State v. Sinclair
| Decision Date | 31 December 1986 |
| Docket Number | Nos. 14761-7-,14767-6-I,s. 14761-7- |
| Citation | 730 P.2d 742,46 Wn.App. 433 |
| Parties | STATE of Washington, Respondent, v. Arthur Lee SINCLAIR, a/k/a Charles Lee Hall, Appellant. |
| Court | Washington Court of Appeals |
Arthur L. Sinclair appeals his first degree burglary conviction, arguing he was denied his right to counsel and that the court erroneously ruled that he could be impeached with his prior convictions should he choose to testify. Sinclair also appeals his subsequent conviction as a habitual criminal and the revocation of his parole. We affirm.
Sinclair was charged with first degree burglary while armed with a deadly weapon. On the day of trial, December 9, 1983, he requested a substitute for his court-appointed attorney, alleging counsel had lied to him, refused to do The trial court ruled that Sinclair had shown no legal basis for discharging appointed counsel. The court told Sinclair if he chose not to be represented by appointed counsel, he had the right to represent himself, but advised him not to do so. Sinclair responded that, if those were his only choices, he would prefer to appear pro se. He prepared a written motion to that effect, which the court granted.
research he had requested and that he had no confidence in her. Counsel confirmed Sinclair's complete dissatisfaction with her representation and asked leave to withdraw
The court advised Sinclair that he would be bound by the rules of evidence and procedure throughout the trial. At appropriate times thereafter, the court also advised Sinclair regarding the procedure involved in his 3.5 hearing, gave a brief explanation of the jury selection process, including the procedure for peremptory challenges, explained the purpose of opening statements and advised Sinclair of when it was appropriate to bring a motion to exclude evidence of his prior convictions.
Sinclair made repeated motions throughout the trial for the appointment of substitute counsel, stating that he was not qualified to represent himself, did not understand the proceedings, felt that the court was taking advantage of him and that he was not receiving a fair trial. Each time, the trial court urged him to take advantage of appointed counsel, who remained in court on stand-by. Sinclair refused, stating that, if the court would not appoint a different attorney, he preferred to represent himself.
The facts of the burglary incident are not in dispute here. Responding to a prowler report, police apprehended Sinclair in the victim's apartment, after observing him through a window, apparently searching through her belongings. The following day, the victim found a handgun with Sinclair's fingerprints on it hidden in her apartment.
At the close of the State's case, Sinclair indicated his desire to testify and moved to exclude evidence of three prior convictions for burglary and one for grand larceny. After questioning Sinclair concerning the content of his Sinclair was convicted as charged, and based thereon, declared a habitual criminal. His probation on a prior conviction was revoked, and he was sentenced to life in prison.
proposed testimony, the court concluded that his credibility would be a crucial issue and ruled that the prior convictions would be admissible for impeachment purposes. Sinclair declined to testify
Sinclair contends the court erred by forcing him to choose between appearing pro se or being represented by appointed counsel and by not conducting a more thorough inquiry into his allegations of misconduct by his appointed counsel. We disagree.
Whether or not an indigent defendant's dissatisfaction with court-appointed counsel is justified and warrants the appointment of a new lawyer lies within the sound discretion of the trial court. State v. Dougherty, 33 Wash.App. 466, 471, 655 P.2d 1187 (1982); State v. Brittain, 38 Wash.App. 740, 689 P.2d 1095 (1984). Thus, even when a defendant does not want to appear pro se, if he fails to provide the court with legitimate reasons why he is entitled to reassignment of counsel, the court can require that he either waive or continue with appointed counsel. McKee v. Harris, 649 F.2d 927 (2d Cir.1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 917, 102 S.Ct. 1773, 72 L.Ed.2d 177 (1982); Wilks v. Israel, 627 F.2d 32, 36 (7th Cir.1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1086, 101 S.Ct. 874, 66 L.Ed.2d 811 (1981); Maynard v. Meachum, 545 F.2d 273, 278 (1st Cir.1976).
In the case sub judice, the trial court asked Sinclair why he was dissatisfied with appointed counsel. He responded with a vague account of how counsel had lied and had not shown him the State's fingerprint evidence. He otherwise failed to articulate any reason he felt justified counsel's replacement, other than his general discomfort with her representation. In short, Sinclair presented to the trial court no valid reason to replace appointed counsel, nor does he offer on appeal any material reason that would have been elicited had the court inquired further.
Sinclair argues that, since he had filed a formal complaint against his lawyer with the State Bar Association, her continued representation would have created a conflict of interest in violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Were that sufficient to disqualify court-appointed counsel, however, a defendant could force the appointment of a new attorney simply by filing such a complaint, regardless of its merit. We hold the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying Sinclair's request for a new attorney.
The waiver of the right to counsel must be knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently made, Bellevue v. Acrey, 103 Wash.2d 203, 208-09, 691 P.2d 957 (1984), and the demand to defend pro se must be unequivocal. State v. Fritz, 21 Wash.App. 354, 360, 585 P.2d 173 (1978). The court should assure that the defendant makes that decision with at least a minimal knowledge of the task involved. Bellevue v. Acrey, supra, 103 Wash.2d at 210, 585 P.2d 173. The preferred method for doing so is a colloquy on the record. In the absence of a colloquy, the record must otherwise show that the defendant understood the seriousness of the charge, the possible maximum penalty and the existence of technical rules governing the presentation of his defense. Acrey, at 211, 585 P.2d 173. Whether a valid waiver of the right to counsel has been made is within the sound discretion of the trial court. State v. Chavis, 31 Wash.App. 784, 787, 644 P.2d 1202 (1982).
Sinclair insists that his request to appear pro se was not unequivocal since he made it clear he was doing so only because the court refused to appoint a new attorney; consequently, there was no valid waiver of the right to counsel.
However, if there can never be a valid waiver when the defendant expressly conditions his request to appear pro se upon the trial court's refusal to appoint new counsel, the court will always be obliged to accede to the defendant's demand under those circumstances, even if there is no legitimate reason to replace appointed counsel. The result here would be that Sinclair would get by default that which he was not entitled to in the first instance--a different attorney. Therefore, we decline to follow Sinclair's reasoning.
Sinclair cites State v. Garcia, 92 Wash.2d 647, 600 P.2d 1010 (1979), as controlling authority. However, Garcia is distinguishable. Garcia never asked to appear pro se, and the court held that such a request could not be inferred from his statement that he did not want to be represented by appointed counsel. Sinclair, on the other hand, repeatedly told the court that he preferred to represent himself rather than be represented by appointed counsel, and he personally submitted a written motion to that effect. In summary, when the trial court has correctly ruled that substitute counsel will not be appointed and the defendant insists that in the absence of substitute counsel he be permitted to defend pro se, his request must be deemed unequivocal.
The remaining question is whether Sinclair's waiver was knowing and intelligent. In that regard, the record demonstrates Sinclair's actual awareness of the risk of self-representation and the task involved. He repeatedly stated he was not qualified to act as his own attorney, did not understand the trial proceedings, did not have access to the witnesses or the resources necessary to prepare his defense, and felt that he was not receiving a fair trial as a consequence. Sinclair's own...
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