State v. Russell
Decision Date | 13 February 2018 |
Docket Number | DA 16-0362 |
Citation | 390 Mont. 253,2018 MT 26,411 P.3d 1260 |
Parties | STATE of Montana, Plaintiff and Appellee, v. Clayton RUSSELL, Defendant and Appellant. |
Court | Montana Supreme Court |
For Appellant: Chad Wright, Appellate Defender, Koan Mercer, Assistant Appellate Defender, Helena, Montana
For Appellee: Timothy C. Fox, Montana Attorney General, Ryan Aikin, Assistant Attorney General, Helena, Montana, Martin D. Lambert, Gallatin County Attorney, Eric N. Kitzmiller, Chief Deputy County Attorney, Bozeman, Montana
¶1 Defendant Clayton Russell ("Russell") appeals from the jury verdict and sentence of the Eighteenth Judicial District, Gallatin County, for driving under the influence of alcohol (DUI), fourth or subsequent offense, a felony, in violation of § 61-8-401, MCA.
¶2 We address the following issue on appeal:
Whether the District Court erred by denying Russell's for-cause challenge to a prospective juror.
¶3 We affirm.
¶4 On February 3, 2015, the State charged Russell with felony DUI.1 During voir dire, Russell's defense counsel, John Hud, questioned jurors individually. One prospective juror, Kaylie Utter ("Utter"), stated that she had "a couple of experiences that might influence [her] opinions" in this case. Utter explained that a close friend died in a drunk driving accident, and that her son-in-law was recently involved in a drunk driving accident. While Utter could not definitively answer whether those experiences would impact her ability to be fair or impartial, she admitted that it "definitely affects [her] opinions." When asked if she was more inclined to believe a police officer's testimony and find Russell guilty, Utter stated, "[t]hat could be; I can't say for sure but it's possible." In response to follow-up questions regarding her ability to neutrally evaluate potential evidence, Utter answered, "yes" when the prosecutor asked whether her life experiences would cause her to evaluate the evidence in a certain way. As to whether Russell's refusal to submit to a breath test in and of itself results in an assumption of guilt, Utter stated that she might infer guilt from a defendant's refusal to submit to a breath test. Russell challenged Utter for cause, and the District Court excused Utter "based on the experiences that she's had personally and the indication that those experiences would maybe influence her decision."
¶5 Upon Utter being excused, the District Court called Prospective Juror Donald Platisha ("Platisha"), who immediately stated that he "might be in the same position as the last juror." In a follow-up question, Platisha explained that his sister was injured, and his brother-in-law killed, by a drunk driver. When pressed directly as to whether he thought his experiences would make it hard for him to be a fair in a DUI case, Platisha stated, Defense Counsel Hud followed up:
¶6 Platisha stated that he had "quite a few" experiences involving drunk drivers and agreed that he would feel "more comfortable" sitting on another type of criminal case where he didn't have so much personal experience.
¶7 The State then followed up with a series of questions of Platisha:
¶8 Russell challenged Platisha for cause. The District Court denied the challenge after determining that Platisha "indicated that even with his life experiences[,] which he has discussed with us, he is still able to be fair in the case ..." and asking Platisha, "is that correct, Mr. Platisha?" Platisha answered in the affirmative. Following the denial of the for-cause challenge, Russell used his first peremptory challenge to excuse Platisha and went on to use all his remaining juror challenges.
¶9 On February 26, 2016, after a two-day trial, the impaneled jury found Russell guilty of Felony DUI. On April 27, 2016, the District Court sentenced Russell to thirteen months with the Department of Corrections for placement in a residential alcohol treatment program and four years suspended to be served consecutively. Russell appeals the District Court's denial of his for-cause challenge of Platisha.
¶10 We review denial of a challenge to dismiss a juror for cause for abuse of discretion. State v. Richeson , 2004 MT 113, ¶ 14, 321 Mont. 126, 89 P.3d 958 ; see also State v. Grant , 2011 MT 81, ¶ 8, 360 Mont. 127, 252 P.3d 193. If a district court abuses its discretion by denying a legitimate for-cause challenge, the error is structural and requires automatic reversal. State v. Good , 2002 MT 59, ¶¶ 62–63, 309 Mont. 113, 43 P.3d 948.
¶11 Whether the District Court erred by denying Russell's for-cause challenge to a prospective juror.
¶12 A criminal defendant's fundamental right to an impartial jury is guaranteed by the United States and Montana Constitutions. U.S. Const. amend VI ; Mont. Const. art. II, § 24 ; State v. Allen , 2010 MT 214, ¶ 25, 357 Mont. 495, 241 P.3d 1045 ; State v. Hausauer , 2006 MT 336, ¶ 20, 335 Mont. 137, 149 P.3d 895. Section 46-16-115(2)(j), MCA, provides a prospective juror may be excused for cause if he or she has "a state of mind in reference to the case or to either of the parties that would prevent the juror from acting with entire impartiality and without prejudice to the substantial rights of either party."
¶13 Merely having common experiences relative to the case at hand does not render a juror impartial or biased. State v. Rogers , 2007 MT 227, ¶¶ 8–9, 25, 339 Mont. 132, 168 P.3d 669 ( ). Further, if the prospective juror simply "expresses concern about impartiality but believes he can fairly weigh the evidence, the court is not required to remove the juror." State v. Normandy , 2008 MT 437, ¶ 22, 347 Mont. 505, 198 P.3d 834. We recognize that "[i]n reality, few people are entirely impartial regarding criminal matters. ..." Allen , ¶ 26.
¶14 Prospective jurors should be disqualified based on their prejudices only when they have formed "fixed opinions on the guilt or innocence of the defendant which they would not be able to lay aside and render a verdict based solely on evidence presented in court," Great Falls Tribune v. Dist. Court of Eighth Judicial Dist. , 186 Mont. 433, 439–40, 608 P.2d 116, 120 (1980) ; see also State v. Falls Down , 2003 MT 300, ¶¶ 23, 27, 318 Mont. 219, 79 P.3d 797, or when a serious question arises about a juror's ability to be fair and impartial, State v. Golie , 2006 MT 91, ¶ 8, 332 Mont. 69, 134 P.3d 95 ; State v. Cudd , 2014 MT 140, ¶ 6, 375 Mont. 215, 326 P.3d 417. In determining whether a serious question is raised, a district court should review the totality of a prospective juror's voir dire responses, Allen , ¶ 26 ; Golie , ¶ 10 ; State v. Heath , 2004 MT 58, ¶ 8, 320 Mont. 211, 89 P.3d 947, and give more weight to spontaneous statements than "coaxed recantations elicited by counsel because spontaneous statements are most likely to be reliable and honest," State v. Jay , 2013 MT 79, ¶ 19, 369 Mont. 332, 298 P.3d 396 (internal citations omitted); see also Cudd , ¶ 8 ; Falls Down , ¶¶ 20-21 ( ).
¶15 Finally, it is not the role of the court or counsel to rehabilitate jurors whose spontaneous responses during voir dire expose a serious question about their ability to be fair and impartial. See State v. DeVore , 1998 MT 340, ¶ 28, 292 Mont. 325, 972 P.2d 816, overruled in part on other grounds by Good , ¶¶ 40–41 ; see also State v. Brown , 1999 MT 339, ¶ 22, 297 Mont. 427, 993 P.2d 672.
¶16 We previously held that a district court did not abuse its discretion when it denied a for-cause challenge to a prospective juror in a case involving sexual intercourse without consent when the juror indicated that she volunteered as a rape survivor advocate and was a victim of stalking. Heath , ¶¶ 17,...
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