State v. Sanchez

• Decision Date: 07 February 1991
• Docket Number: No. 292A89,292A89
• Citation: 328 N.C. 247,400 S.E.2d 421
• Parties: STATE of North Carolina v. Jose Manuel SANCHEZ.
• Court: North Carolina Supreme Court

Page 421

400 S.E.2d 421

328 N.C. 247

STATE of North Carolina v. Jose Manuel SANCHEZ.

No. 292A89.

Supreme Court of North Carolina.

Feb. 7, 1991.

Appeal as of right pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7A-27 from a judgment of life imprisonment entered by Lake, J. at the 10 April 1989 Session of Superior Court, Duplin County. Heard in the Supreme Court on 12 December 1990.

Lacy H. Thornburg, Atty. Gen. by James J. Coman, Sr. Deputy Atty. Gen., and William N. Farrell, Jr., Sp. Deputy Atty. Gen., Raleigh, for the State.

Malcolm Ray Hunter, Jr., Appellate Defender by Daniel R. Pollitt, Asst. Appellate Defender, Raleigh, for defendant-appellant.

MARTIN, Justice.

Defendant was tried capitally and found guilty of murder in the first degree upon the theory of premeditation and deliberation. Failing to find any aggravating circumstances, the jury recommended a sentence of life imprisonment, from which defendant appeals. Defendant contends, inter alia, that the trial court erred in excluding expert opinion evidence that the defendant did not understand the warnings given by police pursuant to Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), before he allegedly waived his rights and confessed. We hold that this exclusion was prejudicial error entitling defendant to a new trial. Therefore, it is not necessary to discuss defendant's other assignments of error.

William McKay was shot and killed on the morning of May 23, 1988 at Lyman's Crossroads in Duplin County. Because we remand for a new trial, a detailed discussion of the crime is not necessary. However a recitation of the facts surrounding defendant's alleged confession will be instructive for the issue at hand. Shortly after the murder, Duplin County officials requested that the Florida Department of Law Enforcement aid their investigation of suspects living in Florida. Agents learned that defendant, a Spanish-speaking immigrant from Puerto Rico, had borrowed a car matching the description of one seen at Lyman's Crossroads around the time of the murder. Four agents, two from North Carolina and two from Florida, went to defendant's apartment and asked him to accompany them to their vehicle. The agents were casually dressed and carried concealed weapons, although one officer placed his gun in the back of his trousers. Because it was hot in the car, defendant agreed to go with the agents to the police station and was read his Miranda rights in Spanish. The agents told him that he did not have to go and could drive his own car, but he indicated that his car was not operative.

Agents testified at the suppression hearing that defendant seemed aware, did not appear intoxicated, and responded affirmatively to the waiver of rights. Defendant originally told the agents that he borrowed the car to go to Disney World, but decided to drive to New York to see his girlfriend, got as far as North Carolina, and then returned to Florida. Twenty to thirty minutes into the questioning, defendant began to talk about his involvement in the crime. Agents testified that defendant confessed and made drawings of the crime scene to aid his explanation. Defendant indicated that Tammy Thompson, a coworker, had offered to pay him to kill McKay. At the agents' request, defendant called Thompson and elicited incriminating statements. After being transported to North Carolina, defendant recanted his confession. However, when an officer told defendant that he did not believe his new story, defendant confessed again. The trial court denied defendant's motion to suppress the confession after a hearing.

At trial, the defense called Dr. Brad Fisher, a forensic clinical psychologist who had examined the defendant. Dr. Fisher testified about defendant's limited intelligence and dependent personality traits. However, the trial court prohibited Fisher from stating his opinion about the defendant's understanding of the Miranda warnings. On voir dire, Dr. Fisher testified as follows:

Q: And, Dr. Fisher, based upon your knowledge, skill, experience, training, education and your clinical evaluation in this case, do you have an opinion as to whether Jose Pepe Sanchez understood his Constitutional rights, commonly referred to as Miranda Rights, including the right to remain silent and the right to an attorney as read to him on May 26, 1988 and on June 3, 1988 and also on June 6, 1988 so that he could voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently waive these rights?

A: Yes.

Q: What is your opinion?

A: My opinion is that he did not. This is based on the specific questions I have spoken to earlier in my own testimony the first time [at the suppression hearing]. For example, that he didn't know what it meant to have a right to. He did not know what an attorney was. There are, there are a set of questions you give as a test for the extent to which you understand Miranda. I gave that and I found limits to the extent that I thought that he was not able to fully comprehend the Miranda Rights.

The State argues that this testimony was properly excluded as an attempt to relitigate the admissibility of the confession. Assuming, arguendo, that the confession was admissible, we hold that the court erred by preventing Dr. Fisher from testifying concerning the surrounding circumstances.

Under Rule 104(e) of the North Carolina Rules of Evidence, the preliminary determination of admissibility of evidence by the trial court "does not limit the right of a party to introduce before the jury evidence relevant to weight or credibility." N.C.G.S. § 8C-1, Rule 104(e) (1988); cf. State v. Walker, 266 N.C. 269, 145 S.E.2d 833 (1966) (error for trial judge to make finding of fact that confession was voluntary in the presence of the jury). Dean Brandis wrote,

[o]nce disputed evidence is admitted at the trial, its weight and credibility are for the jury. Therefore, if otherwise competent, to the extent that it bears upon such weight or credibility, the same testimony which failed to convince the judge to grant the motion to suppress is admissible before the jury.

1 Brandis on North Carolina Evidence § 19a (3d ed.1988) (footnotes omitted). In Walker this Court stated the general rule:

If the judge determines the proffered testimony is admissible, the jury is recalled, the objection to the admission of the testimony is overruled, and the testimony is received in evidence for consideration by the jury. If admitted in evidence, it is for the jury to determine whether the statements referred to in the testimony of the witness were in fact made by the defendant and the weight, if any, to be given such statements if made. Hence, evidence as to the circumstances under which the statements attributed to defendant were made may be offered or elicited on cross-examination in the presence of the jury. Admissibility is for determination by the judge unassisted by the jury. Credibility and weight are for determination by the jury unassisted by the judge.

266 N.C. at 273, 145 S.E.2d at 836 (emphasis added); accord State v. Moore, 321 N.C. 327, 339, 364 S.E.2d 648, 654 (1988).

The State argues that the opinion testimony was...