State v. Saint-Louis (In re D.L.B.)
| Decision Date | 14 July 2016 |
| Docket Number | NO. 92448–1,92448–1 |
| Citation | 376 P.3d 1099,186 Wash.2d 103 |
| Parties | In the Matter of the Dependency of D.L.B.(DOB 11/01/08), minor child. State of Washington, Department of Social and Health Services, Respondent, v. Edelyn Saint–Louis, Petitioner. |
| Court | Washington Supreme Court |
Richard Wayne Lechich, Washington Appellate Project, 1511 Third Avenue, Suite 701, Seattle, WA, 98101–3647, for Petitioner.
Kelly L. Taylor, Office of the Attorney General, 800 5th Ave., Ste. 2000, Seattle, WA, 98104–3188, Anne Elizabeth Egeler, Office of the Attorney General, 1125 Washington Street, P.O. Box 40100, Olympia, WA, 98504–0100, Paul Spencer Graves, Eric B. Wolff, Perkins Coie LLP, 1201 3rd Ave., Ste. 4900, Seattle, WA, 98101–3099, for Respondent.
April M. Rivera, King County CASA Program, 1401 E Jefferson St., Ste. 500, Seattle, WA, 98122–5574, for Guardian Ad Litem.
Lillian Marie Hewko, Washington Defender Association, 110 Prefontaine Pl. S, Ste. 610, Seattle, WA, 98104–2626, for Amicus Curiae on behalf of Washington Defender Association.
Devon Carroll Knowles, Seattle University School of Law, 1215 E Columbia St., Seattle, WA, 98122–4419, Laurel Anne Jones, Carey & Lillevik, PLLC, 1809 7th Ave., Ste. 1609, Seattle, WA, 98101–1313, for Amicus Curiae
on behalf of Incarcerated Parents Advocacy Clinic.
David J. Ward, Sara Lyle Ainsworth, Legal Voice, 907 Pine Street, Suite 500, Seattle, WA, 98101–1818, for Amicus Curiae on behalf of Legal Voice.
Emily P. Henry, Attorney at Law, Flint M. Stebbins, ABC Law Group, LLP, 2722 Colby Ave., Ste. 403, Everett, WA, 98201–3532, Laurel Anne Jones, Carey & Lillevik, PLLC, 1809 7th Ave., Ste. 1609, Seattle, WA, 98101–1313, for Amicus Curiae on behalf of Aclu.
Emily P. Henry, Attorney at Law, Flint M. Stebbins, ABC Law Group, LLP, 2722 Colby Ave., Ste. 403, Everett, WA, 98201–3532, Laurel Anne Jones, Carey & Lillevik, PLLC, 1809 7th Ave., Ste. 1609, Seattle, WA, 98101–1313, for Amicus Curiae on behalf of Washington State Coalition Against Domestic Violence.
Emily P. Henry, Attorney at Law, Flint M. Stebbins, ABC Law Group, LLP, 2722 Colby Ave., Ste. 403, Everett, WA, 98201–3532, Laurel Anne Jones, Carey & Lillevik, PLLC, 1809 7th Ave., Ste. 1609, Seattle, WA, 98101–1313, for Amicus Curiae on behalf of Incarcerated Mothers Advocacy Project.
¶ 1 In 2013, the legislature enacted amendments to the dependency statutes to expressly address “the rights of parents who are incarcerated.” Final B. Rep. on Substitute H.B. 1284, 63d Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2013) (SHB 1284). One critical provision in those amendments requires the dependency court to consider several factors “[i ]f the parent is incarcerated ” RCW 13.34.180(1)(f) (emphasis added). Those factors bar a court from assuming that incarceration will make it impossible to parent; they focus instead on the sufficiency of the Department of Social and Health Services' (Department) services and the parent's efforts, requiring the court to evaluate those things on a case-by-case basis.
¶ 2 Petitioner Edelyn Saint–Louis was incarcerated in the middle of a dependency proceeding that lasted just over 2 years, but was released 1 month and 10 days before the termination trial began. The main question presented here is one of statutory interpretation: does RCW 13.34.180(1)(f)'s requirement that certain factors be considered at the termination hearing “[i]f the parent is incarcerated” apply if the parent isn't incarcerated at that time?
¶ 3 We hold, based on the language and purpose of the amendments, that the answer is no. Other portions of the amended statute already require the Department to offer adequate services to all parents (incarcerated or not), and other portions of the amended statute already bar termination if the Department has failed to offer such services to parents (incarcerated or not); hence, other portions of the statute already ensure that the parent's history (including past incarceration) is considered and accommodated. The provision at issue in this case, by contrast, looks to the incarcerated parent's ability to parent in the future. Limiting its application to those incarcerated at the time of the termination hearing thus fits well into the statutory scheme.1
¶ 4 Saint–Louis gave birth to D.L.B. on November 1, 2008. In February 2012, D.L.B. was taken into protective custody and Saint–Louis entered a voluntary agreement placing D.L.B. in temporary (30–day) foster care. Saint–Louis also told department social workers that she planned to move from Seattle to Chicago to live with D.L.B.'s father and paternal aunt. But the Department soon learned that a lifetime no-contact order barred D.L.B.'s father from contacting both Saint–Louis and D.L.B.
¶ 5 Nevertheless, on March 15, 2012, a shelter care hearing was held and the juvenile court released D.L.B. back to Saint– Louis's care, contingent on her abiding by the terms of the no-contact order against D.L.B.'s father and having no other men in her home with D.L.B.
¶ 6 Then, on April 17, 2012, D.L.B. was placed back into foster care. This time it was at Saint–Louis's request.2
¶ 7 D.L.B. was found dependent on May 11, 2012. The dependency court ordered Saint–Louis to obtain a psychological evaluation with a parenting component, follow the recommended treatment, participate in a domestic violence support group, submit to random urine analyses (UAs) for 90 days, and obtain a drug and alcohol evaluation. The court also allowed Saint–Louis to have two supervised visits with D.L.B. per week, with the possibility of more visits to be worked out in consultation with D.L.B.'s court-appointed special advocate (CASA).
¶ 8 The psychologist who performed the court-ordered evaluation (Dr. Steve Tutty) diagnosed Saint–Louis with bipolar II disorder, alcohol and marijuana abuse, a panic disorder, and a learning disorder with “a rule out” of Histrionic personality disorder. He recommended that Saint– Louis obtain a medical consultation regarding medication for her disorders and a drug and alcohol evaluation to address her alcohol and cannabis use, that she enroll in a parenting class called the Incredible Years parent education program, and that she attend a domestic violence support group. Tutty's report stated that “[i]t is expected that [Saint–Louis will] complete these services in the next six months ,” and recommended that reunification with D.L.B. not occur unless Saint–Louis made “significant progress in ... mood regulation, sobriety, parenting skills, and stable housing” during that time, Ex. 16, at 16.
¶ 9 Saint–Louis completed a 28–day inpatient treatment program for drug and alcohol addiction at Sound Mental Health in December 2012. She then met twice with Alyssa Livingston, the department social worker assigned to D.L.B.'s dependency, to make a formal service plan. This plan included outpatient addiction treatment with random UAs, participation in the Incredible Years program and a domestic violence support group, and mental health counseling.
¶ 10 Saint–Louis's participation in these services, however, was spotty. She completed a formal outpatient addiction treatment program but was never able to complete the required 90 days of clean UAs afterward. She completed participation in a domestic violence support group, but not the Incredible Years program, even though she was referred to it four different times. Saint–Louis also regularly missed scheduled visitations with D.L.B.
¶ 11 In May 2013, the Department held another meeting with Saint–Louis. Livingston and others at this meeting explained to Saint–Louis how serious her situation was, given that D.L.B. had already been in foster care for over 12 months, but they also told Saint–Louis that they would give her three more months before referring the case for termination. They told Saint–Louis that they needed to see significant progress during these months or the Department would not agree to reunification.
¶ 12 Two months later, Saint–Louis was involved in a hit-and-run. She was arrested, spent a month in jail (July 2013 to August 2013), and was then released to a jail alternative (King County's Community Center for Alternative Programs (CCAP)).
¶ 13 On November 14, 2013, the dependency court entered an updated “Permanency Planning Hearing Order,” finding that Saint–Louis had not progressed toward correcting her parental deficiencies, Ex. 6, at 5, making no modifications to the existing services plan, and directing the Department to file a petition for termination. Meanwhile, in the criminal case, Saint–Louis violated CCAP's requirements and was returned to jail on November 21, 2013, pending trial.
¶ 14 Saint–Louis's progress in required services at this point was disputed. Saint–Louis testified that she was 5 weeks along in the 18–week Incredible Years program when she returned to jail. Livingston testified that Saint–Louis was not engaged in any required services between the planning meeting in May 2013 and her return to jail in November 2013, even though Saint–Louis was incarcerated for only 1 of those 6 months.
¶ 15 Saint–Louis pleaded guilty on December 16, 2013, to hit-and-run (attended), a gross misdemeanor, and vehicular assault and taking a car without permission, both felonies. In January 2014, she was sentenced to 12 months for one felony and 3 months for the other. The sentencing court allowed Saint–Louis to serve her entire term on work release, which would have enabled her to participate in all dependency court-ordered services. But Saint–Louis actually participated in work release for only 22 days over two separate periods. The first period of work release was from March 17 to March 25; this ended because Saint–Louis violated a work release requirement. The second period was for 15 days, beginning April 11, 2014. At some point during these 15 days, Saint–Louis met with Livingston to discuss visitation, reenrollment in the Incredible Years program, and other services. Livingston once again referred...
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