State v. Syhavong, No. C0-02-1996.
Decision Date | 20 May 2003 |
Docket Number | No. C0-02-1996. |
Citation | 661 N.W.2d 278 |
Parties | STATE of Minnesota, Respondent, v. Lon SYHAVONG, Appellant. |
Court | Minnesota Court of Appeals |
Duane A. Kennedy, Attorney at Law, Rochester, MN, for appellant.
Mike Hatch, Attorney General, St. Paul, MN, and Terry S. Vajgrt, Assistant Rock County Attorney, Rock County Courthouse, Luverne, MN, for respondent.
Considered and decided by RANDALL, Presiding Judge, SCHUMACHER, Judge, and FORSBERG, Judge.1
Appellant Lon Syhavong challenges the district court's pretrial order admitting evidence found during a traffic stop, arguing the police impermissibly expanded the scope of the stop to initiate an investigation unrelated to the stop's original purpose and unsupported by reasonable suspicion of other illegal activity. We reverse.
Stearns asked Syhavong if there was anything illegal in the car, and Syhavong said there was not.
Stearns asked the passenger if she was Syhavong's wife or girlfriend and why the two were going to Worthington; the passenger replied they were going to visit a friend. Stearns noticed the passenger "appeared nervous" as he questioned her. Stearns then asked Syhavong if he would consent to a search of the car, and Syhavong consented. Stearns discovered methamphetamine in the car. Syhavong was charged with felony possession of a controlled substance in violation of Minn.Stat. § 152.023, subd. 2(1) (2000).
The district court denied Syhavong's motion to suppress the evidence, finding Stearns had reasonable suspicion to detain Syhavong for further investigative questioning after the completion of the traffic stop. Syhavong waived his right to a jury trial and submitted the case to the district court on stipulated facts pursuant to the procedure set out in State v. Lothenbach, 296 N.W.2d 854 (Minn.1980). The district court found Syhavong guilty as charged. Syhavong appeals.
Did the officer have reasonable, articulable suspicion to detain Syhavong once the purpose of the initial traffic stop had been effectuated?
The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 10 of the Minnesota Constitution prohibit unreasonable searches and seizures. We review the legality of a limited investigatory stop and questions of reasonable suspicion de novo. State v. Munson, 594 N.W.2d 128, 135 (Minn.1999).
Stearns initially stopped Syhavong's car because the rear tail light was broken. See Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 810, 116 S.Ct. 1769, 1772, 135 L.Ed.2d 89 (1996) ( ); State v. Wiegand, 645 N.W.2d 125, 135 (Minn.2002) ( ). To be reasonable under the Minnesota and federal constitutions, an investigatory stop must be limited in both duration and scope. Id. at 136. "[A]n investigative detention must be temporary and last no longer than is necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop." Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 500, 103 S.Ct. 1319, 1325, 75 L.Ed.2d 229 (1983). "Moreover, the scope of a stop must be strictly tied to and justified by the circumstances that rendered the initiation of the investigation permissible." Wiegand, 645 N.W.2d at 135 (citation omitted).
Expansion of the scope of the stop to include investigation of other suspected illegal activity is permissible under the Fourth Amendment only if the officer has reasonable, articulable suspicion of such other illegal activity.
Id. (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20-21, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1879-80, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968)). Reasonable suspicion is determined from the totality of the circumstances. State v. Lande, 350 N.W.2d 355, 357-58 (Minn.1984).
Syhavong does not dispute that the initial stop was justified by the broken tail light. He argues, however, that Stearns lacked reasonable, articulable suspicion to expand the scope of the initial investigatory detention by asking Syhavong whether he had anything illegal in the car.
We first conclude that the state has not demonstrated a reasonable relationship between the purpose of the stop — the broken tail light — and Stearns's question concerning contraband in the car. During a traffic stop, an officer's questions must be limited to the purpose of the stop. See Royer, 460 U.S. at 498-500, 103 S.Ct. at 1324-25. This purpose may include a protective search for weapons. Wiegand, 645 N.W.2d at 136. An officer may reasonably ask for the driver's license and registration and ask the driver about his destination and the reason for the trip. United States v. Bloomfield, 40 F.3d 910, 915 (8th Cir.1994) (en banc). Because Stearns's question about contraband was not related in scope to the circumstances that justified the stop, the resulting detention and inquiry were unreasonable.
We further conclude Stearns lacked a reasonable, articulable suspicion that Syhavong was engaged in criminal activity so as to justify expanding the scope of the traffic stop.
[I]f the responses of the detainee and the circumstances give rise to suspicions unrelated to the traffic offense, an officer may broaden his inquiry and satisfy those suspicions.
United States v. Barahona, 990 F.2d 412, 416 (8th Cir.1993). Here, Syhavong's nervousness in the course of the initial questioning was the sole circumstance cited by Stearns to justify expanding the scope of the inquiry.
In arriving at a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, an officer may make inferences and deductions that might elude an untrained person. Appelgate v. Comm'r of Pub. Safety, 402 N.W.2d 106, 108 (Minn.1987). But the officer...
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State v. Mattson, No. A06-483 (Minn. App. 8/29/2006)
...at 1879). "Activities that exceed the scope of a stop are not made reasonable because they are short in duration." State v. Syhavong, 661 N.W.2d 278, 282 (Minn. App. 2003). Chief Pipal asked Mattson for her driver's license because she suspected that Mattson did not possess a valid license.......
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State v. Neumann, No. A03-1941 (MN 11/9/2004), A03-1941.
...1998). The legality of a limited investigative stop and questions of reasonable suspicion are reviewed de novo. State v. Syhavong, 661 N.W.2d 278, 281 (Minn. App. 2003) (citing State v. Munson, 594 N.W.2d 128, 135 (Minn. Appellant first challenges the traffic stop of his car, arguing that T......
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State v. Hughes
...looking away. Nervousness "must be coupled with other particularized and objective facts" to justify a pat-frisk. State v. Syhavong, 661 N.W.2d 278, 282 (Minn. App. 2003). Even though the knives were found on M.B., the fact that Hughes was recently sitting within the same vehicle as M.B., w......
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State v. Robertson, No. A03-962 (MN 5/25/2004), No. A03-962.
...For instance, in State v. Syhavong, we held that excessive nervous behavior, by itself, was not enough to justify a stop. 661 N.W.2d 278, 282 (Minn. App. 2003); see also State v. Johnson, 444 N.W.2d 824, 827 (Minn. App. 1989) (holding that an officer's perception of a defendant's nervousnes......