State v. Skylstad
| Decision Date | 07 October 2003 |
| Docket Number | No. 20944-0-III.,No. 20945-8-III.,20944-0-III.,20945-8-III. |
| Parties | STATE OF WASHINGTON, Respondent and Cross-Appellant, v. SCOTT WILLIAM SKYLSTAD, Appellant. |
| Court | Washington Court of Appeals |
Appeal from Superior Court of Spokane County, Docket No: 01-1-02301-3, Judgment or order under review, Date filed: 03/05/2002.
Susan Marie Gasch, Attorney at Law, Spokane, WA, Counsel for Appellant(s).
Frank Alan Grigaliunas, Spokane County Prose Atty Ofc, Spokane, WA, Counsel for Respondent/Cross-Appellant.
Kevin Michael Korsmo, Deputy Prosecutor, Spokane, WA, Counsel for Respondent/Cross-Appellant.
After a car chase, Scott Skylstad was stopped and arrested for attempting to elude the police. On his way to the hospital and while at the hospital, Mr. Skylstad made statements about being involved in a robbery that had occurred two days earlier. Mr. Skylstad was charged with first degree robbery and attempting to elude a police vehicle. The court denied Mr. Skylstad's motion to suppress the statements he made in the hospital and Mr. Skylstad was convicted of both charges. The court included one weapon enhancement with his sentence. Mr. Skylstad appeals, contending that the court erred by admitting his statements. The State cross-appeals contending that the court erred by sentencing Mr. Skylstad to only one weapon enhancement. Pro se, Mr. Skylstad submitted a statement of additional grounds for review setting forth numerous arguments. We affirm Mr. Skylstad's convictions, reverse his sentence, and remand for resentencing.
On September 17, 2001, two men armed with guns and wearing Halloween-type masks and latex gloves robbed the Mountain View Credit Union in Spokane. Approximately $15,000 was taken in the robbery. Michael Stricker, the branch manager, went outside and saw a car with at least two people in it leave the parking lot. Several workers in the area noticed three strangers lingering near the credit union earlier that day and were able to identify two of them as being Jason Kiss and Scott Skylstad.
The car used in the robbery was spotted later that day at a car wash and the police questioned the owner of the car, Russell Crosswhite. The police executed a search warrant at Mr. Crosswhite's residence where he lived with Mr. and Ms. Skylstad and Ms. Skylstad's father, David Hilliard. The police found $1,115 in Ms. Skylstad's purse and receipts for several, recent, large expenditures. They also found latex gloves in the Skylstads' bedroom.
On September 19, Police Officer Kurt Vigesaa tried to stop a driver who was speeding and driving erratically. The driver refused to stop and a lengthy, high-speed chase ensued. The chase ended when two police cars pinned the suspect car between them and forced it to stop. The officers were able to extract the driver, Scott Skylstad, from the car by putting a police dog through the window of his car and pulling him out. Mr. Skylstad had been using methamphetamines and fought with the officers. After a lengthy struggle, the officers subdued Mr. Skylstad and put him in leg restraints and handcuffs.
During the struggle, Mr. Skylstad yelled, Report of Proceedings (RP) at 13-14. Mr. Skylstad had an elevated body temperature and his arm was injured from a dog bite, so he was transported to the hospital. In the ambulance, Mr. Skylstad said he was going to prison for the rest of his life because the bank robbery was his third strike.
At the hospital, Mr. Skylstad was advised of his Miranda1 rights and stated he understood them and was willing to answer questions. Mr. Skylstad commented to a nurse that he had robbed a bank. She asked which one and he responded, `They know which one.' RP at 16. The nurse asked how much did he get, and he replied: `$15,000.' RP at 16. A little while later, Mr. Skylstad stated: RP at 25. No one questioned Mr. Skylstad, but he told an officer that he was the one who robbed the bank, that he did not want anyone else to go down for it, and he was willing to write out a statement.
Mr. Skylstad was charged with one count of first degree robbery and one count of attempting to elude a police vehicle. The charges were joined for trial. At the CrR 3.5 hearing, the court found that all of Mr. Skylstad's statements were unsolicited and voluntary and, therefore, admissible. Mr. Skylstad was found guilty of both charges by a jury. At sentencing, the State asked for two 5-year weapon enhancements because two weapons were used. The court sentenced Mr. Skylstad to only one weapon enhancement. Mr. Skylstad appeals and the State cross-appeals.
Mr. Skylstad's Statements. Mr. Skylstad contends that his statements made during the arrest, in the ambulance, and at the hospital were inadmissible because he had not been given his Miranda warning. To trigger the protections afforded by Miranda, there must be a custodial interrogation by a state agent. State v. Warner, 125 Wn.2d 876, 884, 889 P.2d 479 (1995); State v. Breedlove, 79 Wn. App. 101, 112, 900 P.2d 586 (1995); State v. Walton, 64 Wn. App. 410, 413, 824 P.2d 533 (1992); State v. McWatters, 63 Wn. App. 911, 915, 822 P.2d 787 (1992). Both custody and interrogation must be present. State v. Warness, 77 Wn. App. 636, 639-40, 893 P.2d 665 (1995) (citations omitted).
It is not disputed that Mr. Skylstad was in custody. However, the court found that Mr. Skylstad's statements were voluntary and not in response to interrogation. In determining whether the court correctly decided that Mr. Skylstad's statements were not in response to an interrogation, we apply the clearly erroneous standard of review. Walton, 64 Wn. App. at 414 (citing United States v. Booth, 669 F.2d 1231, 1238 (9th Cir. 1981)).
A custodial `interrogation' is defined as `express questioning' or its `functional equivalent' initiated by law enforcement officers after a person is in custody or otherwise significantly deprived of his freedom. State v. Hawkins, 27 Wn. App. 78, 82, 615 P.2d 1327 (1980). For purposes of Miranda, the `functional equivalent' of express police questioning includes any words or actions on the part of police that they "should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect." State v. Sargent, 111 Wn.2d 641, 650, 762 P.2d 1127 (1988); State v. Mahoney, 80 Wn. App. 495, 497, 909 P.2d 949 (1996); Hawkins, 27 Wn. App. at 82 (); see Walton, 64 Wn. App. at 414. ``Interrogation' involves some degree of compulsion.' Warner, 125 Wn.2d at 884. The perception of the suspect and the nature of the question rather than the procedure during which the question is asked or the intent of the police are decisive. Sargent, 111 Wn.2d at 651; Walton, 64 Wn. App. at 414.
Mr. Skylstad argues that the officers' conduct amounted to interrogation because they gave Mr. Skylstad the silent treatment which created a coercive environment and it was conduct that the police should have known was reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from him. The evidence shows that Mr. Skylstad was not questioned about the robbery because initially the officers did not even know he was a robbery suspect. Even after Mr. Skylstad was read his Miranda rights, he was not questioned because the officers were told that the sheriff's department would be taking over the investigation. There is no evidence that the officers were using the silent treatment to create a coercive environment. Mr. Skylstad freely talked about the robbery. `Statements which are freely given are voluntary and if they are likewise spontaneous, unsolicited, and not the product of custodial interrogation, they are not coerced within the concept of Miranda.' State v. Miner, 22 Wn. App. 480, 483, 591 P.2d 812 (1979). Mr. Skylstad's statements were spontaneous and voluntary.
Mr. Skylstad further contends he did not knowingly and voluntarily waive his Miranda rights because he was impaired by a severe wound, high body temperature, drugs, and the coercive environment. Statements obtained as a result of police interrogation are voluntary and admissible only if the person receives the Miranda warnings and waives his right against self-incrimination. Such a waiver must be knowing and intelligent, which of course requires the person to be mentally capable of waiver. State v. Davis, 73 Wn.2d 271, 284-86, 438 P.2d 185 (1968).
`The voluntariness of a confession is determined by examining the totality of the circumstances in which the confession was made.' State v. Cushing, 68 Wn. App. 388, 392, 842 P.2d 1035 (1993). The fact that the person in custody has recently used drugs or alcohol, or is in withdrawal from such use, does not automatically invalidate a waiver, but is a factor for the court to consider. State v. Aten, 130 Wn.2d 640, 664, 927 P.2d 210 (1996); State v. Ortiz, 104 Wn.2d 479, 484, 706 P.2d 1069 (1985); State v. Lawley, 32 Wn. App. 337, 345, 647 P.2d 530 (1982); State v. Turner, 31 Wn. App. 843, 845-46, 644 P.2d 1224 (1982). A trial court's determination of voluntariness should be reversed on appeal where it is not supported by substantial evidence in the record. Cushing, 68 Wn. App. at 393. In reviewing the question of voluntariness, the appellate court reviews the challenged findings of fact. State v. Broadaway, 133 Wn.2d 118, 132, 942 P.2d 363 (1997).
Mr. Skylstad was not read his Miranda rights until he was stabilized in the hospital. The court found that at the hospital Mr. Skylstad was oriented,...
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