State v. Roggenkamp
| Decision Date | 03 March 2003 |
| Docket Number | No. 48718-3-I.,48718-3-I. |
| Court | Washington Court of Appeals |
| Parties | STATE of Washington, Respondent, v. Michael ROGGENKAMP, Appellant. |
Mark V. Watanabe, Richard Alan Hansen, Allen Hansen & Maybrown, P.S., Seattle, for Appellant.
Stephen P. Hobbs, King County Deputy Pros. Atty., Seattle, for Respondent.
Michael Roggenkamp was convicted of two counts of vehicular assault and one count of vehicular homicide in juvenile court. He argues that his conviction must be reversed because the trial court used the incorrect definition of "reckless" for the vehicular assault and vehicular homicide statutes and because the actions of the other driver were the superseding cause of the accident. He also argues that the trial court failed to enter findings on ultimate facts as required by JuCR 7.11(d). Finding no error, we affirm.
The motor vehicle accident occurred about an hour before dusk on May 28, 2000, at the intersection of 424th Street and 236th Avenue SE, near Enumclaw. The roadway was wet, but it was not raining. At the time of the accident, Roggenkamp was 16 years old and was driving a Chevrolet Blazer south on 236th Avenue, a two-lane residential country road lined with mailboxes and driveways with a posted speed limit of 35 miles an hour. There is a dashed yellow line down the middle of the road. Roggenkamp had one passenger, Tyler Vorpahl, in his Blazer. Roggenkamp's friend, Kaelen Shay, was driving a Nissan behind Roggenkamp and also had one passenger, Mathew Craighead, riding with him. There is no dispute that neither the drivers nor their passengers had consumed any alcohol or drugs prior to the accident on May 29.
The two drivers were headed to the home of their friend, Josh Wiebenga. Both were exceeding the speed limit as they drove down 236th Avenue. Shay pulled into the left lane to pass Roggenkamp in order to show off his new horn. Shay pulled back into the right lane ahead of Roggenkamp, even though he did not know the way to Wiebenga's house.
As Shay's and Roggenkamp's vehicles were traveling along 236th Avenue and approaching the intersection with 424th Street, three vehicles driven by Vonrahe Chilcoate, JoAnn Carpenter, and Robert Rush were traveling along 424th Street and approaching the intersection with 236th Avenue. The first of the three vehicles was a Dodge Caravan driven by Chilcoate with two children in the back. The second vehicle was a Honda Civic driven by Carpenter with her 16 year old son Michael and 11-year old Andrew Strand as passengers. The third vehicle was a Ford Expedition driven by Rush with his two sons in the back.
The occupants of the three vehicles had left a barbeque at the home of Debbie Strand and were on their way to a movie. Carpenter had arrived at the barbeque between 4:30 and 5:00 p.m. and had one beer before dinner, between 5:00 or 5:30 p.m. She ate dinner between 6:00 and 6:30 p.m. and had one or two more beers afterwards.
Chilcoate, the driver of the first of the three vehicles to reach the intersection of 424th Street and 236th Avenue, stopped at the intersection and looked to her right down 236th Street. She saw a single vehicle approaching, which was Shay's Nissan. When she reached the intersection, she did not see Roggenkamp's Blazer because it was behind Shay's Nissan. When Chilcoate first saw Shay's vehicle, it was 754 to 954 feet away from the intersection. Chilcoate pulled out from the intersection and onto 236th Avenue, traveling in the same direction as Shay and Roggenkamp. While executing her left turn onto 236th Avenue, Chilcoate looked out the right passenger window and realized that Shay's Nissan was approaching much more quickly than she had initially thought.
After Chilcoate made the turn onto 236th Avenue, Roggenkamp decided to pass Shay to get in front of him because Shay did not know the way to Wiebenga's house. Roggenkamp pulled into the left lane to pass. At this point, Shay was traveling approximately 50 miles an hour, and Roggenkamp was traveling over 70 miles an hour. Chilcoate testified that after she completed the turn, she looked in her rear-view mirror and saw Roggenkamp pull into the left lane from behind Shay. Chilcoate saw that both vehicles were approaching very rapidly and, concerned that she might be struck, she immediately pulled off the road onto the right shoulder of 236th Avenue.
According to Roggenkamp, when he saw Chilcoate's minivan pull out onto 236th Avenue, he immediately applied his brakes. The brakes locked and Roggenkamp went into a skid. JoAnn Carpenter, driving the car behind Chilcoate's, stopped at the intersection of 236th Avenue and 424th Street and followed Chilcoate onto 236th Avenue. Robert Rush, who was in the vehicle directly behind Carpenter's, testified that he distinctly remembered Carpenter stopping at the stop sign before she pulled into the intersection.
Roggenkamp was unable to stop his vehicle before it hit Carpenter's. Rush testified that after Carpenter began to turn onto 236th Avenue and was about in the middle of the intersection, he saw a flash in front of him and then Roggenkamp's car hit Carpenter's. Roggenkamp's skid mark to the point of impact with Carpenter's car was 205 feet long. Carpenter's son, Michael, who was in the front passenger seat, was killed instantly. Carpenter and Andrew Strand, the other passenger, sustained serious injuries.1 Roggenkamp's Blazer left an additional 50 feet of skid marks after impact, during which the Blazer pushed Carpenter's car broadside down the road. Carpenter's car spun around and rolled down the road and off to the shoulder. It came to rest 208 feet from the point of impact.
After the collision, Shay brought his Nissan to a stop behind Chilcoate's parked car on the right shoulder of the road.
It was later determined that at the time of the accident, Carpenter's blood alcohol concentration was a minimum of 0.13.
Roggenkamp was charged with one count of vehicular homicide and two counts of vehicular assault. After a bench trial in juvenile court, Roggenkamp was found guilty on all three counts. The court entered findings of fact and conclusions of law, the relevant portions of which will be discussed below. The court sentenced Roggenkamp to 15 to 36 weeks on the vehicular homicide count and 150 hours of community service on the vehicular assault counts.
RCW 46.61.520(1)(b) and RCW 46.61.522(1)(a)
Roggenkamp was charged with one count of vehicular homicide under RCW 46.61.520 and two counts of vehicular assault under RCW 46.61.522. RCW 46.61.520, the vehicular homicide statute, provides:
(2) Vehicular homicide is a class A felony punishable under chapter 9A.20 RCW, except that, for a conviction under subsection (1)(a) of this section, an additional two years shall be added to the sentence for each prior offense as defined in RCW 46.61.5055.2
RCW 46.61.522, the vehicular assault statute, provides:
There are three alternative means of committing both vehicular homicide4 and vehicular assault.5 The three alternatives are the same under both statutes; accordingly "[t]he case law construing these alternatives in the context of vehicular homicide is equally applicable to vehicular assault."6
Roggenkamp was charged under the reckless manner alternative of the vehicular homicide and vehicular assault statutes.7 The trial court concluded that "reckless" for purposes of these statutes means operating a motor vehicle in a rash and heedless manner, indifferent to the consequences.8 Roggenkamp argues that the trial court applied the wrong definition of "reckless" for purposes of both of these statutes because the court's definition eliminated a subjective mens rea requirement. He argues that the trial court should have defined "reckless" as wanton and willful disregard for the safety of persons or others.
The definition of "reckless" Roggenkamp argues should apply to the vehicular homicide and vehicular assault statutes comes from the reckless driving statute, RCW 46.61.500, which provides:
We disagree with Roggenkamp that the definition from the reckless driving statute should be used to define "reckless" under the vehicular homicide and vehicular assault statutes. The language of the vehicular homicide and vehicular assault statutes, the history of legislative enactments leading to the present vehicular homicide statute, and the judicial construction of these statutes establish that willful or wanton disregard for the...
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