State v. Rice
| Decision Date | 22 December 1982 |
| Docket Number | Nos. 48374-4,48375-2,s. 48374-4 |
| Parties | The STATE of Washington, Respondent, v. Daniel Eldon RICE, Appellant. The STATE of Washington, Respondent, v. Monte SANCHEZ, Appellant. |
| Court | Washington Supreme Court |
Calvin C. Jackson, James M. Marshall, Tacoma, for appellant.
Donald F. Herron, Pierce County Prosecutor Mack E. Call, Deputy Pros. Atty., Tacoma, for respondent.
Evergreen Legal Services, Michael Mirra, Steilacoom, amicus curiae.
Defendants Daniel Rice and Monte Sanchez appeal the length of terms of confinement in disposition orders issued by the juvenile division of the Superior Court. The issues raised on appeal are twofold: first, whether the legislature intended that juvenile dispositions under RCW 13.40 may include terms of confinement which exceed the maximum sentences allowed by RCW 9A.20.020; second, if the legislature so intended, whether confining juveniles for periods longer than the maximum allowed for Defendant Rice was adjudicated guilty in the Juvenile Division of the Pierce County Superior Court on July 6, 1981, of attempted criminal trespass, a misdemeanor. RCW 9A.52.070, 9A.28.020(3)(e).
adults violates the equal protection clauses of the United States and Washington constitutions. We hold that the legislature did not intend RCW 9A.20.020 to [655 P.2d 1147] apply to juvenile dispositions, and that imposing longer terms of confinement on juveniles than on adults does not violate the requirement of equal protection
At the disposition hearing on July 17, 1981, Rice's parole officer recommended a 52-65 week commitment. Rice had a history of prior offenses. He had been diverted from prosecution for third degree theft in June 1979 when he was 14 years of age. He did not complete the terms of his diversion agreement. He was convicted of third degree theft and possession of stolen property in September 1979, and sentenced to a term of community supervision. He violated the terms of his probation several times. In April 1980, he was convicted of second degree burglary and was sentenced to 52 weeks' detention. He was released from this detention on March 9, 1981, (having received leave for good behavior) and committed the present offense about 2 months later, on May 19, 1981. The parole officer reported that Rice was living at home with his mother, but that he was beyond control. He stole from his mother, lied to her, smoked marijuana, and failed to attend school. Rice's counsel conceded at the disposition hearing that the standard range disposition of 20-35 hours of community service or 3 months of community supervision was inadequate in light of the parole officer's report. However, he argued that Rice's sentence should be limited to the 90-day maximum allowed under RCW 9A.20.020 for an adult convicted of a misdemeanor. The court found a manifest injustice on Rice's recent criminal history, violations of the terms of prior dispositions, refusal to submit to supervision, and the other aggravating factors in the file. Rice was committed to the Department of Institutions for a period of 52 weeks.
Defendant Sanchez pleaded guilty on September 4, 1981, in the Pierce County Superior Court, Juvenile Division, to unlawful assault, a violation of the Pierce County Code, PCC 35.02.070, and a misdemeanor. The juvenile parole officer recommended a manifest injustice sentence and commitment to the Department of Institutions. Sanchez had a prior criminal history. In 1980, he was diverted from prosecution for possession of marijuana, and subsequently remanded to the juvenile court for violation of the terms of the diversion agreement. In June 1981, he was ordered to serve 1 year of community supervision and 120 hours of community service for 3 offenses, 2 of second degree burglary and 1 of first degree theft. At the time of the present offense, Sanchez was age 14 and living at home with his mother. He was 1 year behind in his schooling owing to serious absenteeism. His mother was incapable of controlling him, and he was unresponsive to the authority of officials at the juvenile detention facility. The court found that the limits established by the category of offender disposition of 10-20 days' detention, 80-110 hours' community service, and 1 year community supervision was insufficient for the defendant. It ordered a manifest injustice sentence of 52 weeks' confinement; this was based on the short time since Sanchez' prior offense and his being still under community supervision at the time of the present offense, the lack of parental control, his failure to comply with a prior diversion agreement, and the fact that community supervision would not provide the structure necessary for his rehabilitation and correction.
Defendants argue that their terms of commitment on a finding of manifest injustice cannot exceed the maximum terms laid down in RCW 9A.20.020. This section sets out maximum sentences which may be imposed on persons convicted of offenses. The maximum sentence for a misdemeanor is 90 days' imprisonment or $1,000 fine or both. Defendants argue that this section applies to dispositions under the Juvenile Justice Act of 1977, RCW 13.40 (hereinafter JJA), as well as to adult criminal sentences. They We begin our analysis with a very brief review of the history of our juvenile justice system, so as to place the present legislation in a historical perspective.
argue that the legislature intended that RCW 9A.20.020 apply to all sentences, including juvenile dispositions. They argue [655 P.2d 1148] further that the legislature could not have legislated otherwise because to impose longer terms of confinement on children than on adults would violate the equal protection clauses of the United States and Washington constitutions. We disagree. We hold that the legislature did not intend RCW 9A.20.020 to apply to juvenile dispositions. And equal protection does not preclude the legislature's mandating longer terms of confinement for children than for adults
The juvenile justice movement dates from the early nineteenth-century development of the prison system as a substitute for physical punishment. Under common law, a child below the age of seven could not be criminally prosecuted, while a youth between the ages of seven and fourteen was presumed to lack criminal capacity, a presumption only infrequently rebutted. Children above the age of fourteen bore full criminal responsibility, although punishment could always be mitigated. Prior to the nineteenth century, criminal punishment was swift and physical in nature, and imprisonment was unknown.
In the absence of incarceration, the "mixing" of juvenile offenders with adults in common facilities was impossible. Equally, the absence of physical custody precluded the implementation of rehabilitative programs tailored to the young transgressor, the hallmark of the twentieth-century juvenile justice system.
In the early nineteenth century, reforms led to the establishment of the prison system, resulting for the first time, in the incarceration of youths with more hardened adult criminals.
(Footnotes omitted.) Sobie, The Juvenile Offender Act: Effectiveness and Impact on the New York Juvenile Justice System, 26 N.Y.L.Sch.L.Rev. 677, 678 (1981).
It was in response to this result that the reforms which led to the juvenile court system were initiated.
The early reformers were appalled by adult procedures and penalties, and by the fact that children could be given long prison sentences and mixed in jails with hardened criminals. They were profoundly convinced that society's duty to the child could not be confined by the concept of justice alone. They believed that society's role was not to ascertain whether the child was "guilty" or "innocent," but "What is he, how has he become what he is, and what had best be done in his interest and in the interest of the state to save him from a downward career." ... The idea of crime and punishment was to be abandoned. The child was to be "treated" and "rehabilitated" and the procedures, from apprehension through institutionalization, were to be "clinical" rather than punitive.
(Footnote omitted.) In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 15-16, 87 S.Ct. 1428, 1437-1438, 18 L.Ed.2d 527 (1967).
This reform was embraced by the legislature of this state, which enacted legislation in 1905 and 1909 to establish a juvenile court. In 1913 the legislature enacted a more comprehensive juvenile court statute which was codified as RCW 13.04, and remained substantially unchanged until the present legislation was enacted in 1977. Becker, Washington State's New Juvenile Code: An Introduction, 14 Gonz.L.Rev. 289 (1979).
In Washington, as elsewhere in the country, the stage was thus set for an era of what has been called "socialized justice" for juveniles. In contrast to its power in the adult criminal model, the juvenile court could obtain jurisdiction on the basis of a youngster's status rather than on the basis of his or her involvement in criminal acts. Legal rights were subordinated to judicial discretion, and punishment was "replaced" with individualized "treatment" plans. Justice was de-emphasized in order for the court to become an instrument for the diagnosis of social ailments and the delivery of social services.
(Footnote omitted.) 14 Gonz.L.Rev. at 291.
However, between the reformers' idea of socialized juvenile services and the reality of dealing with juvenile delinquents, there fell the shadow of failure. The juvenile justice system was failing the juveniles who were supposed to be Juvenile Court history has again demonstrated that unbridled discretion, however benevolently motivated, is frequently a poor substitute for principle and procedure....
protected and rehabilitated by the system, and it was failing the public who were supposed to benefit from having children steered gently but firmly from a life of crime to a productive place in society. The
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