State v. Sanders
| Decision Date | 20 July 1992 |
| Docket Number | No. 49S02-9207-PC-563,49S02-9207-PC-563 |
| Citation | 596 N.E.2d 225 |
| Parties | STATE of Indiana, Appellant, v. Fred C. SANDERS, Appellee. |
| Court | Indiana Supreme Court |
The State of Indiana (Appellant-Respondent below) petitions this Court to accept transfer of this case after the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's grant of Fred Sanders' (Appellee-Petitioner below) petition for post-conviction relief. The issue presented is whether the trial court's grant of relief setting aside Sanders' guilty plea is clearly erroneous because it is not supported by the evidence. We decide this issue in the State's favor and, therefore, reverse the order of the trial court and remand to the trial court with directions to deny Sanders' petition.
In August 1988, Sanders admittedly shot and killed an Indianapolis police officer, Matthew Faber, after Faber had forced entry into Sanders' house and after he had identified himself as a police officer. As a result of this killing, the State charged Sanders with murder and sought the death penalty. Additionally, he was charged with two counts of attempted murder and one count of resisting law enforcement resulting in bodily injury. The State later dismissed the death penalty count and proceeded toward trial on the other four charges. Prior to trial, on January 31, 1989, Sanders pled guilty to involuntary manslaughter in exchange for the State's dismissal of all other charges. He was never formally charged with involuntary manslaughter, but pled guilty to involuntary manslaughter as a lesser-included offense of murder. Following a pre-sentence investigation, Sanders was sentenced to a term of seven years imprisonment.
Subsequently, on October 24, 1990, Sanders filed a verified petition for post-conviction relief in which he alleged that his plea of guilty to involuntary manslaughter was not knowingly, voluntarily, or intelligently made because "neither the State of Indiana, the Court, nor my counsel, furnished me in writing or read to me an information setting out the crime to which I was pleading guilty." Additionally, Sanders alleged in his petition that "neither the State of Indiana, the Court, nor my counsel, informed me the [sic] necessary elements for any such underlying crime." The remainder of Sanders' petition alleged that he had never deviated from the defense that he was acting in self-defense. The petition also detailed conversations with Sanders' trial attorney in which he allegedly advised Sanders that he should accept the plea bargain and plead guilty to involuntary manslaughter. His petition further alleged that his counsel advised him to enter such a plea because counsel was not ready to try the murder charge and because Sanders was, in fact, guilty of involuntary manslaughter in that he had acted recklessly in causing the death of Faber. Sanders finally alleged in the petition that he was never advised of the legal definition of "reckless" or "recklessly", and that had he been so advised, he would not have pleaded guilty.
At the hearing on the petition, Sanders' counsel stated to the court his theory of the case which, in effect, was that the guilty plea should be set aside because at the time of the guilty plea hearing there was no charging document (either information or indictment) that charged Sanders with involuntary manslaughter. Sanders' legal premise was that, as a matter of law, a defendant cannot knowingly enter into a guilty plea to the charge of involuntary manslaughter unless there is an information or indictment charging him with the crime of involuntary manslaughter.
In support of that position, Sanders testified and was asked a total of eight questions. During his examination, he identified himself and his petition for post-conviction relief. Counsel then offered the petition into evidence. The State objected on the grounds that the petition simply constituted a pleading in the case and, therefore, should not be considered as evidence in the case. In response to that objection, Sanders' attorney replied as follows:
Simply, your honor, it is not for the truth of the matters stated because there has been an answer and certain denials simply for the record of this proceeding introducing it in evidence as in effect the Petitioner Complaint by petitioner and again not for the truth of the matters stated....
(Emphasis added.) With that understanding, the State no longer objected and the court admitted the petition into evidence. Additionally, the court admitted the plea agreement, as well as the State's answers to interrogatories and requests for admission, and the transcript of the guilty plea hearing. Sanders rested without any additional testimony on his part other than identifying the documents set forth above. The State called no witnesses.
In granting the petition for post-conviction relief, the trial court quoted at length from Sanders' petition and found that the allegations contained in Sanders' petition were true and correct, and that he was not advised of the charge against him or of the specific elements of the offense to which he pled guilty. The Court of Appeals affirmed in spite of the State's argument that Sanders did not provide testimony necessary to establish the claims contained within his petition. 587 N.E.2d 166. The Court of Appeals noted that Sanders' verified petition was entered into evidence at the post-conviction hearing, and, citing State v. Keith (1985), Ind.App., 482 N.E.2d 751, that the post-conviction court's judgment could rest on Sanders' verified petition alone. We disagree.
The crux of the problem presented in this case is that the verified petition was admitted into evidence for a limited purpose, and was specifically not being admitted into evidence for the truth of the matters contained within the petition. After admitting the petition into evidence with the understanding that it was not being admitted for the truth of the matters contained within the petition, the trial court erroneously...
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