State v. Samalia

• Decision Date: 28 July 2016
• Docket Number: No. 91532–6,91532–6
• Citation: 186 Wash.2d 262,375 P.3d 1082
• Parties: State of Washington, Respondent, v. Adrian Sutlej Samalia, Petitioner.
• Court: Washington Supreme Court

186 Wash.2d 262
375 P.3d 1082

State of Washington, Respondent
v.
Adrian Sutlej Samalia, Petitioner.

No. 91532–6

Supreme Court of Washington, En Banc.

Argued January 12, 2016
Filed July 28, 2016

Nancy P. Collins, Washington Appellate Project, 1511 3rd Avenue, Suite 701, Seattle, WA, 98101–3647, Counsel for Petitioner.

David Brian Trefry, Yakima County Prosecutors Office, P.O. Box 4846, Spokane, WA, 99220–0846, Joseph Anthony Brusic, Tamara Ann Hanlon, Yakima County Prosecuting Attorney's Office, 128 N 2nd St. Room 329, Yakima, WA, 98901–2621, Counsel for Respondent.

Arnold Reagan Jin, Jin Weis PLLC, 1752 NW Market St., P.O. Box 952, Seattle, WA, 98107–5264, Nancy Lynn Talner, Attorney at Law, 901 5th Avenue Suite 630, Seattle, WA, 98164–2008, Douglas B. Klunder, Attorney at Law, 6940 Parshall Pl. SW, Seattle, WA, 98136–1969, Amicus Curiae on behalf of American Civil Liberties Union.

Gretchen Eileen Verhoef, Spokane County Prosecutors Office, 1100 W Mallon Avenue, Spokane, WA, 99260–0270, Amicus Curiae on behalf of Washington Association of Prosecuting Attorneys.

WIGGINS, J.

186 Wash.2d 266

¶ 1 Petitioner Adrian Sutlej Samalia fled on foot from a stolen vehicle during a lawful traffic stop, leaving his cell phone behind in the vehicle. After Samalia successfully escaped, the police searched the cell phone without a warrant and made contact with one of the numbers stored in the cell phone. That contact led to Samalia's identification as the owner of the phone and driver of the stolen vehicle. The State used this evidence against Samalia at trial. Samalia contends that his right to be free from unreasonable searches was violated when the State introduced the identification evidence derived from the search of his cell phone. We hold that although Samalia initially had a constitutionally protected privacy interest in the cell phone and its data, he abandoned that interest when he voluntarily left the cell phone in a stolen vehicle while fleeing from a lawful traffic stop. Accordingly, we affirm the Court of Appeals.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶ 2 Yakima Police Officer Ryan Yates observed what he believed to be a stolen vehicle while on patrol. He confirmed with dispatch that the vehicle was stolen and began to follow it. Eventually, the driver stopped, got out of the vehicle, and faced Officer Yates. Officer Yates gave the driver various commands, but the driver did not obey and ran away. Officer Yates attempted to chase after the driver, but the driver successfully escaped.

¶ 3 Failing to apprehend the driver, Officer Yates returned to the stolen vehicle and began to search it without a warrant. Officer Yates found a cell phone somewhere near the vehicle's center console, but he did not know to whom it belonged. He then began calling some of the contacts listed in the cell phone.

¶ 4 From the cell phone's contacts, Officer Yates called Deylene Telles. He told Telles that he had found a cell phone and wanted to return it to its owner. Telles agreed to meet

186 Wash.2d 267

at a designated location. When Telles arrived at that location, Yakima Police Sergeant Henne immediately arrested her. Sergeant Henne seized Telles' cell phone and used the cell phone recovered by Officer Yates to call it. Telles' cell phone displayed Samalia's name and photo, identifying him as the caller. Officer Yates then looked up Samalia's

375 P.3d 1085

photo in a law enforcement database and identified Samalia as the driver who fled from the stolen vehicle.

¶ 5 On these facts, the State charged Samalia with possession of a stolen vehicle. Samalia moved to suppress the cell phone evidence, arguing that the officers violated his constitutional rights when they seized and searched his cell phone with neither a warrant nor a valid exception to the warrant requirement. The State responded that the warrantless search was valid under the abandonment doctrine. The trial court denied Samalia's motion, agreeing with the State that no warrant was required under the abandonment doctrine. The trial court held that Samalia voluntarily abandoned any privacy interest that he had in the cell phone by leaving it in the stolen vehicle, which he also voluntarily abandoned, while fleeing from Office Yates. After denying Samalia's suppression motion and subsequent motion for reconsideration, the trial court found Samalia guilty as charged in a bench trial.

¶ 6 Samalia appealed, and the Court of Appeals Division Three affirmed the trial court in a split decision. State v. Samalia , 186 Wash.App. 224, 226, 344 P.3d 722 (2015). The Court of Appeals affirmed for three reasons: (1) the abandonment doctrine applied, (2) the exigent circumstances doctrine applied, (3) and the attenuation doctrine applied. Samalia then sought this court's discretionary review, which we granted.

ANALYSIS

¶ 7 The issue before us is whether Samalia had a constitutionally protected privacy interest in his cell phone and, if

186 Wash.2d 268

so, whether the police were justified in searching the cell phone without a warrant. We conclude that Samalia did initially have a constitutionally protected privacy interest in his cell phone under the Washington Constitution, but he lost that interest when he “voluntarily abandoned the cell phone located in the vehicle” while fleeing from police. Clerk's Papers at 31 (Finding of Fact IV); Wash. Const. art. I, § 7.

¶ 8 Washington's Constitution states that “[n]o person shall be disturbed in his private affairs ... without authority of law.” Wash. Const. art. I, § 7. Article I, section 7 encompasses the privacy expectations protected by the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and, in some cases, may provide greater protection than the Fourth Amendment because its protections are not confined to the subjective privacy expectations of citizens. State v. Myrick , 102 Wash.2d 506, 510–11, 688 P.2d 151 (1984). Under article I, section 7—in its protection of “private affairs”—“a search occurs when the government disturbs ‘those privacy interests which citizens of this state have held, and should be entitled to hold , safe from government trespass absent a warrant.’ ” (State v. Hinton , 179 Wash.2d 862, 868, 319 P.3d 9 (2014) (quoting Myrick , 102 Wash.2d at 511, 688 P.2d 151 )). “The ‘authority of law’ required by article I, section 7 [to search or seize an item classified as a ‘private affair’] is a valid warrant unless the State shows that a search ... falls within one of the jealously guarded and carefully drawn exceptions to the warrant requirement.” Id. at 868–69, 319 P.3d 9.

¶ 9 Our private affairs analysis leads to the conclusion in Part II of this opinion that cell phones, including the information that they contain, are “private affairs” under article I, section 7. As a private affair, the police may not search a cell phone without a warrant or applicable warrant exception.

¶ 10 However, citizens may lose their constitutional protections in a private affair under the abandonment doctrine. In Part III, we conclude that the abandonment doctrine

186 Wash.2d 269

applies to cell phones, and in Part IV, we affirm the trial court's conclusion that Samalia abandoned his cell phone. Finally, in Part V, we reverse the Court of Appeals rulings on the exigent circumstances and attenuation doctrines.

I. Standard of review

¶ 11 We review constitutional issues de novo. State v. Gresham , 173 Wash.2d 405, 419, 269 P.3d 207 (2012). When a trial court denies a motion to suppress, we also review that court's conclusions of law de novo. State v. Winterstein , 167 Wash.2d 620, 628, 220 P.3d 1226 (2009). Whether Samalia had and

375 P.3d 1086

then abandoned a privacy interest in his cell phone and its data is a mixed question of law and fact because we are required to apply legal principles to a particularized set of factual circumstances. See In re Det. of Anderson , 166 Wash.2d 543, 555, 211 P.3d 994 (2009) ; Erwin v. Cotter Health Ctrs. , 161 Wash.2d 676, 687, 167 P.3d 1112 (2007). “Analytically, resolving a mixed question of law and fact requires establishing the relevant facts, determining the applicable law, and then applying that law to the facts.” Tapper v. Emp't Sec. Dep't , 122 Wash.2d 397, 403, 858 P.2d 494 (1993). For mixed questions of law and fact, unchallenged factual findings are verities on appeal and we review application of those facts to the law de novo. In re Det. of Anderson , 166 Wash.2d at 555, 211 P.3d 994.

II. Cell phones and the information they contain are “private affairs” under article I, section 7 of the Washington Constitution

¶ 12 We hold that cell phones and the information contained therein are private affairs because they may contain intimate details about individuals' lives, which we have previously held are protected under article I, section 7. In determining whether something is a private affair (meaning “those privacy interests which citizens of this state have held, and should be entitled to hold, safe from

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