State v. Sigler
| Decision Date | 25 November 2009 |
| Docket Number | No. 34741.,No. 34584.,34741.,34584. |
| Court | West Virginia Supreme Court |
| Parties | STATE of West Virginia, Appellee, v. Linda S. SIGLER a/k/a Linda S. Mullins, Appellant. and State of West Virginia, Appellee, v. John R. Mullens, Appellant. |
Syllabus by the Court
1. "While police officers may enforce the licensing and registration laws for drivers and motor vehicles respectively by routine checks of licenses and registrations, such checks must be done according to some non-discriminatory, random, pre-conceived plan such as established check points or examination of vehicles with particular number or letter configurations on a given day; accordingly, detention of vehicles without probable cause to believe that a registration is irregular absent a random, non-discriminatory, preconceived plan is contrary to the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States and W. Va. Constitution, art. 3, sec. 6." Syl. pt. 5, State v. Frisby, 161 W.Va. 734, 245 S.E.2d 622 (1978).
2. "Sobriety checkpoint roadblocks are constitutional when conducted within predetermined operational guidelines which minimize the intrusion on the individual and mitigate the discretion vested in police officers at the scene." Syl. Pt. 1, Carte v. Cline, 194 W.Va. 233, 460 S.E.2d 48 (1995).
3. This Court's prior decision in State v. Davis, 195 W.Va. 79, 464 S.E.2d 598 (1995) (per curiam) is expressly overruled.
4. A stop of a motor vehicle at a police checkpoint is intrusive to private citizens. Such an intrusion is by its nature a constitutional seizure.
5. The essential purpose of the Fourth Amendment is "to impose a standard of `reasonableness' upon the exercise of discretion" by officers in order to protect against arbitrary intrusions into the privacy of individuals. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653-55, 99 S.Ct. 1391, 1395-97, 59 L.Ed.2d 660 (1979).
6. In evaluating the lawfulness of a suspicionless seizure, a balancing of interests should be considered to determine if such a seizure is permissible under the United States Constitution and the Constitution of West Virginia and, and these factors should be considered: (1) the gravity of the public concern that is being addressed or served by the checkpoint; (2) the degree to which the checkpoint is likely to succeed in serving this public interest; and (3) the severity with which the checkpoint interferes with individual liberty.
7. When evaluating the degree of severity of interference with individual liberty, West Virginia courts must consider not only the subjective intrusion determined by the potential of the checkpoint to generate fear and surprise in motorists, but also the objective intrusion into individual freedom as measured by the duration of the detention at the checkpoint and the intensity of the inspection.
8. The court's obligation in weighing these factors is to assure that an individual's reasonable expectation of privacy is not subject to arbitrary invasions solely at the unfettered discretion of officers in the field.
9. Suspicionless checkpoint roadblocks are constitutional in West Virginia only when conducted in a random and non-discriminatory manner within predetermined written operation guidelines which minimize the State's intrusion into the freedom of the individual and which strictly limits the discretion vested in police officers at the scene.
John M. (Jack) Thompson, Jr., Esquire, Oak Hill, WV, for Appellants.
Brian Parsons, Esquire, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, Fayetteville, WV, for Appellee.
These consolidated appeals relating to the propriety of administrative or safety roadblocks are before the Court upon final judgments of the Fayette County Circuit Court. Linda S. Sigler, also known as Linda S. Mullins (hereinafter referred to as appellant Sigler), appeals her conviction for third offense driving under the influence. John R. Mullens (hereinafter referred to as appellant Mullens) appeals the circuit court affirmation of his magistrate court conviction for first offense driving under the influence. The appeals were consolidated by this Court on December 30, 2008.
After carefully reviewing the briefs, the arguments of the parties, the legal authority cited and the record presented for consideration, we reverse the circuit court's rulings.
On January 27, 2008, at or near 3:22 a.m., Linda S. Sigler, also known as Linda S. Mullins (hereinafter referred to as the appellant Sigler), was traveling within the City of Gauley Bridge, Fayette County, West Virginia, at or near the intersection of U.S. Route 60 and State Route 39. As she approached the intersection, appellant Sigler encountered the parked police car of Gauley Bridge Police Officer Charles R. Burkhamer blocking her path. The police car was parked in the roadway, with blue flashing lights in use. Officer Burkhamer was the sole officer present. The officer had unilaterally decided to set up the roadblock along this roadway because there had been little law enforcement activity that evening. Officer Burkhamer, who was not wearing a reflective vest but was holding a flashlight, motioned for appellant Sigler to stop. The officer then requested that she present her driver's license, vehicle registration and proof of insurance. Officer Burkhamer detected the odor of alcohol and saw two cans of beer in the console of the truck being driven by appellant Sigler. The officer questioned appellant Sigler, who then stated that she had consumed five to six beers earlier. Officer Burkhamer requested that appellant Sigler pull to the side of the road and exit the truck. Three field sobriety tests were administered to Sigler. After Sigler failed these field sobriety tests, she was given a preliminary breath test. Appellant Sigler was then driven to Fayetteville where a secondary test was to be administered. Appellant Sigler refused to give a sample for use in this test. After the officer determined that appellant Sigler had two previous driving under the influence convictions, Officer Burkhamer arrested appellant Sigler for third offense driving under the influence.
Appellant Sigler was subsequently indicted by the May, 2008, term of the Fayette County Grand Jury on one count of third-offense driving under the influence of alcohol, in violation of West Virginia Code §§ 17C-5-2(d) and (k).1
Prior to the trial of this matter, Appellant Sigler, through her counsel, moved to suppress the all evidence obtained by the State of West Virginia pursuant to Officer Burkhamer's "safety checkpoint", which was called by counsel an "illegal road block." In his motion, counsel stated that "Defendant believes that the Officer was in fact conducting a sobriety check point and not a safety check point," and that the operation of the sobriety check point was in violation of standards promulgated by the Fayette County Sheriff's Department and the West Virginia State Police. Gauley Bridge Police Department had not promulgated any regulations, policies or procedures governing sobriety or other checkpoints. The motion stated that the arresting officer failed to have flares, appropriate lighting or signs notifying drivers of the stop, and that the officer was acting outside the scope of his authority in calling the road block a safety check when in fact, it was a sobriety check point.
The State of West Virginia responded that the checkpoint was not placed in an area intended to intimidate motorists and that the stops were uniformly conducted, with all vehicles passing the checkpoint were stopped in a "minimally intrusive manner." The State's response also indicated that the checkpoint was being conducted in such a manner consistent with prior Supreme Court rulings on the issue.
On July 10, 2008, the circuit court commenced a hearing on appellant Sigler's motion to suppress. In its order dated August 6, 2008, denying the motion to suppress, the circuit court made the following findings:
1. On January 27, 2008, in Gauley Bridge, Fayette County, West Virginia, Patrolman C.L. Burkhamer, a non-certified officer at the time, set up a safety road check, which has been done seven (7) or eight (8) times before.
2. The road check was on Route 60/39 with marked curves with lights and a flashlight.
3. From 3:00 a.m. until 3:22 a.m. all cars passing through the intersection were stopped at the intersection including the defendant's car.
4. The police officer did not issue any citations on the night in question.
5. There were two (2) other ways around the road check.
6. Patrolman Burkhamer asked the defendant for her driver's license, registration and proof of insurance.
7. The officer was generally authorized by the Chief of Police to conduct the road checks, but had no specific authority to conduct this particular road check.
8. Road checks were being conducted because nothing was going on in town.
9. The police officer did not know the defendant
10. Upon smelling alcohol on the defendant's person, Patrolman Burkhamer did a field sobriety test and the defendant was arrested.
11. Patrolman Burkhamer knows the difference between a safety check and a DUI road block.
12. According to State v. Davis[] 195 W.Va. 79 (1995), Carte v. Cline, 194 W.Va. 233 (1995) and State v. Frisby, 161 W.Va. 734 (1978), the Court sees clear distinction between a DUI road block and a safety check.
13. The factual situation is covered by Davis.
14. The stop was random, non-discriminatory and non-excessive.
The State and appellant Sigler entered into a plea agreement, in which Sigler agreed to plead guilty to the felony offense of third offense driving under the influence. The State agreed to stand silent at the sentencing phase. Appellant Sigler specifically reserved the right the appeal the circuit court's adverse ruling regarding her motion to suppress evidence arising from the road block. By order entered August...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Miller v. Toler
...as a matter of law, that the vehicle equipment checkpoint was unconstitutional, in light of the Court's decision in State v. Sigler, 224 W.Va. 608, 687 S.E.2d 391 (2009).9 The circuit court, in reversing the Commissioner's decision, then implicitly applied the exclusionary rule to the civil......
-
Grim v. E. Elec., LLC
...employees who receive and spend lump sum wages” (internal quotations and citations omitted)).1 See generally State v. Sigler, 224 W.Va. 608, 687 S.E.2d 391 (2009), wherein this Court looked beyond the characterization which law enforcement chose to use to describe a particular traffic stop ......
- White v. Miller, 11–0171.
- White v. Miller