State v. Saenz

• Decision Date: 23 August 2012
• Docket Number: No. 84949–8.,84949–8.
• Citation: 175 Wash.2d 167,283 P.3d 1094
• Court: Washington Supreme Court
• Parties: STATE of Washington, Respondent, v. Jorge Ariel SAENZ, Petitioner.

175 Wash.2d 167

283 P.3d 1094

STATE of Washington, Respondent,

v.Jorge Ariel SAENZ, Petitioner.

No. 84949–8.

Supreme Court of Washington,

En Banc.

Argued Oct. 27, 2011.

Decided Aug. 23, 2012.

Tanesha La Trelle Canzater, Attorney at Law, Bellingham, WA, for Petitioner.

Kevin Gregory Eilmes, Prosecuting Attorney's Office, Yakima, WA, for Respondent.

WIGGINS, J.

[175 Wash.2d 170]¶ 1 This case requires us to examine how our juvenile justice laws interact with the Persistent Offender Accountability Act (POAA) of the Sentencing Reform Act of 1981, chapter 9.94A RCW, also known as the “three strikes law.” When Jorge Saenz was 15 years old, he agreed to waive juvenile court jurisdiction and transfer his case to adult court, where he pleaded guilty to two counts of felony assault in exchange for a moderately lower sentencing recommendation. As a result, seven years later he faces life in prison without the possibility of parole under the POAA. We now examine whether his waiver of juvenile court jurisdiction was valid and whether his case was properly transferred to adult court. We conclude first that Saenz's waiver was invalid because there is virtually nothing in the record demonstrating that it was intelligently made or that Saenz was fully informed when he made it. Next, we hold that Saenz's case was not properly transferred to adult court because the commissioner transferring the case failed to enter findings that transfer was in the best interest of the juvenile or the public as required by statute. On these facts, we hold that Saenz's conviction cannot be used as a “strike” to sentence him to spend the rest of his life in prison with no possibility of release, the second harshest sanction in our criminal justice system. Instead, we affirm the 561–month sentence imposed by the trial court.

FACTS

¶ 2 In 2008, Saenz was convicted by a jury of two counts of first degree assault and one count of unlawful possession of a firearm. He was accused of shooting two members of a rival gang in Sunnyside, Washington, in January 2008. After the jury reached its verdict, the State sought to sentence Saenz under the POAA. SeeRCW 9.94A.570. Saenz had two prior convictions that were potentially strikes, both gang-related assault convictions. One of them was the 2001 guilty plea to assault when Saenz was only 15 years old.

¶ 3 At his “three strikes” hearing, Saenz argued that his 2001 conviction could not be used as a strike. He argued that there were two defects in the transfer of his case from juvenile to adult court precluding the conviction from being used against him under the POAA: (1) there was no decline hearing and he did not knowingly and intelligently waive his decline hearing or juvenile court jurisdiction and (2) the juvenile court did not enter findings that declining juvenile jurisdiction was in the best interest of Saenz or the public as required by former RCW 13.40.110(2) and (3) (1997).

¶ 4 For Saenz's 2001 conviction, the juvenile court did not hold a decline hearing before transferring the case to adult court. Saenz stipulated to a waiver of his hearing and to transfer to adult court as part of a plea bargain that dropped multiple charges and reduced the length of his sentence. However, the record for the 2001 conviction contained very little evidence that the waiver was made knowingly and intelligently, only a statement by Saenz's attorney that “Mr. Saenz and I had two conversations, one at length here, and two this afternoon. I believe that he understands what the implications are of having this moved to adult court, but that is his desire at this time.” Clerk's Papers at 116.

¶ 5 Nevertheless, a juvenile court commissioner accepted the stipulation and transferred the case to adult court where Saenz pleaded guilty to second degree assault and custodial assault 10 days later. His guilty plea contained an acknowledgement that Saenz's offense was a potential strike offense, and Saenz checked a box on the guilty plea that said he had read the plea and understood it.

¶ 6 The trial court ruled that in these circumstances the 2001 conviction could not be used as a strike, sentencing Saenz to 561 months in prison instead of the State's requested sentence of life without possibility of parole. The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded for resentencing as a persistent offender. State v. Saenz, 156 Wash.App. 866, 878–79, 234 P.3d 336 (2010). We granted review. 170 Wash.2d 1013, 245 P.3d 775 (2010).

Analysis

I. Standard of Review

¶ 7 The prosecution bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that a conviction can be used as a strike under the POAA, and we review a trial court's determination de novo. State v. Knippling, 166 Wash.2d 93, 98, 100–01, 206 P.3d 332 (2009).

II. Overview of the Juvenile Justice System

¶ 8 The magnitude of Saenz's decision to be tried as an adult is best understood by examining the history of and policy behind the juvenile justice system. In 1905, Washington enacted legislation establishing juvenile courts in response to a wider reform movement focused on treating and rehabilitating juveniles instead of subjecting them to the harsh procedures, penalties, and jail conditions of adult courts. State v. Rice, 98 Wash.2d 384, 389, 655 P.2d 1145 (1982). In Washington's new juvenile courts, “ ‘[t]he idea of crime and punishment was to be abandoned. The child was to be ‘treated’ and ‘rehabilitated’ and the procedures, from apprehension through institutionalization, were to be ‘clinical’ rather than punitive.' ” Id. (quoting In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 15–16, 87 S.Ct. 1428, 1437–38, 18 L.Ed.2d 527 (1967)).

¶ 9 Despite these early goals, as juvenile crime rates rose the failings of a wholly rehabilitative system became apparent, leading to Washington's adoption of the Juvenile Justice Act of 1977, chapter 13.40 RCW. The act departed from the old view of the juvenile courts as rehabilitators and service providers in favor of a new view that saw them, at least in part, as instruments for administering justice in light of the realities of juvenile criminality. Despite the act's shift, the legislature still intended to foster “a system capable of having primary responsibility for, being accountable for, and responding to the needs of youthful offenders ....” RCW 13.40.010(2) (emphasis added). Thus, although the act made juvenile courts more punitive, it preserved the fundamental difference between juvenile courts and adult courts—unlike wholly punitive adult courts, juvenile courts remained rehabilitative.

¶ 10 This fundamental difference is manifest in the additional protections juveniles receive in juvenile court but not in adult court. Most pertinent here, juvenile offenses do not count as strikes under the POAA. RCW 9.94A.030(37), (34). There are numerous other protections as well. For example, juvenile courts have far more discretion to order alternative sentences, such as diversion agreements in lieu of prosecution, community supervision, and individualized programs involving employment, education, or treatment. See, e.g.,RCW 13.40.080, .0357 (“Option B, Suspended Disposition Alternative”); RCW 13.40.020(4). In juvenile court, convicted offenders cannot be confined past the age of 21. RCW 13.40.300. Juvenile offenses are not generally considered crimes, so a juvenile cannot be convicted of a felony. RCW 13.04.240; In re Pers. Restraint of Frederick, 93 Wash.2d 28, 30, 604 P.2d 953 (1980). A juvenile cannot be sent to adult prison, or to any adult jail or holding facility. RCW 13.04.116. There are limitations on the use of juvenile records and the length of time they will be made public. SeeRCW 13.50.050. Juvenile courts can consider mitigatingfactors at disposition hearings, RCW 13.40.150(3)(h), and can impose sentences outside standard sentencing ranges to prevent “manifest injustice.” RCW 13.40.160(2).

¶ 11 Ordinarily, juvenile offenders are guaranteed these increased protections because juvenile courts have automatic, statutorily granted jurisdiction over any person under 18 who is charged with a crime. ¹RCW 13.04.030. However, the defendant, the state, or the juvenile court can request that the case be transferred to adult court after a decline hearing. RCW 13.04.030(1)(e)(i). At the decline hearing, the court must consider eight factors set forth in Kent v. United States to decide whether to decline jurisdiction.²383 U.S. 541, 86 S.Ct. 1045, 16 L.Ed.2d 84 (1966); State v. Holland, 98 Wash.2d 507, 515, 656 P.2d 1056 (1983).

¶ 12 When a juvenile waives juvenile court jurisdiction he or she also waives the increased protections of the juvenile justice system, exiting a system designed to rehabilitate and entering a system designed to punish. This exit is a one-way street with no return: by waiving juvenile jurisdiction once, the juvenile enters the adult system permanently, forfeiting the right to be tried in juvenile court for all future offenses. RCW 13.40.020(14); State v. Sharon, 100 Wash.2d 230, 231, 668 P.2d 584 (1983). Thus, moving a case from juvenile court to adult court is “a ‘critically important’ action determining vitally important statutory rights of the juvenile.” Kent, 383 U.S. at 556, 86 S.Ct. 1045 (quoting Black v. United States, 122 U.S.App.D.C. 393, 355 F.2d 104, 105 (1965)).

¶ 13 The critical importance of transferring a juvenile to adult court prompted our legislature to include statutory protections before the transfer can be made. First, like the waiver of any right in juvenile court, a juvenile's waiver of juvenile court jurisdiction and a decline hearing must be an “express waiver intelligently made by the juvenile after the juvenile has been fully informed of the right being waived.” RCW 13.40.140(9). Second, after a decline hearing but before transferring a case to adult court, juvenile courts must enter findings in the record, including a finding that transfer to adult court is in the best interest of the juvenile or the public. Former RCW...