State v. Rohn

• Decision Date: 12 January 1909
• Citation: 119 N.W. 88,140 Iowa 640
• Parties: STATE v. ROHN.
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

140 Iowa 640

119 N.W. 88

STATE

v.ROHN.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

Jan. 12, 1909.

Appeal from District Court, Jones County; Milo P. Smith, Judge.

The defendant was convicted of having committed rape, and appeals. Affirmed.Welch & Welch, for appellant.

H. W. Byers, Atty. Gen., and Chas. W. Lyon, Asst. Atty. Gen., for the State.

LADD, J.

The female alleged to have been outraged was a deaf mute, some 32 years of age, who resided with a brother several miles from Monticello. She walked to that place August 25, 1907, and, according to her story, met defendant Rohn, a stranger to her, on the street. He proposed intercourse, the meaning of which was not comprehended by her, and the two walked along the street until reaching Hogan's place, where defendant helped her to the loft of the barn. He then threw her on a platform and effected his purpose, notwithstanding such resistance as she could make, and after the act, called George Hogan and William Haussler, each of whom also had intercourse with her. Some hours later Hogan overtook her on the way home and again compelled her to submit to his lust. Hogan and Haussler were arrested the same day, but Rohn escaped, and was not taken in custody until September 14, 1907. An indictment was returned on the 28th of that month, in which the state charged that, on or about August 25, 1907, defendant, “in and upon one Emma Farhni, feloniously and violently did make an assault on her, the said Emma Farhni, then and there violently and against her will feloniously did ravish and carnally know.” Appellant contends this language is not equivalent to saying that the act was by force, and relies on State v. Blake, 39 Me. 322, where the Supreme Court of Maine seems to have thought that the word “violently” did not convey the idea of force with the technical accuracy exacted by the statute of that state. But the weight of authority is to the effect that the use of the word “violently” in the indictment was equivalent to that of “forcibly” or “by force,” and that the instrument sufficiently charged the crime. State v. Williams, 32 La. Ann. 337, 36 Am. Rep. 272;State v. Daly, 16 Ore. 240, 18 Pac. 357;Walling v. State, 7 Tex. App. 625;Com. v. Fogerty, 74 Mass. 489, 69 Am. Dec. 264. Even were this not so, it alleges that defendant did ravish prosecutrix against her will; and, according to the two decisions last cited, this, as the word “ravish” imports the employment of force, sufficiently charged the crime. Possibly the meaning of “violently” is a little more extensive than that of “forcibly” or “by force,” but the rule seems to be settled that, “where there is a change in phraseology, and a word not in a statute is substituted in the indictment for one that is, and the word thus substituted is equivalent to the word used in the statute, or is of more extended signification that it, and includes it, the indictment is sufficient.” 1 Wharton's Crim. Law, § 376. State v. Wells, 31 Conn. 210. The exception to the indictment is not well taken.

2. A motion for continuance was filed October 2, 1907, based on want of time on the part of counsel to prepare for the defense and the feeling prevailing in the community. W. M. Welch had been appointed by the court to defend September 30th, but he had acted as attorney for defendant since his arrest September 14th, and for his confederates since the date of the alleged offense. In these circumstances the court rightly held counsel not entitled to delay for preparation, even though his other engagements in court may have been numerous. Nor was the feeling in the community such as was likely to be obviated by delay. Postponement of the trial could not be expected to obviate the condemnation which like transactions merit from mankind. All that could be rightly demanded by defendant was that feeling be not so directed against the accused personally as to prevent a fair and impartial determination with respect to his individual guilt or innocence. There was no error in overruling the motion.

3. On October 9, 1907, the defendant applied for a change of venue owing to the alleged prejudice of the people of the county, and supported the same by affidavits of some 80 citizens besides those of defendant and his attorney. On the other hand, the state's resistance was sustained by the affidavits of 250 citizens. Attached to the motion were numerous excerpts from local and other papers reciting the circumstances as charged by the state, with substantial accuracy, and denouncing the offense and its perpetrators in severest terms. But there is nothing in the record to indicate feeling against the accused personally. Doubtless comparatively few people of the county knew him, and the sentiment largely was directed against the crime alleged, and in demand for the vindication of the law. The showing falls far short of indicating a state of excitement and prejudice in the county which would prevent a fair and impartial trial. See State v. Hoffman, 134 Iowa, 587, 112 N. W. 103;State v. Icenbice, 126 Iowa, 16, 101 N. W. 273.

4. Exceptions were taken to overruling challenges for cause to several jurors. Their answers on voir dire did not disclose unqualified opinions as to the guilt or innocence of the accused, but were conditioned on the newspaper accounts being true. Should a juror be excused because of having read these, the public would be deprived of the advantage of having its most intelligent citizens in such service. A person is qualified if, notwithstanding any impressions he may have received from reading or hearing, he appears to be fair-minded and free from prejudice, and able and willing to render an impartial verdict. State v. Young, 104 Iowa, 730, 74 N. W. 693;State v. Crofford, 121 Iowa, 395, 96 N. W. 889;State v. Brown, 130 Iowa, 57, 106 N. W. 379;State v. Ralston (Iowa) 116 N. W. 1058;State v. Munchrath, 78 Iowa, 273, 43 N. W. 211. The challenges were rightly overruled.

5. After testifying to reaching the loft prosecutrix was asked what the accused did to her. Objection that this assumed he did something was overruled, the court stating that, as counsel for defendant had admitted in his opening statement to the jury that something took place, the only question was the character of it. Appellant insists that the court was mistaken, and that its remark was prejudicial. In the absence of any showing to the contrary, rulings of the trial court are presumed to have been correct; and, as the statement...