State v. Scruggs
Decision Date | 21 November 2019 |
Docket Number | No. 19-0073,19-0073 |
Citation | 836 S.E.2d 466,242 W.Va. 499 |
Court | West Virginia Supreme Court |
Parties | STATE of West Virginia, Petitioner v. Daniel Scott SCRUGGS, Respondent |
Patrick Morrisey, Esq., Attorney General, Mary Beth Niday, Esq., Assistant Attorney General, Charleston, West Virginia, Counsel for the Petitioner
Gregory V Smith, Esq., Law Office of Gregory V Smith, Martinsburg, West Virginia, Counsel for the Respondent
In this case we consider two certified questions regarding West Virginia's kidnapping statute, W. Va. Code § 61-2-14a (2017). After exercising our authority to reformulate the certified questions, and after considering the parties' briefs, relevant portions of the joint appendix record, oral arguments, and the pertinent law, we answer the reformulated certified questions as follows:
On September 19, 2018, the Respondent Daniel Scott Scruggs ("Scruggs") was indicted for kidnapping in violation of W. Va. Code § 61-2-14a.1 During a pretrial hearing, the circuit court requested briefing from the parties as to whether the United States Supreme Court's decision in Alleyne v. United States, 570 U.S. 99, 133 S.Ct. 2151, 186 L.Ed.2d 314 (2013) has impacted the holding of Syllabus point 2 of State v. Haught, 218 W.Va. 462, 624 S.E.2d 899 (2005) so that a jury would now need to make additional determinations when considering a kidnapping charge. Another pretrial hearing was held and the parties discussed whether the judge or the jury should make determinations found in W. Va. Code § 61-2-14a(b)(3) and (4). The parties also discussed the propriety of submission of special interrogatories to the jury in a kidnapping case. The State of West Virginia ("State") argued that the circuit court judge had the authority to decide the issues regarding whether a person is returned without bodily harm and before some concession had been received. The circuit court did not agree with the State's position, and it was decided that Scruggs' trial would be continued so that these issues could be brought before this Court for consideration.
The Court entered its Order Certifying Questions on January 23, 2019. The circuit court proposed two certified questions. The two questions, and the circuit court's answers are as follows:
The State and Scruggs both agree that the trial judge, not the jury, should determine those facts that are found in W. Va. Code § 61-2-14a(b)(3) and (4). Further, the State and Scruggs also agree that a trial court exceeds its legitimate authority and abuses its discretion if it submits special interrogatories to the jury in a kidnapping case, in the absence of a statutory requirement.
"The appellate standard of review of questions of law answered and certified by a circuit court is de novo [,]" Syl. Pt. 1, Gallapoo v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. , 197 W.Va. 172, 475 S.E.2d 172 (1996), meaning that "we give plenary consideration to the legal issues that must be resolved to answer the question" certified by the circuit court. Michael v. Appalachian Heating, LLC, 226 W.Va. 394, 398, 701 S.E.2d 116, 120 (2010).
Prior to addressing the issues raised in this proceeding, we exercise our authority to reformulate the questions certified by the circuit court in order to fully address the legal issues presented.
When a certified question is not framed so that this Court is able to fully address the law which is involved in the question, then this Court retains the power to reformulate questions certified to it under both the Uniform Certification of Questions of Law Act found in W.Va. Code, 51-1A-1, et seq. and W.Va. Code, 58-5-2 [1967], the statute relating to certified questions from a circuit court of this State to this Court.
Syl. Pt. 3, Kincaid v. Mangum, 189 W.Va. 404, 432 S.E.2d 74 (1993).
Consistent with our authority to do so, we reformulate the questions certified as follows:
We will address each of these questions in turn.
In the first certified question, we are asked to determine whether the trial judge or the jury should determine the facts that will reduce a criminal defendant's sentence from life to a term of years. Answering this question requires us to examine our kidnapping statute. Therefore, we begin our analysis with a review of our rules of statutory interpretation. This Court has held that in deciding the meaning of a statutory provision, Appalachian Power Co. v. State Tax Dep't of W. Va ., 195 W.Va. 573, 587, 466 S.E.2d 424, 438 (1995). See also Syl. Pt. 2, Crockett v. Andrews , 153 W.Va. 714, 172 S.E.2d 384 (1970) (); and Syl. Pt. 2, State v. Epperly , 135 W.Va. 877, 65 S.E.2d 488 (1951) (). Additionally, this Court has held that "[a] statute is open to construction only where the language used requires interpretation because of ambiguity which renders it susceptible of two or more constructions or of such doubtful or obscure meaning that reasonable minds might be uncertain or disagree as to its meaning." Sizemore v. State Farm Gen. Ins. Co., 202 W.Va. 591, 596, 505 S.E.2d 654, 659 (1998) (internal quotations and citation omitted).
With these rules of statutory construction in mind, we examine W. Va. Code § 61-2-14a. It provides:
Exceptions to the mandatory penalty of life imprisonment are found in subsection (b) of W. Va. Code § 61-2-14a :
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