State v. Ruiz

• Decision Date: 18 December 2003
• Docket Number: No. SC02-524., No. SC02-389
• Parties: STATE of Florida, Petitioner, v. Roberto RUIZ, Respondent. State of Florida, Petitioner, v. Curley Braggs, Respondent.
• Court: Florida Supreme Court

863 So.2d 1205

STATE of Florida, Petitioner, v. Roberto RUIZ, Respondent.

State of Florida, Petitioner, v. Curley Braggs, Respondent.

Nos. SC02-389, SC02-524.

Supreme Court of Florida.

December 18, 2003.

Charles J. Crist, Jr., Attorney General, Michael J. Neimand, Assistant Attorney General, Bureau Chief, and Frank J. Ingrassia, Assistant Attorney General, Fort Lauderdale, FL, and Paulette R. Taylor, Assistant Attorney General, Miami, FL, for Petitioner.

Bennett H. Brummer, Public Defender, and Manuel Alvarez, Assistant Public Defender, Eleventh Judicial Circuit, Miami, FL; and May L. Cain, Special Assistant Public Defender of Cain & Snihur, North Miami Beach, FL, for Respondents.

PARIENTE, J.

We have for review two decisions of the Third District Court of Appeal, which each certified the following question of great public importance:

WHETHER SECTION ONE OF CHAPTER 2001-58, LAWS OF FLORIDA, HAS LEGISLATIVELY OVERRULED DELGADO V. STATE, 776 So.2d 233 (Fla.2000), FOR CRIMES COMMITTED ON OR BEFORE JULY 1, 2001.

Ruiz v. State, 841 So.2d 468, 468 n. 1 (Fla. 3d DCA 2002); Braggs v. State, 815 So.2d 657, 661 (Fla. 3d DCA 2002).¹ We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(4), Fla. Const. Because the certified question posed by the Third District raises constitutional issues regarding separation of powers that we need not reach to resolve these cases, we rephrase the certified question as follows:

WHETHER SECTION 1 OF CHAPTER 2001-58, LAWS OF FLORIDA, WHICH IS CODIFIED AT SECTION 810.015, FLORIDA STATUTES (2002), APPLIES TO CONDUCT THAT OCCURRED PRIOR TO FEBRUARY 1, 2000.

For the reasons that follow, we answer the rephrased question in the negative.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Both Curley Braggs and Roberto Ruiz were convicted of burglary and other offenses based on conduct that occurred prior to February 1, 2000. The convictions for the other offenses, second-degree murder and armed robbery in Braggs' case, and kidnapping and battery in Ruiz's case, were affirmed by the Third District and are not at issue in this case. The sole issue is the validity of their burglary convictions.

Both Braggs and Ruiz had direct appeals of their convictions pending when this Court decided Delgado v. State, 776 So.2d 233, 240 (Fla.2000), in which we held that the phrase "remaining in" found in Florida's burglary statute, section 810.02(1), Florida Statutes (1989), applied "only in situations where the remaining in was done surreptitiously."² After Delgado and during the 2001 legislative session, the Florida Legislature amended the burglary statute. See Ch.2001-58, Laws of Fla. Specifically, section 1 of chapter 2001-58, which is the subject of the certified question, created section 810.015, Florida Statutes (2002):

810.015 Legislative findings and intent; burglary.—

(1) The Legislature finds that the case of Delgado v. State, Slip Opinion No. SC88638 (Fla.2000) was decided contrary to legislative intent and the case law of this state relating to burglary prior to Delgado v. State. The Legislature finds that in order for a burglary to occur, it is not necessary for the licensed or invited person to remain in the dwelling, structure, or conveyance surreptitiously.

(2) It is the intent of the Legislature that the holding in Delgado v. State, Slip Opinion No. SC88638 be nullified. It is further the intent of the Legislature that s. 810.02(1)(a) be construed in conformity with Raleigh v. State, 705 So.2d 1324 (Fla.1997); Jimenez v. State, 703 So.2d 437 (Fla.1997); Robertson v. State, 699 So.2d 1343 (Fla.1997); Routly v. State, 440 So.2d 1257 (Fla.1983); and Ray v. State, 522 So.2d 963 (Fla. 3rd DCA, 1988). This subsection shall operate retroactively to February 1, 2000.

(3) It is further the intent of the Legislature that consent remain an affirmative defense to burglary and that the lack of consent may be proven by circumstantial evidence.

(Emphasis supplied.)³ The question posed by these two cases is whether the Legislature's declared intent regarding Delgado is applicable to conduct that occurred prior to February 1, 2000. Delgado directly impacts Braggs' and Ruiz's burglary convictions because in each case the initial entry into the victim's residence was consensual and there was no evidence in either case of a burglary other than the commission of crimes within the residence.

In Ruiz, the victim testified that she had lived with Ruiz from October 1997 through December 1997, and that on January 3, 1998, she allowed Ruiz to come into her apartment so he could retrieve some of his belongings. The victim stated that when they went into the bedroom, Ruiz shut and locked the door, began to hit her, and eventually sexually assaulted her. The only evidence of a burglary was Ruiz's commission of the other crimes, specifically kidnapping and battery, once he was inside the victim's residence.⁴ In other words, Ruiz's conviction for burglary was based solely on the evidence that he committed the crimes of kidnapping and battery within the residence.

In Braggs,

[t]he evidence showed that the defendant went to the home of an elderly relative, Ruby Stevenson, who had previously lent the defendant money. The physical evidence indicated that Ms. Stevenson voluntarily admitted the defendant to her home. Once inside, the defendant stabbed her to death, stole her jewelry and a bicycle, and left the house.

815 So.2d at 659. Trial testimony established that the victim's home had burglar bars on the doors and windows, that the victim normally kept the gate on the door locked, and that there were no signs of forced entry. As in Ruiz, the only evidence that Braggs committed a burglary in this case was his commission of other crimes inside the victim's home, specifically second-degree murder and armed robbery.⁵ In other words, the only evidence to support a burglary conviction in Braggs' case was his commission of the crimes of armed robbery and second-degree murder within the victim's residence.

On appeal, Braggs and Ruiz argued that because the evidence showed that they entered the victims' homes with permission and did not surreptitiously remain, their burglary convictions should be vacated pursuant to Delgado. In Braggs, the Third District concluded that because Braggs' appeal was pending when Delgado was decided, he was entitled to the benefit of that decision. See815 So.2d at 659. The State asserted that this Court had receded from Delgado but conceded that if Delgado applied, Braggs' burglary conviction could not stand. See id. at 660-61. The Third District determined that this Court had not receded from Delgado and that Delgado applied to Braggs' case. See id. at 661.

In Braggs, the Third District also addressed what effect, if any, the Legislature's enactment of chapter 2001-58 had on Braggs' burglary conviction. Specifically, the Third District addressed "whether the effect of section 1 of chapter 2001-58[was] to overturn Delgado." 815 So.2d at 659. After determining that the statute applied to Braggs' case, the Third District concluded that section 1 of chapter 2001-58 (now section 810.015, Florida Statutes (2002)) was "simply a statement of intent" and "expresse[d] the view of the Legislature that Delgado was wrongly decided and should be nullified." Id. at 660. The Third District further concluded that unless and until this Court overrules Delgado, lower courts are required to follow that decision. See id. Accordingly, the Third District reversed Braggs' burglary conviction and certified the question of great public importance to this Court.

In Ruiz, the Third District concluded that once Ruiz established that his entry into the victim's residence was consensual and that he did not surreptitiously remain, the evidence was insufficient to establish the crime of burglary. See 841 So.2d at 469. As in Braggs, the Third District reversed Ruiz's burglary conviction and certified the question of great public importance. See id. at 468-69 & n. 1. Because the Third District's decision in Ruiz was based on Braggs, the Ruiz opinion does not contain any analysis of chapter 2001-58. See id. at 468-69.

ANALYSIS

The threshold issue decided by the Third District is whether the expression of legislative intent to nullify Delgado retroactive to February 1, 2000, contained in section 810.015(2) applies to Braggs and Ruiz, whose conduct occurred in 1995 and 1998, respectively. The Third District determined that section 810.015(2) was intended to apply to cases such as Braggs' and Ruiz's, which were in the "pipeline"⁶ at the time Delgado was decided, based on the legislative history of chapter 2001-58. See Braggs, 815 So.2d at 660

. We conclude that the Third District erred in going beyond the plain meaning of section 810.015(2), which, as the Third District acknowledged, by its own terms does not apply to those defendants whose conduct occurred prior to February 1, 2000. See id.

"[T]he plain meaning of statutory language is the first consideration of statutory construction." State v. Bradford, 787 So.2d 811, 817 (Fla.2001) (quoting Capers v. State, 678 So.2d 330, 332 (Fla.1996)). "Even where a court is convinced that the Legislature really meant and intended something not expressed in the phraseology of the act, it will not deem itself authorized to depart from the plain meaning of the language which is free from ambiguity." Fla. Dep't of Revenue v. Fla. Mun. Power Agency, 789 So.2d 320, 323 (Fla. 2001) (quoting Forsythe v. Longboat Key Beach Erosion Control Dist., 604 So.2d 452, 454 (Fla.1992)).

In this case, the Legislature specified that section 810.015(2), which states an intent to nullify Delgado, was to apply retroactively to February 1, 2000. We recently explained in Floyd v. State, 850 So.2d 383 (Fla.2002), that the express language of section 810.015(2) makes it inapplicable to cases where the conduct occurred before February 1, 2000:

We are aware that in enacting section 810.015(2), Florida Statutes (2001), the Legislature

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