State v. Sidell
| Decision Date | 05 July 2022 |
| Docket Number | 82290-0-I |
| Parties | STATE OF WASHINGTON, Appellant, v. JASON TAYLOR SIDELL, Respondent. |
| Court | Washington Court of Appeals |
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
Jason Sidell appeals from a conviction of felony harassment following a bench trial. Sidell contends that (1) the evidence adduced at trial was insufficient to prove that his words constituted a true threat and (2) the First Amendment requires that the State prove Sidell's subjective intent. As neither contention is meritorious, we affirm.
Jason Sidell owned a five bedroom home in Snohomish. Jay Oliver rented a room from Sidell between April and October 2020. During the summer, Oliver and Sidell had a conflict regarding Oliver's pet dog, during which Sidell yelled at Oliver and called him names. Sidell also began having frequent "tantrums," during which he would throw objects in his bedroom, causing the house to shake.
On August 23, 2020, Oliver heard Sidell having a "tantrum." Oliver went into the garage and where Sidell was located. Sidell informed Oliver that Oliver's boxes should be removed from the garage. Oliver responded that he had not understood a previous text message concerning when the boxes were expected to be removed. In response Sidell became angry, pointed at Oliver, and yelled that he had a 9-millimeter gun and would shoot Oliver in the head. Sidell then left the garage and went toward his room. Oliver concerned for his safety, went to his own bedroom, locked the door, and telephoned the police. A teenager who lived across the street overheard the discussion and, concerned about what she had heard, telephoned her mother to get advice about what to do. Before the neighbor and her mother could take any action, police officers arrived.
Eventually Sidell was charged with one count of felony harassment with a domestic violence enhancement. Sidell was convicted as charged, following a bench trial.
Sidell appeals.
Sidell first contends that a constitutionally insufficient quantum of evidence supported Sidell's conviction. This is so, he argues, because "there was no evidence that a true threat was uttered."[1] As sufficient evidence was adduced at trial, his claim fails.
The due process clauses of the federal and state constitutions require that the government prove every element of a crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 476-77, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000) ); State v. Johnson, 188 Wn.2d 742, 750, 399 P.3d 507 (2017) (citing Wash. Const. art. I, § 3). After a verdict, the relevant question when reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence is "whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt." Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979).[2] "A claim of insufficiency admits the truth of the State's evidence and all inferences that reasonably can be drawn therefrom." State v. Salinas, 119 Wn.2d 192, 201, 829 P.2d 1068 (1992). "[A]ll reasonable inferences from the evidence must be drawn in favor of the State and interpreted most strongly against the defendant." State v. Partin, 88 Wn.2d 899, 906-07, 567 P.2d 1136 (1977).
RCW 9A.46.020.
Because the harassment statute criminalizes a form of pure speech-threats-it must be "'interpreted with the commands of the First Amendment clearly in mind.'" State v. Williams, 144 Wn.2d 197, 207, 26 P.3d 890 (2001) (quoting Watts v. United States, 394, U.S. 705, 707, 89 S.Ct. 1399, 22 L.Ed.2d 664 (1969)). Accordingly, the harassment statute is construed as limited to criminalizing true threats, which are not protected by the First Amendment. State v. Allen, 176 Wn.2d 611, 628, 294 P.3d 679 (2013). Our Supreme Court has adopted a definition of "true threat."
"A 'true threat' is a statement made 'in a context or under such circumstances wherein a reasonable person would foresee that the statement would be interpreted . . . as a serious expression of intention to inflict bodily harm upon or to take the life of [another individual].'" State v. Knowles, 91 Wn.App. 367, 373, 957 P.2d 797 (1998) (alteration[s] in original) (quoting United States v. Khorrami, 895 F.2d 1186, 1192 (7th Cir. 1990)).
Williams, 144 Wn.2d at 207-08.
The true threat requirement is not an essential element of the felony harassment statute-rather, the constitutional requirement of a true threat "defines and limits the scope" of the essential element of a threat. Allen, 176 Wn.2d at 630.
Herein, Oliver testified that during a conflict about storage boxes in the garage area of the home, Sidell began "really, really started yelling at [Oliver] [and] pointing his finger at [Oliver]." Oliver testified while pointing at him, Sidell yelled " Oliver recalled that Sidell's facial expression appeared "extremely angry." Sidell then exited the garage. Oliver believed "[t]hat [Sidell] was getting his 9-milimeter gun to shoot [Oliver] in the head." Furthermore, a teenaged neighbor, who overheard the interaction, described Sidell's tone as serious and, indeed, took it seriously, calling her mother for guidance as to what to do.
From this evidence, a rational finder of fact could determine that a reasonable speaker in Sidell's position would foresee that his statements would be interpreted by Oliver as a serious expression of intention to inflict bodily harm or to kill Oliver. The evidentiary sufficiency claim fails.
Sidell asserts that the State failed to prove that his statements were a true threat, rather than a "transient tantrum[,]"[3] because the trial court did not make a specific factual finding that his statements constituted a true threat. We disagree.
As we have explained, our review of whether constitutionally sufficient quantum of evidence supported Sidell's convictions is not determined by what the specific fact finder at trial actually found. Rather, the constitutional standard of review is whether any rational finder of fact could have determined that Sidell's statement was a threat (meaning a true threat). Moreover, here, the trial court implicitly found that Sidell made a true threat when it found that Sidell "knowingly threatened to kill Jay Oliver." Finding of Fact A.
Again the true threat requirement imposed by the First Amendment is not an essential element of the harassment statute. Allen, 176 Wn.2d at 628. Rather, it functions as part of the definition of the essential element of "threat." State v. Schaler, 169 Wn.2d 274, 287-88 n.5, 236 P.3d 858 (2010). In a jury trial, the true threat requirement is not required to appear in the to-convict instruction, so long as the definitional instruction defines a threat as a true threat. Allen, 176 Wn.2d at 630. Indeed, the pattern jury instruction which defines "threat" includes the following language:
To be a threat, a statement or act must occur in a context or under such circumstances where a reasonable person, in the position of the speaker, would foresee that the statement or act would be interpreted as a serious expression of intention to carry out the threat rather than as something said in [jest or idle talk] [jest, idle talk, or political argument].
11 Washington Practice Pattern Jury Instructions: Criminal 2.24 (5th Ed 2021).
Jurors are presumed to follow the court's instructions. State v. Weaver, 198 Wn.2d 459, 467, 496 P.3d 1183 (2021). Accordingly, to convict a defendant, the jury must necessarily conclude that the defendant has made a true threat, because the definitional instruction defines "threat" as a "true threat," and the threat element is an essential element which must appear in the to-convict instruction. See Schaler, 169 Wn.2d at 288 n.5 ().
Following a bench trial, a trial court must enter findings of fact and conclusions of law. CrR 6.1(d). As with a to-convict instruction in a jury trial, these findings must address each element of the crime and, to convict, must state that every element has been proved. State v. Banks, 149 Wn.2d 38, 43, 65 P.3d 1198 (2003). Jury instructions are not required in bench trials. In re...
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