State v. Roy, A17-1741

• Decision Date: 29 May 2018
• Docket Number: A17-1741
• Parties: State of Minnesota, ex rel, Robert Young, petitioner, Appellant, v. Tom Roy, Commissioner of Corrections, Respondent.
• Court: Minnesota Court of Appeals

State of Minnesota, ex rel, Robert Young, petitioner, Appellant, v. Tom Roy, Commissioner of Corrections, Respondent.

A17-1741

STATE OF MINNESOTA IN COURT OF APPEALS

May 29, 2018

This opinion will be unpublished and may not be cited except as provided by Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2016).

Affirmed

Randall, Judge^*

Anoka County District Court

File No. 02-CV-17-3621

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Amy Lawler, Assistant Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Lori Swanson, Attorney General, Bradley Simon, Assistant Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota (for respondent)

Considered and decided by Cleary, Chief Judge; Hooten, Judge; and Randall, Judge.

UNPUBLISHED OPINION

RANDALL, Judge

On appeal from the district court's order denying his petition for a writ of habeas corpus seeking immediate release from prison, appellant argues that the Department of Corrections (DOC) violated state law by revoking his release, that the revocation violated his substantive due process rights, and that the revocation violated his rights under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) to benefits, services, programs, and activities. Appellant was released from prison subsequent to filing this appeal. We conclude that Young's appeal is now moot. We affirm.

FACTS

In 2012, a district court convicted appellant Robert Young of third-degree criminal sexual conduct. In January 2014, the district court committed Young to the Commissioner of Corrections, under the Minnesota DOC, for 32 months, with credit for 392 days, and 10 years conditional release after confinement. Young completed his prison sentence and supervised release, and is now serving his 10-year conditional release, which will expire in 2025.

In May 2016, the DOC released Young to Alpha House, a residential program for sex-offender treatment. One month later, the program terminated Young from treatment "due to the frequency of his seizures and the medical attention required." Upon termination, the DOC revoked Young's release and re-incarcerated him. For a short time, Young resided at 180 Degrees, a halfway house, but he did not complete the program. In July 2016, the DOC's Hearings and Release Unit (HRU) held a revocation hearing. Thehearing officer revoked Young's release. Young was again imprisoned until the HRU officer released Young to 180 Degrees in August 2016.

In September 2016, 180 Degrees terminated Young as a client. The manager at 180 Degrees wrote that Young's "health was a huge barrier that prevented him from success." (emphasis added). A subsequent revocation hearing was held. In his HRU report, the case manager recommended revoking Young's release until he could be placed in a facility "that can address his mental health and medical needs." (emphasis added). The HRU hearing officer revoked Young's supervised release for 90 days or less because Young committed acts requiring discipline while incarcerated, and Young "failed to complete residential program and/or aftercare as directed by agent/designee."

In December 2016, the HRU held another review hearing to extend the projected release date. The case manager reported that neither 180 Degrees nor Damascus Way programs could take Young because of the extent of his medical needs. The release attorney explained that the two largest obstacles for Young are his medical issues, including seizures, and his status as a level 3 predatory offender. The HRU hearing officer extended Young's incarceration¹ by 90 days or less for "accountability" and "to assist in release planning."

Young appealed the decision of the HRU hearing officer. The Executive Officer of the HRU denied it, explaining that Young's release was revoked "because he did not have adequate housing to address his multifaceted needs for mental and medical health inaddition to being a level 3 sex offender on ISR supervision. [Young] was not revoked because he had epilepsy."

Young had another review hearing in March 2017. The HRU hearing officer extended the release date by 90 days or less because Young did not have an agent-approved release plan with a suitable residence that would provide services for his medical and mental health needs. The HRU hearing officer encouraged the parties involved to seek "all viable release opportunities."

Young appealed the decision of the HRU hearing officer. The Executive Officer again denied the appeal, explaining that the release review process exists "to monitor progress on the development of a release plan or completion of treatment directives and to determine whether the projected release date needs to be extended."

On July 21, 2017, Young filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. He argued that the Commissioner of Corrections denied his liberty interest in serving his conditional release term in the community, that administrative rules prohibit the DOC from incarcerating Young indefinitely because the DOC "must approve an alternative program with workable conditions of release," and that the extended release period violated the ADA, Minnesota law, and his substantive due process rights.

The district court denied Young's habeas petition. The district court concluded that Minnesota law authorized the DOC's decision to return Young to jail while on supervised release because Young did not obtain an agent-approved residence. Lack of agent-approved housing was the result of his medical and mental health issues, and his level 3 sex offender status precludes him from many of the residences and programs that areavailable.² The district court clarified that the revocation of release was not a result of Young's medical condition, and noted that Young can only be released to a residence that can address his medical and mental health needs. The state argued, and the district court found, that there was no violation of the ADA because Young was not precluded from any program or benefit offered directly by the prison. The ADA is a real issue. But we do not need to address it at this time because of our finding that Young's appeal is moot.³

Young filed this appeal in November 2017. At oral argument on March 8, 2018, both parties agreed that on December 18, 2017, Young was placed on intensive supervised release (ISR) and has remained in the community since that time.

DECISION

"A person imprisoned or otherwise restrained of liberty . . . may apply for a writ of habeas corpus to obtain relief from imprisonment or restraint." Minn. Stat. § 589.01 (2016). "[T]he function of the writ of habeas corpus is to relieve one from unlawful restraint." State v. Schnagl, 859 N.W.2d 297, 302 (Minn. 2015) (quotation omitted). A writ of habeas corpus may also be used to challenge conditions of confinement or to raiseclaims involving fundamental constitutional rights or significant restraints on liberty. Guth v. Fabian, 716 N.W.2d 23, 26-27 (Minn. App. 2006), review denied (Minn. Aug. 15, 2006). The petitioner bears the burden of proving unlawful detention. Bedell v. Roy, 853 N.W.2d 827, 829 (Minn. App. 2014). A district court's findings on a denial of a habeas petition "are entitled to great weight." Aziz v. Fabian, 791 N.W.2d 567, 569 (Minn. App. 2010). We review the district court's findings to determine whether "they are reasonably supported by the evidence," and we review questions of law de novo. Guth, 716 N.W.2d at 26.

I. Young's appeal is moot.

An action "should be dismissed as moot when a decision on the merits is no longer necessary or an award of effective relief is no longer possible." Dean v. City of Winona, 868 N.W.2d 1, 5 (Minn. 2015). We will not dismiss a claim as moot if the claim is likely to reoccur but might evade review, or if the case is considered "functionally justiciable" and "of statewide significance." Id. at 6 (quotation omitted). When an issue is "capable of repetition, yet evading review," the aggrieved party must show that "(1) the challenged action was in its duration too short to be fully litigated prior to its cessation or expiration, and (2) there was a reasonable expectation that the same complaining party would be subjected to the same action again." Weinstein v. Bradford, 423 U.S. 147, 149, 96 S. Ct. 347, 349 (1975). We will resolve the case if it is "functionally justiciable" and is an important public issue "of statewide significance that should be decided immediately." State v. Brooks, 604 N.W.2d 345, 347-48 (Minn. 2000) (quotations omitted).

Young filed a habeas petition seeking immediate release. After filing his petition, he was released on December 18, 2017. That made his requested relief—release from prison—moot. See Dean, 868 N.W.2d at 5; Limmer v. Swanson, 806 N.W.2d 838, 839 (Minn. 2011). We have no need to provide relief on Young's habeas corpus petition. The only relief we can provide on habeas corpus is release. He received it.

Unfortunately, this issue is capable of repetition and does not evade review!⁴ See, e.g., State ex rel. Sather v. Roy, A16-2064, 2017 WL 2920361, at *2 n.2 (Minn. App. July 10, 2017) (addressing Sather's habeas petition despite being released from prison on ISR); Manska v. Fabian, A08-0025, 2008 WL 5215954, at *1-2 (Minn. App. Dec. 16, 2008) (applying the collateral consequences exception to mootness to address the merits of Manska's appeal despite having been released from custody and placed on supervised release); Johnson v. Fabian, A07-2132, 2008 WL 3290669, at *2 n.2 (Minn. App. Aug. 12, 2008) (acknowledging the inability to "grant the relief typically given to a successful habeas petitioner" but finding collateral consequences and concluding that the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Johnson's habeas petition). Unless there are changes in the law, this parade of appeals will continue.

II. If Young had not been released from prison, Marlowe would apply.

In this appeal, Young argues that his prior ongoing detention violates Minnesota law and administrative rules. He contends that his detention violates the purpose of...