State v. Sigler

• Decision Date: 11 October 2007
• Docket Number: No. SC04-1934.,SC04-1934.
• Citation: 967 So.2d 835
• Parties: STATE of Florida, Appellant/Cross-Appellee, v. Jay Junior SIGLER, Appellee/Cross-Appellant.
• Court: Florida Supreme Court

967 So.2d 835

STATE of Florida, Appellant/Cross-Appellee, v. Jay Junior SIGLER, Appellee/Cross-Appellant.

No. SC04-1934.

Supreme Court of Florida.

October 11, 2007.

Bill McCollum, Attorney General, Tallahassee, FL, Celia Perenzio, Bureau Chief, and August A. Bonavita, Assistant Attorneys General, West Palm Beach, FL, for Appellant/Cross-Appellee.

Carey Haughwout, Public Defender, and Paul E. Petillo, Assistant Public Defender, Fifteenth Judicial Circuit, West Palm Beach, FL, for Appellee/Cross-Appellant.

QUINCE, J.

We have on appeal a decision from the Fourth District Court of Appeal declaring invalid a state statute. Sigler v. State, 881 So.2d 14 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004). We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(1), Fla. Const. For the reasons that follow, we affirm the district court's determination that application of section 924.34, Florida Statutes (2001), in this instance, is contrary to the Sixth Amendment right to jury trial. We remand the issue of whether the defendant is guilty of third-degree murder for resolution by a jury.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The Fourth District Court of Appeal summarized the facts of this case in Sigler's first appearance before that court as follows:

While appellant was serving a lawful twenty year prison sentence, he, with the aid of his mother and three of his friends, including Christopher Michelson, crafted and successfully carried out an elaborate scheme for appellant's escape from the state prison in Miami-Dade County. At an agreed time, one cohort drove a stolen semi-tractor trailer through the prison's perimeter fence, and simultaneously the other three arrived in two, possibly three, getaway cars. During the commotion, appellant ran through the breach in the prison fence and entered one of the getaway cars, whereupon all sped away to a rendezvous point. There, an exchange of cars and drivers occurred as police were approaching. Although the others were apprehended on the spot, appellant and Michelson successfully fled the scene in a Saturn automobile owned by appellant's mother. The two drove to the City of Lake Worth where they stayed overnight in a motel. There they watched television reports of the escape, and became aware that the police were on the lookout for the Saturn.

Around noon of the following day, the two left the motel in the Saturn, with Michelson driving. En route to Ft. Lauderdale to visit Michelson's family, they were spotted by a police officer. A high speed chase ensued with Michelson accelerating to speeds estimated as high as eighty miles an hour. Eventually, he turned into a narrow alley, at the end of which he ran a stop sign, crossed the transverse street, and entered the alley in the next block. Continuing at high speed, he ran a stop sign at the next transverse street where, tragically, he crashed into another car, killing its driver. Appellant and Michelson were arrested at the scene of the fatal collision.

See Sigler v. State, 805 So.2d 32, 33-34 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001)(Sigler I).

Sigler was indicted and tried for first-degree felony murder which the State alleged was committed while he was engaged in an escape. At the request of the State and over Sigler's objection, the jury was instructed on first-degree felony murder as charged, as well as the lesser-included offenses of second-degree murder and third-degree felony murder. The jury found Sigler guilty of the lesser-included offense of second-degree murder,¹ and he was sentenced to life in prison.

Sigler appealed, raising the issue of whether there was sufficient evidence to sustain his conviction of second-degree murder. The district court reasoned that "[s]ince appellant was neither the driver, owner, nor in control of the car which crashed into and killed the victim, his criminal liability, if any, normally would have to be established under a principal theory." Sigler I, 805 So.2d at 34. Finding no evidence of ill will, hatred, spite or evil intent directed at the victim by the driver of the car, Michelson, the court opined they did not need to decide whether Sigler, a passenger, could be convicted as a principal. Therefore, the district court reversed the conviction for depraved mind second-degree murder based on a lack of evidentiary support. See Sigler I, 805 So.2d at 35.

The Fourth District indicated that section 924.34, Florida Statutes (2001), allows an appellate court to reverse a judgment and direct the trial court to enter a judgment for a necessarily lesser-included offense. See Sigler I, 805 So.2d at 35 (citing I.T. v. State, 694 So.2d 720 (Fla.1997)). In directing the entry of judgment for third-degree murder, the district court reasoned that "the underlying crime supporting the third-degree felony murder charge was the offense of harboring, concealing or aiding an escaped prisoner" as defined by section 944.46, Florida Statutes (2001). Id.

The district court opined that it was clear that Michelson could be convicted of third-degree felony murder committed in furtherance of the crime harboring an escaped prisoner, i.e., Sigler. However, the question for the court was whether Sigler, the escapee, could be guilty of concealing, assisting, or giving aid to himself. See Sigler I, 805 So.2d at 35. In finding that Sigler could be guilty of third-degree murder based on harboring himself, the district court reasoned that under section 777.011, Florida Statutes (1997), both the person who aids and abets in the commission of the crime and the person who otherwise procures the commission of the crime are principals in the first degree. See Sigler I, 805 So.2d at 36. The Fourth District said, "[i]n order to be guilty as a principal for a crime physically committed by another, one must intend that crime be committed and do some act to assist the other person in actually committing the crime." Id. (quoting Staten v. State, 519 So.2d 622, 624 (Fla.1988)); see also Arroyo v. State, 705 So.2d 54 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997) (indicating that in order to be guilty as a principal or as an aider and abetter to a crime, the defendant must intend that the crime take place and must do some act which did or was intended to incite, cause, encourage, assist, or advise in the commission of the crime).

The district court concluded that the evidence supported a finding that the defendant was a perpetrator of the underlying felony of harboring, and thus a principal in the homicide committed to further the common criminal design. Sigler, 805 So.2d at 36. The judgment and sentence for second-degree murder was reversed and vacated, and the trial court was directed to "enter a judgment of third-degree felony murder as a lesser-included offense of that charged in the indictment, and to sentence appellant thereon accordingly." Id. at 37.

On remand, Sigler filed a motion for discharge in the trial court arguing that a third-degree felony murder conviction "would be illegal because the jury had not found him guilty of an essential element of the offense, namely the underlying offense of harboring an escapee." Sigler v. State, 881 So.2d 14, 16 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004) (Sigler II). The motion was denied, and the trial court followed the mandate and entered the conviction for third-degree felony murder. On appeal, the State cited to Greene v. Massey, 384 So.2d 24, 28 (Fla. 1980), for the proposition that the correctness of the third-degree felony murder conviction is the law of this case because the Fourth District confronted the issue in Sigler I and concluded that such a conviction was proper. Sigler, however, countered that pursuant to Zolache v. State, 687 So.2d 298, 299 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997), appellate courts have the power to correct significant mistakes in spite of the law of the case doctrine. See Sigler II, 881 So.2d at 17.

The Fourth District examined the defendant's argument that when the jury convicted him of second-degree murder, it did not have to determine beyond a reasonable doubt whether he had committed any felony, much less the felony of harboring an escapee. See Sigler II, 881 So.2d at 17. Thus, the jury could not have found him guilty of any underlying felony. While the Fourth District took notice that the jury actually exonerated the defendant of the first-degree felony murder charge, which required proof of an underlying felony, it reasoned that "[b]ecause the verdict in this case is general, we have no way of ascertaining which element of first-degree felony murder was not proved beyond a reasonable doubt." Id. Assuming that the "jury could well have based its decision on the failure of the evidence to prove an underlying felony," the Fourth District concluded "a conviction for third degree felony murder may actually conflict with that precise finding by the jury." Id. The court opined that the original jury verdict could in no way be read to include a determination on any predicate felony, and the jury's verdict did not include a determination beyond a reasonable doubt of all of the elements necessary to prove third-degree murder. The Fourth District further reasoned that the question of Sigler's guilt for third-degree murder had to be submitted and determined by a jury and reasoned that "the decision by the Judges of this Court in Sigler I was not a `constitutionally acceptable substitute' for such a jury determination." Id. at 18.

In reaching this conclusion the Fourth District cited with approval the First District's decision in Pratt v. State, 668 So.2d 1007 (Fla. 1st DCA), approved, 682 So.2d 1096 (Fla.1996). The defendant in Pratt was convicted of attempted third-degree felony murder, which was no longer a crime after this Court's decision in State v. Gray, 654 So.2d 552 (Fla.1995). On appeal the State argued that the defendant was not entitled to a new trial but that pursuant to section 924.34, the appellate court should direct the trial court to enter a conviction on the offense of attempted manslaughter, a necessarily lesser-included offense to the charged offense of...