State v. Gibson

• Decision Date: 18 February 2005
• Docket Number: No. 30255.,30255.
• Citation: 141 Idaho 277,108 P.3d 424
• Parties: STATE of IDAHO, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Eric K. GIBSON, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: Idaho Court of Appeals

108 P.3d 424

141 Idaho 277

STATE of IDAHO, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Eric K. GIBSON, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 30255.

Court of Appeals of Idaho.

February 18, 2005.

Molly J. Huskey, State Appellate Public Defender; Justin Michael Curtis, Deputy Appellate Public Defender, Boise, for appellant. Justin Michael Curtis argued.

Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General; Lori A. Fleming, Deputy Attorney General, Boise, for respondent. Lori A. Fleming argued.

WALTERS, Judge Pro Tem.

Eric K. Gibson appeals from his judgment of conviction following a conditional guilty plea to possession of a controlled substance, reserving the right to appeal the district court's order denying his motion to suppress evidence. For the reasons set forth below, we reverse the order denying Gibson's motion to suppress and vacate Gibson's judgment of conviction.

I. FACTS AND PROCEDURE

In February 2003, at 2:49 in the morning, an officer with the Twin Falls Sheriff's Office observed a vehicle traveling approximately 33 mph on the right shoulder of the road. The officer watched as the vehicle stopped and the driver and passenger switched places. The officer activated his overhead lights and called for backup. When the officer made contact with the vehicle, he identified Gibson as the occupant who had moved to the driver's seat. The other occupant, who had been operating the vehicle when the officer first observed it, was a fourteen-year-old boy. A second officer arrived on the scene with a certified drug dog. The dog was walked around the outside of the vehicle while Gibson and the passenger were still inside. The dog alerted on the passenger-side door. Following the dog's indication that it detected the odor of controlled substances, Gibson and the lad were removed from the vehicle and patted down for weapons. Gibson appeared agitated and excited. The officers removed items from Gibson's jacket, including his wallet, and placed them in a paper bag. The search of the vehicle did not uncover any drugs. The officers then searched Gibson's wallet and discovered a small baggie containing methamphetamine. Gibson was arrested and charged with possession of a controlled substance. I.C. § 37-2732(c)(1).

Gibson filed a motion to suppress the methamphetamine arguing that, by searching his wallet, the officer impermissibly expanded the automobile search to a search of his person. The district court denied Gibson's motion, finding that the dog's alert gave the officers probable cause to suspect that there were drugs either in the vehicle or on its occupants. Therefore, the district court found that, once a search of the vehicle failed to disclose any contraband, the officers had probable cause to search Gibson. Gibson entered a conditional plea of guilty, reserving his right to appeal the district court's denial of his motion to suppress.

II. ANALYSIS

The standard of review of a suppression motion is bifurcated. When a decision on a motion to suppress is challenged, we accept the trial court's findings of fact that are supported by substantial evidence, but we freely review the application of constitutional principles to the facts as found. State v. Atkinson, 128 Idaho 559, 561, 916 P.2d 1284, 1286 (Ct.App.1996). At a suppression hearing, the power to assess the credibility of witnesses, resolve factual conflicts, weigh evidence, and draw factual inferences is vested in the trial court. State v. Valdez-Molina, 127 Idaho 102, 106, 897 P.2d 993, 997 (1995); State v. Schevers, 132 Idaho 786, 789, 979 P.2d 659, 662 (Ct.App.1999). Here the facts are undisputed. Instead, Gibson contends the district court improperly applied the law to those uncontested facts.

On appeal, Gibson argues that probable cause to search his vehicle could not extend to authorization to search belongings found on his person. The state contends that, when the search of the vehicle failed to disclose any controlled substances, the officers had probable cause to believe that the drugs the dog detected were on Gibson's person. Accordingly, the state asserts that the officers had probable cause to arrest Gibson for possession of a controlled substance and that the search of his wallet was lawful as a search incident to that arrest. Gibson argues that the officers did not have probable cause to arrest him. Thus, Gibson contends that the search of his wallet was unconstitutional and that the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress.

A. Search of Wallet

Under the automobile exception, police may search an automobile and the containers within it when they have probable cause to believe that the automobile contains contraband or evidence of a crime. State v. Gallegos, 120 Idaho 894, 898, 821 P.2d 949, 953 (1991). Probable cause is a flexible, common-sense standard. A practical, nontechnical probability that incriminating evidence is present is all that is required. Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 742, 103 S.Ct. 1535, 1543, 75 L.Ed.2d 502, 513 (1983). When a reliable drug-detection dog indicates that a lawfully stopped automobile contains the odor of controlled substances, the officer has probable cause to believe that there are drugs in the automobile and may search it without a warrant. State v. Tucker, 132 Idaho 841, 843, 979 P.2d 1199, 1201 (1999); Gallegos, 120 Idaho at 898, 821 P.2d at 953. Here, Gibson did not contest the legality of his vehicle's exposure to the dog. Accordingly, when the dog alerted on Gibson's vehicle,¹ the subsequent warrantless search was authorized under the automobile exception.²

The district court held that, once the officers failed to find controlled substances in Gibson's vehicle, the justification to search the vehicle extended to authorization to search Gibson. We disagree with the district court's determination.

The automobile exception is based both upon the automobile's ready mobility, which is deemed an exigency sufficient to excuse the warrant requirement once probable cause for the search is clear, and upon the lesser expectation of privacy in an automobile as compared to the privacy interest in a home. California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 390-92, 105 S.Ct. 2066, 2068-70, 85 L.Ed.2d 406, 412-13 (1985); State v. Bottelson, 102 Idaho 90, 93, 625 P.2d 1093, 1096 (1981). If probable cause justifies the search of a lawfully stopped vehicle, it justifies the search of every part of the vehicle and its contents that may conceal the object of the search. United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 825, 102 S.Ct. 2157, 2173, 72 L.Ed.2d 572, 594 (1982). However, occupants of a car continue to have a heightened expectation of privacy, which protects against personal searches without a warrant. See Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 303, 119 S.Ct. 1297, 1302, 143 L.Ed.2d 408, 416 (1999). There exists a "unique, significantly heightened protection afforded against searches of one's person." Id. Even a limited personal search intrudes upon cherished personal security and is an annoying, frightening, and perhaps humiliating experience. Id. The "traumatic consequences [like those involved in a personal search] are not to be expected when the police examine an item of personal property found in a car." Id. Thus, personal searches of vehicle occupants are not authorized under the automobile exception as a result of the occupant's mere presence within a vehicle, which there is probable cause to search. United States v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581, 586-87, 68 S.Ct. 222, 224-25, 92 L.Ed. 210, 216 (1948); People v. Temple, 36 Cal.App.4th 1219, 42 Cal.Rptr.2d 888, 891-92 (1995); State v. Mitchell, 87 Ohio App.3d 484, 622 N.E.2d 680, 685-86 (1993).

Accordingly, the district court erred in concluding that the automobile exception to the warrant requirement justified the warrantless search of Gibson following the dog's alert and the fruitless search of his vehicle. However, where a ruling in a criminal case is correct, though based upon an incorrect reason, it still may be sustained upon the proper legal theory. State v. Pierce, 107 Idaho 96, 102, 685 P.2d 837, 843 (Ct.App.1984). Therefore, we will evaluate whether Gibson's motion to suppress should have been denied on another basis.

B. Probable Cause for Arrest

The state concedes that the automobile exception did not provide a basis to search Gibson but, instead, urges that probable cause existed to arrest Gibson for possession of a controlled substance prior to the search of his wallet. Therefore, the state alleges that the search of Gibson's wallet was a valid as a search incident to arrest. The state points out that, so long as a search and arrest are substantially contemporaneous, and there is probable cause to arrest without depending on the fruits of the search, a valid search incident to arrest may precede the actual arrest. See State v. Johnson, 137 Idaho 656, 662, 51 P.3d 1112, 1118 (Ct.App.2002). To determine whether an officer had probable cause to arrest an individual, we examine the events leading up to the arrest and then decide whether those historical facts amount to probable cause. Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366, 371, 124 S.Ct. 795, 800, 157 L.Ed.2d 769, 775 (2003).

A peace officer may make a warrantless arrest when a person has committed a public offense in the presence of the peace officer. I.C. § 19-603(1). Probable cause is "the possession of information that would lead a person of ordinary care and prudence to believe or entertain an honest and strong presumption that such person is guilty." State v. Julian, 129 Idaho 133, 136, 922 P.2d 1059, 1062 (1996). In analyzing whether probable cause existed, this Court must determine whether the facts available to the officers at the moment of the seizure warranted a person of reasonable caution to believe that the action taken was appropriate. Id.; State v. Hobson, 95 Idaho 920, 925, 523 P.2d 523, 528 (1974). The application of probable cause to arrest must allow room for some mistakes by the arresting officer; however, the mistakes must be...