State v. Schroeder

• Decision Date: 04 February 1999
• Docket Number: No. 98-1420,98-1420
• Citation: 224 Wis.2d 706,593 N.W.2d 76
• Parties: STATE of Wisconsin, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Chad D. SCHROEDER, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: Wisconsin Court of Appeals

Page 76

593 N.W.2d 76

224 Wis.2d 706

STATE of Wisconsin, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Chad D. SCHROEDER, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 98-1420.

Court of Appeals of Wisconsin.

Submitted on Briefs Jan. 12, 1999.

Opinion Released Feb. 4, 1999.

Opinion Filed Feb. 4, 1999.

On behalf of the defendant-appellant, the cause was submitted on the briefs of Patrick Cavanaugh Brennan of Brennan, Ramirez, Wilmouth & Sesini, L.L.P. of Milwaukee.

On behalf of the plaintiff-respondent, the cause was submitted on the brief of James E. Doyle, attorney general, and David J. Becker, assistant attorney general.

Before VERGERONT, ROGGENSACK and DEININGER, JJ.

VERGERONT, J.

Chad Schroeder appeals from an order that denied his postconviction motion challenging his conviction and sentence on two charges of third-degree sexual assault contrary to § 940.225(3), STATS. The charges involved incidents occurring before his eighteenth birthday, but the criminal complaint was not filed until after he turned eighteen. He pleaded guilty to both counts. Schroeder contends that he was entitled to a hearing under State v. Becker, 74 Wis.2d 675, 247 N.W.2d 495 (1976), at which the State had to establish that it did not intentionally delay filing the criminal complaint until after his eighteenth birthday; and that this objection affects the court's "subject matter jurisdiction" and is therefore not waived even though he did not request a Beckerhearing before he entered his pleas. We conclude that a Beckerhearing addresses a potential constitutional violation, not the court's subject matter jurisdiction, and that Schroeder waived the right to request a Beckerhearing when he entered the guilty pleas. We therefore affirm.

BACKGROUND

The State filed a delinquency petition on December 4, 1990, charging Schroeder with one count of second-degree sexual assault contrary to § 948.02(2), STATS. (sexual contact or intercourse with a person under sixteen), arising out of an incident that occurred on August 18, 1990. The State also filed a waiver petition about the same time. ¹ Schroeder's eighteenth birthday was on February 11, 1991. On February 19, the State amended the juvenile petition to add two additional charges of third-degree sexual assault contrary to § 940.225(3), STATS. (sexual intercourse without consent). The hearing on the waiver petition occurred on March 4, 1991, and the court granted the petition.

On March 28, 1991, the State filed a criminal complaint charging Schroeder with eleven counts of either second or third-degree sexual assault. A second amended complaint added seventeen more counts. Three of the counts were based on the same conduct alleged in the delinquency petition as amended; twenty-three were based on other incidents occurring before Schroeder's eighteenth birthday; and two were based on incidents occurring after Schroeder's eighteenth birthday. Ultimately, the information to which Schroeder pleaded guilty contained five counts of third-degree sexual assault, three of which occurred before Schroeder After an unsuccessful direct appeal raising only an ineffective assistance of counsel issue, Schroeder filed a motion for postconviction relief under § 974.06, STATS., asking the court to vacate the judgments of conviction on counts 2 and 3 of the information because "subject matter jurisdiction as to [those counts] properly rested with the Juvenile Court [and][t]he Juvenile Court never waived jurisdiction in regard to those charges." Therefore, Schroeder contended, the convictions on those two charges were void and had to be dismissed with prejudice. Alternatively, Schroeder's motion sought an evidentiary hearing under State v. Becker, 74 Wis.2d 675, 247 N.W.2d 495 (1976), which held that when a defendant alleges and makes a prima facie showing ² that the State delayed in filing a complaint in criminal court for the "purpose of manipulating the system to avoid juvenile court jurisdiction," "jurisdiction in criminal court cannot be maintained" unless the State establishes at a "due-process hearing" that the delay was not for that purpose. Id. at 678, 247 N.W.2d at 497. Schroeder contended that he was entitled to such a hearing with respect to counts 2 and 3. The court denied Schroeder's motion, concluding that Schroeder had waived his right to raise his objections to counts 2 and 3 when he entered pleas of not guilty to them.

was eighteen (counts 1, 2 and 3). Only count 1 had been charged in the delinquency petition as amended. Schroeder was sentenced to consecutive prison terms totaling sixteen years on the five convictions.

DISCUSSION

On appeal Schroeder contends the trial court erred in deciding that he waived the right to raise his objections to counts 2 and 3 by the entry of his guilty pleas because, he contends, those objections challenged the subject matter jurisdiction of the court, and the entry of a guilty plea does not waive objections to subject matter jurisdiction. The State responds that Schroeder's claim that he is entitled to a Becker hearing does not affect the court's subject matter jurisdiction but instead implicates a defendant's constitutional right to due process, and guilty pleas do waive any potential constitutional error. Whether a trial court lacks subject matter jurisdiction is a question of law, which we review de novo. State v. Webster, 196 Wis.2d 308, 316, 538 N.W.2d 810, 813 (Ct.App.1995). A careful reading of the cases upon which both parties rely convinces us that the State's analysis is the correct one.

The general and often-stated rule is that the knowing, voluntary and intelligent entry of a guilty plea waives all "nonjurisdictional defects" preceding the entry of a plea, including constitutional violations and objections to personal jurisdiction, but does not waive objections to subject matter jurisdiction. Pillsbury v. State, 31 Wis.2d 87, 93-94, 142 N.W.2d 187, 191 (1966). In the context of deciding whether certain claims of error were waived by a guilty plea, the court in Mack v. State, 93 Wis.2d 287, 286 N.W.2d 563 (1980), discussed the meaning of "subject matter jurisdiction."

Criminal subject matter jurisdiction is defined as the power of the court to inquire into the charged crime, to apply the applicable law and to declare the punishment in a court of a judicial proceeding. The power is one conferred by law. A court has subject matter jurisdiction where it has been authorized to hear and determine the primary object of the action.

The circuit courts in Wisconsin are courts of general jurisdiction. They have original subject matter jurisdiction of all matters, civil and criminal, not excepted in the constitution or prohibited by law.

Mack, 93 Wis.2d at 294, 286 N.W.2d at 566 (citations omitted). The court then quoted Article VII, Section 8 of the Wisconsin Constitution ³ and § 252.03, STATS., 1975, now § 753.03, STATS., ⁴ and continued:

If the criminal complaint is defective, or if the defendant is convicted under an invalid law, the conviction itself is not void. The circuit court still has subject matter jurisdiction to render its judgment. Even where the error in the law or proceedings is fatal to the prosecution, the circuit court has the power to inquire into the sufficiency of the charges before the court.

Id. at 295, 286 N.W.2d at 567 (citations omitted).

The court in Mack observed one instance in which courts have held a defect was "jurisdictional" and therefore non-waivable--when the complaint fails "to charge any offense known to law." Id. (citing Champlain v. State, 53 Wis.2d 751, 754, 193 N.W.2d 868, 871 (1972)); State v. Lampe, 26 Wis.2d 646, 648, 133 N.W.2d 349, 350 (1965). A complaint that charges an offense not known to law is one that omits an essential element of the crime charged as defined by statute or case law. See Champlain, 53 Wis.2d at 754, 193 N.W.2d at 871; see also State v. Dreske, 88 Wis.2d 60, 81, 276 N.W.2d 324, 334 (Ct.App.1979). We are not aware of any case subsequent to Mack that has held any other type of deficiency to be non-waivable. Indeed, relying on Mack, we have repeatedly stated: "The circuit court lacks criminal subject-matter jurisdiction only where the complaint does not charge an offense known to law." State v. Aniton, 183 Wis.2d 125, 129, 515 N.W.2d 302, 304 (Ct.App.1994) (emphasis added); see also Webster, 196 Wis.2d at 317, 538 N.W.2d at 813; State v. West, 214 Wis.2d 468, 482, 571 N.W.2d 196, 201 (Ct.App.1997). ⁵

The criminal complaint against Schroeder, and the amended complaints, properly alleged the elements of the crimes of second-degree sexual assault as defined in § 848.08(2), STATS., and third-degree sexual assault as defined in § 940.225(3), STATS., and Schroeder does not contend otherwise. Rather, he contends that the use of the terms "jurisdiction of the juvenile court" and "jurisdiction of the criminal court" or "adult court" in Becker and subsequent cases applying Becker, demonstrate that an inappropriate motive for the State's delay in charging affects the court's subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate the criminal charges and is therefore not waived by a guilty plea. We disagree.

The court in Becker based its requirement of a hearing on Miller v. Quatsoe, 348 F.Supp. 764 (E.D.Wis.1972), which held that the "[a]dministrators of a state juvenile system may not manipulate administrative procedures so as to avoid state and constitutional procedural rights meant to protect juveniles." Becker, 74 Wis.2d at 677, 247 N.W.2d at 496 (quoting Miller, 348 F.Supp. at 766). A reading of Miller makes clear that the legal basis for the hearing requirement is not the subject matter jurisdiction of Wisconsin courts, but the Fourteenth Amendment. After referring to §§ 48.12 and 48.18, STATS., (presumably those versions in effect in 1968, when the relevant events occurred), the Miller court stated:

Recognizing that the constitution may not require that the state provide a bifurcated system so as to better provide for the...