State v. Rodgers
| Decision Date | 21 October 1914 |
| Docket Number | 234. |
| Citation | 83 S.E. 161,168 N.C. 112 |
| Parties | STATE v. RODGERS. |
| Court | North Carolina Supreme Court |
Appeal from Superior Court, Wake County; Cooke, Judge.
Cleveland Rodgers was convicted of setting fire to a ginhouse with intent to burn it, and he appeals. Affirmed.
The witness Hopkins testified that he had refused accused credit at his store, and further testified that, on the night of the burning of the gin, but prior thereto, accused came into the store cursing at the top of his voice, and when offered some potted ham by another person in the store, refused it, saying that he had got no credit and did not want any, and that he continued cursing, though requested to stop or get out, and finally left still cursing. While the testimony as to accused's conduct in the store was being given, counsel interposed an objection to "this line of testimony," and the third exception mentioned in the opinion was to the overruling of this objection.
On trial for setting fire to ginhouse, evidence that owner told witness on the night of the fire that accused had fired the ginhouse held competent to corroborate his testimony.
B. C Beckwith, of Raleigh, for appellant.
The Attorney General and T. H. Calvert, Asst. Atty. Gen., for the State.
The defendant was convicted on an indictment for "willfully and feloniously setting fire to a certain ginhouse, the property of W. B. Hopkins, with intent to burn and destroy the same." State v. Purdie, 67 N.C. 25; State v. Pierce, 123 N.C. 745, 31 S.E. 847. The indictment was sufficient, both under Revisal 3336 and 3341 and it was immaterial under which, as the punishment inflicted was within the limits prescribed for either. Revisal 3336 covers a willful attempt to burn a "cotton gin," which from the context evidently means the same thing as a "ginhouse." Revisal 3341 makes punishable the willful burning of any "ginhouse." Here the ginhouse was set fire to but not consumed. The form here used was held sufficient in State v. Green, 92 N.C. 779, and is substantially the same as that used in the other two cases above cited.
The tendency formerly prevailing in criminal proceedings was checked by the statutes, now Revisal 3254 and Revisal 3255 which prohibit such proceedings to be "quashed or judgment reversed by reason of any informality or refinement if they express the charge in a plain, intelligble, and explicit manner." The whole course of this trial shows that the defendant was fully informed of the charge against him and for what he was being tried. He was at no disadvantage on that ground, and there is no other object in the indictment. The motion in arrest of judgment was properly denied. The "charring" was sufficient proof of a "burning" even in a charge for arson. State v. Hall, 93 N.C. 573.
The witness Hopkins was permitted to use a map "for the purpose of explaining the testimony of the witness." This was competent and is very often resorted to both in civil and criminal procedure. Arrowood v. Railroad, 126 N.C. 629, 36 S.E. 151; Tankard v. Railroad, 117 N.C. 558, 23 S.E. 46; Riddle v. Germanton, 117 N.C. 389, 23 S.E. 332, and cases there cited; State v. Wilcox (murder) 132 N.C. 1135, 44 S.E. 625; and State v. Harrison, 145 N.C. 411, 59 S.E. 867 (for kidnapping). Both these latter cases were thoroughly contested, and the court affirmed its previous ruling on this point in State v. Whiteacre, 98 N.C. 753, 3 S.E. 488, and Dobson v. Whisenhant, 101 N.C. 645, 8 S.E. 126. It is true the witness said the map was "approximately correct." It could hardly have been otherwise, being made at the time, and merely to illustrate his evidence. This did not render the map incompetent as a part of his testimony, for the defendant doubtless made the most of it by arguing that therefore his whole testimony was only approximately correct. But that was a matter for the jury.
The witness stated that, on discovery of the fire which was blazing up two feet or more, he ran to the ginhouse and saw the defendant running away. "Whom he distinctly recognized, aided by the light from the fire; that he was well acquainted with defendant, having known him ever since he was a little boy." The solicitor then asked, "Have you any doubt as to the defendant being the man?" The objection made was overruled, and the witness answered "No." The testimony was competent. State v. Lytle, 117 N.C. 803, 23 S.E. 476. Nor can we sustain exception 3 which pointed to no particular part of the testimony. Exceptions to evidence must be specific. State v. English, 164 N.C. 508, 80 S.E. 72. At most the evidence was merely irrelevant, and hence possibly a needless consumption of the time of the court but it was not legally prejudicial to the defendant. The evidence in regard to the defendant being refused credit at the store of the owner of the ginhouse, and the defendant's remarks about it, was competent as tending to show motive taken in connection with other evidence offered for the same purpose. The testimony of King that Hopkins told him on the night of the fire that the defendant had fired his ginhouse was competent as corroborative evidence. State v. Maultsby, 130 N.C. 664, 41 S.E. 97; State v. Rowe, 98 N.C. 629, 4 S.E. 506; State v. Parish, 79 N.C. 610.
The defendant excepted to the solicitor's argument containing strictures upon defendant's counsel, because calculated to...
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