorus, a precursor chemical for manufacturing methamphetamine, a silver box containing oxycontin tablets and one percocet tablet, and a black bag containing a syringe, a glass vial, and cotton swabs, all of which are items used to inject controlled substances. Finally, the trooper found a bent spoon in the passenger's pocket containing a residue common to that found after "cooking" methamphetamine.
Appellant was charged with conspiracy to commit a controlled-substance crime in the first degree, in violation of Minn. Stat. §§ 152.021, subd. 2a, .096 (2002). At a contested omnibus hearing, appellant moved that all the items recovered from the search of the vehicle be suppressed because appellant had been illegally seized. The district court denied appellant's motion finding that the trooper had a reasonable and articulable basis for his suspicion and that appellant had been lawfully seized. A jury found appellant guilty of the charged offense.
The first issue is whether the district court erred by denying appellant's motion to suppress certain evidence. "When reviewing pretrial orders on motions to suppress evidence, we may independently review the facts and determine, as a matter of law, whether the district court erred in . . . not suppressing . . . the evidence." State v. Harris, 590 N.W.2d 90, 98 (Minn. 1999). In reviewing the denial of a suppression motion, this court is bound by the district court's factual findings unless they are clearly erroneous. State v. Britton, 604 N.W.2d 84, 87 (Minn. 2000). Here the validity of the search is only challenged because appellant claims he was first improperly seized. The determination of whether a seizure is constitutional is a question of law subject to de novo review. State v. Olson, 634 N.W.2d 224, 228 (Minn. App. 2001), review denied (Minn. Dec. 11, 2001). When there is no factual dispute, a reviewing court determines if a police officer's actions constitute a seizure and if the officer articulated an adequate basis for the seizure. See State v. Houston, 654 N.W.2d 727, 731 (Minn. App. 2003).
The first part of our inquiry considers whether the trooper's actions constituted a seizure. The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 10, of the Minnesota Constitution protect against unreasonable searches and seizures. To conduct an investigatory stop, an officer must have a reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal activity. State v. Munson, 594 N.W.2d 128, 136 (Minn. 1999) (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20-22, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 1879-80 (1968)). To determine whether an individual has been seized, we ask whether, considering the totality of the circumstances, a reasonable person would feel free to end the encounter with the police. State v. Cripps, 533 N.W.2d 388, 391 (Minn. 1995).
First, we note that the trooper did not "stop" appellant's vehicle. The law differentiates between the stop of a moving vehicle and the approach of an already stopped vehicle for Fourth Amendment purposes. State v. McKenzie, 392 N.W.2d 345, 346 (Minn. App. 1986). Here, the law is clear; the trooper did not seize appellant when he first approached the car to ascertain whether the occupants were in need of assistance. An officer may, without any suspicion of illegal activity, approach a parked vehicle to inquire about the welfare of the occupants. State v. Vohnoutka, 292 N.W.2d 756, 757 (Minn. 1980); Kozak v. Comm'r of Pub. Safety, 359 N.W.2d 625, 628 (Minn. App. 1984). Thus, the seizure did not occur when the trooper first approached the vehicle to perform a welfare check.
We also note that a single request for identification does not generally constitute a seizure; there needs to be a more substantial intrusion by the officer. State v. Pfannenstein, 525 N.W.2d 587, 588-89 (Minn. App. 1994), review denied (Minn. Mar. 14, 1995). This court has held that a seizure occurred where the police, in conjunction with requesting identification, also asked the defendant to exit the vehicle or sit in the officer's vehicle while the officer performs an identification check. See, e.g., LaBeau v. Comm'r of Pub. Safety, 412 N.W.2d 777, 779 (Minn. App. 1987); Kotewa v. Comm'r of Pub. Safety, 409 N.W.2d 41, 43 (Minn. App. 1987); Paulson v. Comm'r of Pub. Safety, 384 N.W.2d 244, 246 (Minn. App. 1986). Thus, a seizure did not occur upon the trooper's initial request for identification.
However, after inquiring of appellant and his passenger and learning that neither party had a valid driver's license, the trooper then requested both appellant's and the passenger's name and birth date, and returned to his vehicle to run checks on their records. The facts before us indicate that at this point a reasonable person would not have felt free to end the encounter with the trooper. Unlike Pfannenstein, this is not a case where there is but one single request for identification from law enforcement. We conclude that when the trooper requested further information from appellant following his admission that he did not possess a valid driver's license, a reasonable person would not have felt free to leave under the circumstances and therefore appellant was seized at that time. See Pfannenstein, 525 N.W.2d at 588-89 ().
The next question we must ask is whether the seizure by the trooper was reasonable and resulting search was proper. A police officer's investigative stop or seizure must not be "the product of mere whim, caprice or idle curiosity." State v. Pike, 551 N.W.2d 919, 921 (Minn. 1996). Rather, it must be based on "specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that seizure." Id. at 921-22 (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 21, 88 S. Ct. at 1880). A determination of a reasonable, articulable suspicion requires consideration of the totality of the circumstances. State v. Martinson, 581 N.W.2d 846, 852 (Minn. 1998).
Appellant argues that the trooper's suspicion could not have been reasonable because the basis for his suspicion was impermissible. Appellant cites to several cases to argue that nervous behavior and possession of Sudafed were not enough to justify the seizure. For instance, in State v. Syhavong, we held that excessive nervous behavior, by itself, was not enough to justify a stop. 661 N.W.2d 278, 282 (Minn. App. 2003); see also ...
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