State v. Schinzel

• Decision Date: 09 May 2002
• Docket Number: No. 1 CA-CR 00-0996.,1 CA-CR 00-0996.
• Parties: STATE of Arizona, Appellee, v. Luke Jaret SCHINZEL, Appellant.
• Court: Arizona Court of Appeals

45 P.3d 1224

202 Ariz. 375

STATE of Arizona, Appellee, v. Luke Jaret SCHINZEL, Appellant.

No. -0996.

Court of Appeals of Arizona, Division 1, Department B.

May 9, 2002.

Janet Napolitano, Attorney General By Randall M. Howe, Chief Counsel, Criminal Appeals Section and Katia Mehu, Assistant Attorney General, Phoenix, Attorneys for Appellee.

James J. Haas, Maricopa County Public Defender By Spencer D. Heffel, Deputy Public Defender, Phoenix, Attorneys for Appellant.

OPINION

TIMMER, Presiding Judge.

¶ 1 Luke Jaret Schinzel appeals from his convictions and sentences for possession of drug paraphernalia, possession of marijuana, and two counts of forgery, challenging the trial court's rulings on his motion to suppress. We are asked to decide whether the trial court erred by refusing to suppress Schinzel's answers to police inquiries made after his arrest but prior to advising him of his Miranda rights and concerning an offense unrelated to the one underlying his arrest. We are additionally asked to determine whether the court erred by declining to suppress evidence obtained during a search of a dresser in Schinzel's girlfriend's apartment and from questioning Schinzel after he had waived his Miranda rights. For the reasons that follow, we reverse and remand for further proceedings.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶ 2 In April 2000, Phoenix Police Officer Georgia Sevcou investigated complaints that an apartment leaseholder, Tara Montoya, was engaging in illegal drug activities and allowing her boyfriend to reside with her, although he was not listed on the lease. In the course of her investigation, Officer Sevcou and other officers contacted Montoya at her apartment. Montoya permitted Officer Sevcou to look around the apartment, but the officer saw no evidence of drug activity. Montoya did admit that she had outstanding traffic warrants, though, and was given "a two-week reprieve" to take care of them.

¶ 3 Schinzel was present in the apartment during this time, and Montoya identified him as her boyfriend. Officer Sevcou asked other officers to obtain identifying information from Schinzel, and he provided a false name. When Officer Sevcou later returned to the apartment to ascertain Schinzel's true identity, he had left.

¶ 4 On the morning of May 3, 2000, Officer Sevcou and plain-clothes detectives returned to the apartment to arrest Montoya because her warrants remained outstanding. Officer Sevcou also planned to confirm the absence of drug activity and, if possible, ascertain Schinzel's identity.

¶ 5 Officers McCauley and Luney, dressed as maintenance workers, went to Montoya's apartment, knocked on the door, and spoke to Schinzel after he had opened it. Schinzel sent Montoya to the door to confirm her leaseholder status to the "workers," who then asked Montoya if they could examine her thermostat. When she answered affirmatively and invited them inside, Officer McCauley grabbed her arm, identified himself as a police officer, and arrested her for the outstanding warrants. Officer Sevcou then entered the apartment and took charge of Montoya, who went to a back bedroom to change from her night clothes.

¶ 6 Officer McCauley turned to Schinzel and asked for his name, which Schinzel eventually disclosed. Upon learning that Schinzel had outstanding warrants, Officer Luney placed him in handcuffs and directed him to sit in a chair in the front room of the apartment.

¶ 7 Officer Siekmann then entered the apartment and stood near a dresser also located in the front room. The officer spotted glass pipes "commonly used in smoking methamphetamine directly on top of the dresser in plain view." He asked Schinzel if the dresser belonged to him, and Schinzel answered affirmatively. Officer Siekmann next asked if Schinzel owned the glass pipes, and Schinzel again replied affirmatively. The officer then asked Schinzel whether there were "any other drugs inside of the apartment," and Schinzel answered that drugs were located in the top dresser drawer. After obtaining Schinzel's permission to remove the drugs from the dresser, Officer Siekmann opened the drawer and pulled out a plastic bag containing a white, crystal-like substance that he believed to be methamphetamine. Schinzel then declared that there was also a baggie of marijuana inside the same drawer, which the officer retrieved.

¶ 8 Officer Siekmann also found in the drawer a wallet and loose checks, which were not in Schinzel's name. He asked Schinzel if the checks belonged to him, and Schinzel replied that he had found them. He next asked Schinzel if he wanted to take the wallet to jail with him, and Schinzel said that he did. An "inventory search" of the wallet disclosed two Arizona identification cards bearing Schinzel's photograph but not his name.

¶ 9 Eventually, the police transported Schinzel to the precinct where, for the first time, they advised him of his Miranda¹ rights. Schinzel waived his right to remain silent and answered questions about the checks and the identification cards. The State ultimately charged Schinzel with possession of dangerous drugs, possession of drug paraphernalia, possession of marijuana and two counts of forgery.

¶ 10 Prior to trial, Schinzel moved the court to preclude his statements to the officers and suppress the evidence seized at the time of his arrest. After conducting an evidentiary hearing, the court found that Officer Siekmann's questions regarding Schinzel's ownership of the dresser and pipes were investigatory and were therefore properly asked without first advising Schinzel of his Miranda rights. The court found that after Schinzel had answered these questions, however, the officer's questions turned to custodial interrogation. Because Schinzel had not been advised of his Miranda rights before answering these questions, the court precluded their admission during the State's case-in-chief. The court also suppressed evidence of the methamphetamine because Officer Siekmann had located it only by his wrongful questioning of Schinzel, but it denied the request to suppress evidence of the marijuana, the checks, and the wallet based on its finding that the officer had discovered them as a result of Schinzel's unsolicited comments. The court also ruled that the pipes were admissible because they were in "plain view," and it declined to preclude admission of Schinzel's statements made after the police had informed him of his Miranda rights.

¶ 11 The State dismissed the charge of possessing methamphetamine. A jury convicted Schinzel of the remaining counts. This appeal followed.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶ 12 We review the trial court's ruling for a clear abuse of discretion, State v. Acinelli, 191 Ariz. 66, 69, 952 P.2d 304, 307 (App.1997), considering only the evidence presented at the suppression hearing. State v. Spears, 184 Ariz. 277, 284, 908 P.2d 1062, 1069 (1996). While we view this evidence in the light most favorable to sustaining the trial court's ruling, State v. Stanley, 167 Ariz. 519, 525, 809 P.2d 944, 950 (1991), we review de novo the court's legal conclusions. State v. Sanchez, 200 Ariz. 163, 165, ¶ 5, 24 P.3d 610, 612 (App.2001).

DISCUSSION

I. Statements regarding the ownership of the dresser and pipes

¶ 13 Schinzel first argues that the trial court erred by refusing to suppress his admissions to the police that he owned the dresser and pipes. He contends that because Officer Siekmann conducted a custodial interrogation by asking Schinzel about the dresser and pipes without first advising him of his Miranda rights and securing a waiver, admission of the statements violated Schinzel's rights against self-incrimination guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article 2, Section 10 of the Arizona Constitution.² The State counters, and the trial court agreed, that even though Schinzel was in custody at the time Officer Siekmann posed his questions, because the inquiry was merely investigatory, the police were not required to first advise Schinzel of his Miranda rights. To resolve this issue, we must discern where the line is drawn between "custodial interrogation" and an "investigatory inquiry" when questions are directed to a person in custody for an offense unrelated to the subject of the inquiry.

¶ 14 In Miranda, the Court held that police officers must inform a suspect of enumerated constitutional rights prior to conducting a "custodial interrogation." 384 U.S. at 444, 86 S.Ct. 1602. It explained, however, that its decision was "not intended to hamper the traditional function of police officers in investigating crime." Id. at 477, 86 S.Ct. 1602. Consequently, the Court held as follows:

When an individual is in custody on probable cause, the police may, of course, seek out evidence in the field to be used at trial against him. Such investigation may include inquiry of persons not under restraint. General on-the-scene questioning as to facts surrounding a crime or other general questioning of citizens in the fact-finding process is not affected by our holding. It is an act of responsible citizenship for individuals to give whatever information they may have to aid in law enforcement. In such situations the compelling atmosphere inherent in the process of in-custody interrogation is not necessarily present.

Id. at 477-78, 86 S.Ct. 1602.

¶ 15 The State seizes on this aspect of Miranda and argues that Officer Siekmann's questions were the type of on-the-scene questioning described by Miranda and exempted from its holding. It contends that because the pipes could have belonged to either Schinzel or Montoya, the questions were necessarily investigatory. Thus, the State asserts, until the police had sufficient facts to arrest someone for possessing the pipes, its questions were merely part of a preliminary investigation. The trial court agreed with the State, ruling that the questions were investigatory because the police did not have probable cause to arrest Schinzel for...