State v. Rumold

• Decision Date: 14 August 2020
• Docket Number: No. 121,038,121,038
• Citation: 469 P.3d 103 (Table)
• Parties: STATE of Kansas, Appellee, v. Stephanie Rose RUMOLD, Appellant.
• Court: Kansas Court of Appeals

469 P.3d 103 (Table)

STATE of Kansas, Appellee,

v.Stephanie Rose RUMOLD, Appellant.

No. 121,038

Court of Appeals of Kansas.

Opinion filed August 14, 2020.

Heather Cessna and Kasper Schirer, of Kansas Appellate Defender Office, for appellant.

Laura L. Miser, assistant county attorney, Marc Goodman, county attorney, and Derek Schmidt, attorney general, for appellee.

Before Powell, P.J., Gardner, J., and Walker, S.J.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Per Curiam:

After Stephanie Rose Rumold waived her right to a jury trial, the district court found her guilty in 2018 of burglary of a dwelling and misdemeanor theft. Because of her prior convictions for aggravated burglary and conspiracy to commit aggravated robbery, the district court scored Rumold's criminal history score as a B and sentenced her to 29 months in prison.

On appeal, Rumold first challenges the voluntariness of her Miranda waiver. Yet under a totality of the circumstances test, we affirm the district court's denial of Rumold's suppression motion. Next, Rumold argues her sentence was illegal because the district court should have classified her Kansas 2010 aggravated burglary conviction as a nonperson felony because that crime is broader than the Kansas 2018 aggravated burglary statute. We disagree, finding the identical-or-narrower rule inapplicable. Finally, Rumold contends the Kansas Sentencing Guidelines Act's (KSGA) criminal history scheme is unconstitutional under section 5 of the Kansas Constitution Bill of Rights. But Rumold fails to show that the protections of section 5 are broader than its federal counterpart and that a common-law rule existed at the time of adopting the Kansas Constitution that would preclude the KSGA's scheme.

Factual and Procedural Background

The State charged Rumold with burglary of a dwelling and misdemeanor theft, committed August 25, 2018. Before trial, Rumold moved to suppress incriminating statements. Rumold admitted to the arresting officers that she had been inside the burglarized residence and had taken personal property. But she complained to the district court that the officers coerced those statements and obtained them without a valid Miranda warning.

The district court held a hearing on the motion. Officer Nathan Rankin was the sole witness, and he presented the video from his body camera. After responding to a report of a burglary, Rankin and his fellow officers believed that a suspect was hiding nearby in a grouping of trees. That suspect turn out to be Rumold. The body camera video showed Rankin and another officer, tasers drawn, yelling at Rumold to come out from the trees and lie on the ground. When she did, several officers helped handcuff her arms behind her back. The other officers then left Rankin alone with Rumold while they searched the trees. Rankin testified that this initial interaction was intense, but the situation deescalated once they secured Rumold.

While Rumold sat on the ground, Rankin asked her to identify herself. She replied her name was "Stephanie Gomez," her birthday was December 1, 1991, and she did not have identification. Rankin later learned that neither that name nor that birthdate was correct.

The video shows that when Rankin asked Rumold to stand, she told him that she was not trying to resist them but was only scared. Rankin reproached her for entering others' houses and, while walking, recited her Miranda rights. Rankin asked Rumold if she understood these rights, but she did not respond, so Rankin asked again. The body camera's audio did not pick up Rumold's response. But Rankin testified that she responded, "yeah," and he believed she understood her rights. And the video records Rankin reciting Rumold's Miranda rights to her. Similarly, Rankin's affidavit says, "I read Stephanie her Miranda rights at approximately 1206 hours. Stephanie advised she understood her rights and waived her right to have coun[sel] present."

The video then shows Sergeant Dragonas approach and ask if Rumold had agreed to talk. Rankin responded, "Yeah, she's talking." Dragonas questioned Rumold about her part in the burglary and about her accomplice. Rumold admitted to being in the house and taking paperwork and postcards. She also discussed with Dragonas what cooperation would mean for her.

An ambulance took Rumold to the hospital to treat her ankle injury

. At the hospital, Rumold gave Rankin more information about the burglary. During closing arguments, the State conceded that if the initial Miranda warning were insufficient or Rumold's statements at the scene were involuntary, then Rankin's questioning at the hospital would also be inadmissible.

The district court denied Rumold's motion to suppress. It found that after the initial contact, the situation quickly deescalated, and the police were not overly aggressive when they handcuffed her. It stated also:

"I think it's important to note that after she was cuffed they did ask some quick questions, her name. She had the wherewithal at that time to, as [the State] pointed out, give a false name. So that indicates to the Court that she wasn't so overcome by the high intensity situation or the stress of the situation that she wasn't thinking. She may not have been making good decisions, because it's never a good idea to lie to law enforcement, but she was working out a strategy of how she was going to deal with this situation.

"Shortly after she was handcuffed, she was read her Miranda warnings. Although the video—or audio on the recording did not pick it up, the officer testified unequivocally that she responded she understood her Miranda warnings. That testimony is not controverted, other than by argument. There is no evidence to the contrary before the Court.

"Counsel for the defendant argues a single alleged ‘yeah’ is not sufficient to show an understanding of the Miranda warnings. The Court is convinced that a single alleged ‘yeah,’ whether recorded or not, coupled with the obvious cooperation of the individual making sure officers knew that she was interested in getting some benefit from her cooperation, show that she knew what her Miranda rights were and, in this Court's mind, effectively waived that right by cooperating.

....

"I've heard no evidence here today that would cause me any reason to believe that Ms. Rumold had problems understanding any of the questions. There's nothing to indicate that she did not understand she had the right to refuse to answer any questions.

"The Court finds the State has met its burden of proof in this case. The statements made by Ms. Rumold, while they were made in custody, they were voluntarily given after Miranda warnings. The motion to suppress is denied."

After the motion hearing, Rumold waived her right to a jury trial and agreed to submit the case to the judge on stipulated facts. Those facts included Rumold's admissions to the police:

"4. Defendant was questioned by law enforcement, and she admitted to having been inside the residence at 1028 Woodland Street; furthermore, she admitted to taking miscellaneous items of personal property from said residence."

The stipulations also included that a reporting party believed Rumold was the person he had seen running from the residence. Based on the stipulated facts, the district court found Rumold guilty as charged.

The district court held a sentencing hearing in February 2019. The presentence investigation report showed Rumold's criminal history score was a B based on a 2010 Lyon County aggravated burglary conviction and a 2010 Lyon County conspiracy to commit aggravated robbery conviction. Rumold did not object to her criminal history score. Based on this score, the district court sentenced Rumold to 29 months in prison with 12 months of postrelease supervision.

Rumold timely appeals.

Did the District Court Err in Denying Rumold's Motion to Suppress?

Rumold first argues that she did not knowingly or voluntarily waive her Miranda rights. Rumold asserts that the intensity of the situation, her fear of the officers, and the video's failure to show that she understood her rights weigh against finding her waiver voluntary. She asks us to remand for a new trial excluding her statements.

Standard of Review

Our standard of review for a district court's decision on a motion to suppress has two components. First, we review the district court's factual findings to determine whether they are supported by substantial competent evidence. State v. Parker , 311 Kan. ––––, 459 P.3d 793, 796 (2020). Substantial competent evidence refers to legal and relevant evidence that a reasonable person could accept as adequate to support a conclusion. State v. Doelz , 309 Kan. 133, 138, 432 P.3d 669 (2019). In reviewing the factual findings, we do not reweigh the evidence, assess the credibility of witnesses, or resolve conflicting evidence. And, second, we review the ultimate legal conclusion using a de novo standard. Parker , 459 P.3d at 796.

Analysis

We first determine whether substantial competent evidence supports the district court's factual finding that Rumold responded "yeah" when Rankin asked her if she understood her Miranda rights. Rumold contends the district court should have "seriously question[ed]" Rankin's testimony because the body camera audio did not show or reflect her aural response, and Rankin's affidavit portrayed a waiver "much clearer and more explicit than occurred in real life." But on appeal we cannot reweigh the evidence, assess the credibility of witnesses, or resolve conflicting evidence. See Parker , 459 P.3d at 796. Rankin's testimony at trial was legal and relevant evidence that a reasonable person could accept as adequate to support the district court's factual finding that Rumold responded "yeah." Thus we accept the district court's finding.

We next address the voluntariness of Rumold's consent. The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution protects an individual's right against self-incrimination. State v. Palacio , 309 Kan. 1075, 1081, 442 P.3d 466 (2019). This protection is...