State v. Robinson, A13-0716
| Decision Date | 27 May 2014 |
| Docket Number | A13-0716 |
| Court | Minnesota Court of Appeals |
| Parties | State of Minnesota, Respondent, v. Antwon Demetrius Robinson, Appellant. |
This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2012).
Reversed
Stearns County District Court
Lori Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and
Matthew A. Staehling, St. Cloud City Attorney, Mark C. Hansen, Assistant City Attorney, St. Cloud, Minnesota (for respondent)
Elizabeth A. Larsen, Benjamin D. Eastburn, Special Assistant Public Defenders, Leonard, Street & Deinard, Professional Association, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for appellant)
Considered and decided by Johnson, Presiding Judge; Cleary, Chief Judge; and Rodenberg, Judge.
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
On appeal from his conviction of third-degree test refusal in violation of Minn. Stat. § 169.20, subd. 2 (2010), appellant Antwon Demetrius Robinson argues that lawenforcement officers (1) stopped his vehicle without reasonable suspicion and (2) unlawfully expanded the scope of the investigative stop and illegally arrested him. He contends that the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence. Because law enforcement improperly expanded the scope of the investigative stop and arrested appellant without probable cause to do so, we suppress the evidence resulting from the unlawful arrest and reverse the conviction.
On April 10, 2011, St. Cloud police received information that a domestic assault had occurred in a St. Cloud residence and that there were firearms and controlled substances in the home. Police officers kept watch on the house while they waited for a warrant authorizing a search of it for evidence of crime. Police established what was described in testimony as a "perimeter," with orders to stop all vehicles leaving the residence. Between 5:00 and 5:30 a.m., a black Yukon arrived at the home. Four men exited the vehicle and entered the residence. About 10 to 15 minutes later, appellant exited the home, entered the black Yukon, and began to drive away from the home. Nothing in the record suggests that appellant was observed carrying anything out of the residence or placing anything into the rear cargo area of the Yukon.
St. Cloud Police Officer Scott Wenshau was ordered to follow and stop the Yukon because appellant matched the description of the suspect involved in the domestic assault. But Officer Wenshau testified that he did not stop the Yukon until he "developed [his] own probable cause to stop it." Officer Wenshau testified that the Yukon was speeding, reaching speeds of around 50 miles per hour in a 30-mile-per-hour zone. Beforesignaling the Yukon to stop, Officer Wenshau radioed Minnesota State Trooper Christopher James for assistance. Trooper James had to travel around 50 miles per hour "to keep up with the" Yukon. Both Officer Wenshau and Trooper James turned on their emergency lights, and appellant promptly pulled over. One officer pulled up behind the Yukon and the other pulled up behind and to the left of it. At some point, a third police officer also arrived on the scene. The stop and subsequent events were recorded by a dashboard camera.
Following verbal instructions from Officer Wenshau given by loudspeaker, appellant opened his car door using his left hand, exited the vehicle, pulled up his shirt, and then walked backward toward the officers. The officers determined that appellant was not the suspect they were looking for in the domestic-assault case. Appellant was handcuffed and placed in the back seat of a squad car. The three officers searched the Yukon for eight to ten minutes. Although the officers did not find firearms or narcotics, they found swords in the back of the vehicle. At some point, appellant asked if he could go home, but he was told "no." After the Yukon was searched by the three police officers, one of the officers can be heard to say At some point not clearly revealed by the record, one police officer suggested that he had smelled an odor of alcohol on appellant.1 After the Yukon had been searched and apparently locked up, Trooper James required appellant to perform field sobriety tests and a preliminary breath test. These things were also recorded by the dashboard camera,and the recording is in the record on appeal. The preliminary breath test showed an alcohol concentration of .194, and Trooper James placed appellant under arrest.
After arriving at the jail, Trooper James read appellant the Motor Vehicle Implied Consent Advisory. Appellant indicated that he understood the advisory, and he declined to consult with an attorney. He refused to take a breath test "because I'm already refusal." Appellant was charged with one count of fourth-degree driving while impaired and one count of third-degree test refusal.
Appellant moved to suppress evidence resulting from the investigative stop and derivatively moved to dismiss. The district court denied appellant's motions. In its detailed memorandum accompanying the order, the district court concluded that Officer Wenshau's testimony lacked credibility. Specifically, the district court noted discrepancies between Officer Wenshau's testimony and his original report, and between Officer Wenshau's testimony and the testimony of the other officers. But the district court concluded:
Based on the report that a firearm and narcotics were present in the residence, the court finds law enforcement had reasonable articulable suspicion to stop [appellant]'s vehicle to investigate (1) whether [appellant] was the suspect of the domestic assault and (2) whether [appellant] had removed a firearm or narcotics from the residence.
The district court also concluded that the investigative stop had not been illegally expanded because And the district courtconcluded that appellant was not under de facto arrest when he was handcuffed and placed in the back of the squad car, even though this was "a very close call."
Appellant waived his right to a trial and stipulated to the state's case under Minn. R. Crim. P. 26.01, subd. 4. The parties agreed that the pretrial ruling was dispositive and that no trial would be required if the pretrial ruling was reversed on appeal.
On December 21, 2012, the district court found appellant not guilty of fourth-degree driving while impaired because the record contained no evidence that appellant "exhibited any driving conduct that would indicate that he did not have control of the vehicle." It concluded that the state failed to prove driving while impaired beyond a reasonable doubt. But the district court found appellant guilty of third-degree test refusal. This appeal followed.
"When reviewing a district court's pretrial order on a motion to suppress evidence, we review the district court's factual findings under a clearly erroneous standard and the district court's legal determinations de novo." State v. Gauster, 752 N.W.2d 496, 502 (Minn. 2008) (quotation omitted). We review reasonable suspicion and probable cause determinations de novo. In re Welfare of G.M., 560 N.W.2d 687, 690 (Minn. 1997). And we give deference to the district court's credibility determinations. State v. Klamar, 823 N.W.2d 687, 691 (Minn. App. 2012).
"The United States and Minnesota Constitutions protect 'the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.'" State v. Diede, 795 N.W.2d 836, 842 (Minn. 2011) (quoting U.S. Const.amend. IV); see also Minn. Const. art. I, § 10. The analysis of an investigative seizure State v. Askerooth, 681 N.W.2d 353, 364 (Minn. 2004) (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19-20, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 1879 (1968)) (other citations omitted).
Legality of the investigative stop
A police officer may stop and detain an individual briefly for the purpose of investigation when the officer has a reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal activity. State v. Timberlake, 744 N.W.2d 390, 393 (Minn. 2008). "The reasonable-suspicion standard is not high" and is "less demanding than the standard for probable cause." Diede, 795 N.W.2d at 843 (quotations omitted). "The police must only show that the stop was not the product of mere whim, caprice or idle curiosity, but was based upon 'specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion.'" State v. Pike, 551 N.W.2d 919, 921-22 (Minn. 1996) (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 21, 88 S. Ct. at 1880). We consider the events "leading up to the stop or search" to decide whether the totality of the circumstances, "viewed from the standpoint of an objectively reasonable police officer, amount[s] to reasonable suspicion" of criminal activity. State v. Martinson, 581 N.W.2d 846, 850 (Minn. 1998).
Here, appellant was "seized" when Officer Wenshau and Trooper James activated their emergency lights and pulled their squad cars behind and beside the Yukon. See Klamar, 823 N.W.2d at 692 (). Appellant argues that the officers lacked reasonable suspicion for the investigative stop because the stop was pretextual and based on a mere hunch. The officers were operating under orders to stop any vehicle leaving the residence. As appellant argues, "Officer Wenshau and Trooper James were going to stop [appellant]'s...
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