State v. Shipe
Decision Date | 03 February 2015 |
Docket Number | No. 0009, Sept. Term, 2014.,0009, Sept. Term, 2014. |
Citation | 109 A.3d 182,221 Md.App. 425 |
Parties | STATE of Maryland, COMPTROLLER OF MARYLAND v. Kenneth R. SHIPE. |
Court | Court of Special Appeals of Maryland |
Benjamin M. Grossman (Renee Nacrelli, Douglas F. Gansler, Atty. Gen., on the brief), Baltimore, MD, for Appellant.
Diane E. Feuerherd (Joseph P. Suntum, Glenn M. Anderson, Miller, Miller & Canby, Chtd., on the brief), Rockville, MD, for Appellee.
Panel: WOODWARD, HOTTEN, and RAYMOND G. THIEME, JR. (Retired, Specially Assigned), JJ.
Appellant, the Comptroller of Maryland (“the State”), appeals from a judgment entered by the Circuit Court for Montgomery County, granting appellee's, Kenneth R. Shipe's, motion to release a tax judgment lien held by the State for unpaid income taxes regarding the 1997 and 1998 tax years. The State noted an appeal and presents a single question for our review:
Did the circuit court err in holding that a properly recorded tax lien in favor of the [S]tate with respect to an undisputed, unsatisfied tax obligation is subject to the statute of limitations applicable to “specialties” in § 5–102 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article where that statute expressly provides that it “does not apply to a specialty taken for the use of the State” and where the State has not waived its sovereign immunity?
For the following reasons, we shall reverse the judgment of the circuit court.
On April 26, 2001, the State issued a “Notice of Lien of Judgment for Unpaid Tax” to appellee because of his failure to pay $2,111.70 in income taxes for the period of January 1, 1997 through December 31, 1998.1 On May 8, 2001, the notice of lien of judgment was recorded, indexed, and entered in the docket by the Circuit Court for Montgomery County.
On June 19, 2013, appellee filed a “Motion to Release Judgment/Tax Lien” with the Circuit Court for Montgomery County.2 Citing § 5–102(a)(3) of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article, appellee argued that the judgment/tax lien was subject to renewal and therefore, “became unenforceable by reason of lapse of time on May 8, 2013.” In response, the State cited § 5–102(c) of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article and contended that “the twelve-year limitation section ‘[did] not apply to a specialty taken for the use of the State.’ ”
On August 27, 2013, a hearing was held to address appellee's motion. Following oral argument, the circuit court requested additional information, took the motion under advisement and requested that the parties submit memoranda within fourteen days. The circuit court issued an order on December 2, 2013, “find[ing] that a plain reading of the statutes and cases cited clearly demonstrates the intent of the General Assembly to impose time limits on the Comptroller to enforce a tax lien once filed,” thereby, releasing the State's tax lien.
On December 13, 2013, the State filed a motion for reconsideration, which the circuit court denied on February 3, 2014. Thereafter, the State noted a timely appeal. Additional facts shall be provided, infra, to the extent they prove relevant in addressing the issues presented.
The issue before this Court is one of statutory construction. Upon review, our primary goal in statutory interpretation is “to ascertain and effectuate the intent of the legislature.” Rossville Vending Mach. Corp. v. Comptroller of the Treasury, 114 Md.App. 346, 351, 689 A.2d 1295 (1997) (citation omitted). We start our analysis by “begin[ning] with the plain language of the statute, and ordinary, popular understanding of the English language dictates interpretation of its terminology.” Bowen v. City of Annapolis, 402 Md. 587, 613, 937 A.2d 242 (2007) (quoting Kushell v. Dep't of Natural Res., 385 Md. 563, 576, 870 A.2d 186 (2005) ). Maryland Econ. Dev. Corp. v. Montgomery County, 431 Md. 189, 199, 64 A.3d 478 (2013) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Additionally, the Court of Appeals discussed the basic concepts governing statutory construction, noting:
If the language of the statute is clear and unambiguous, we need not look beyond the statute's provisions and our analysis ends. If however, the language is subject to more than one interpretation, it is ambiguous, and we resolve that ambiguity by looking to the statute's legislative history, case law, and statutory purpose.
Barbre v. Pope, 402 Md. 157, 173, 935 A.2d 699 (2007) (citations omitted). Further, “laws enacted for the collection of general taxes must be interpreted with very great liberality; consequently, construction should not be undertaken with an eye to defeating the legislation, but with both eyes focused on giving it force, if reasonably possible.” Surratts Associates v. Prince George's Cty., 286 Md. 555, 566, 408 A.2d 1323 (1979).
We have before us an issue of first impression regarding whether the statute of limitations applies to a tax/judgment lien held by the State of Maryland. Maryland Code (1988 Repl.Vol.2010), § 13–805 of the Tax–General Article [hereinafter “Tax–Gen.”] states:
Pursuant to Maryland Code (1988 Repl.Vol.2010), § 13–808 of the Tax–General Article :
From the date on which a tax lien is filed under § 13–8073 of this subtitle, the lien has the full force and effect of a judgment lien.
The State avers that Maryland Code (1974 Repl.Vol.2013), § 5–102(a) of the Courts & Judicial Proceedings Article [hereinafter “Cts. & Jud. Proc.”] is the sole statutory support for the application of a statute of limitations to a judgment lien. Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 5–102(a) states:
In contrast, appellee contends that the life of a tax lien is defined by Maryland Code (1988 Repl.Vol.2010), § 13–1103 of the Tax–General Article, which states:
We agree with the State that Tax–Gen. § 13–1103 would not apply to the circumstances of this case. We provided an analysis to support this conclusion in Rossville Vending Mach. Corp. v. Comptroller of the Treasury, 114 Md.App. 346, 689 A.2d 1295 (1997). In Rossville, as a case of first impression, we determined the “period of limitations applicable to enforcement of a recorded tax lien.” Id. at 347, 689 A.2d 1295. We discussed how Maryland Code (1988 Repl.Vol.2010), § 13–806 of the Tax–General Article, which governs the duration of liens, does not reference Tax–Gen. § 13–1103. Id. at 352, 689 A.2d 1295. Tax–Gen. § 13–806, states:
In rejecting the taxpayer's contentions that “ § 13–808 only gives tax liens the same priority as judgment liens and does not vitiate the statute of limitations set forth in § 13–1103 [,]” we stated:
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