State v. Smart
| Decision Date | 07 July 2021 |
| Docket Number | Opinion No. 5830,Appellate Case No. 2017-001754 |
| Citation | 433 S.C. 651,861 S.E.2d 383 |
| Court | South Carolina Court of Appeals |
| Parties | The STATE, Respondent, v. Jon SMART, Appellant. |
Appellate Defender Joanna Katherine Delany, of Columbia, for Appellant.
Attorney General Alan McCrory Wilson, Chief Deputy Attorney General W. Jeffrey Young, Deputy Attorney General Donald J. Zelenka, Senior Assistant Deputy Attorney General Melody Jane Brown, Assistant Attorney General Sherrie Butterbaugh, and Assistant Attorney General Mark Reynolds Farthing, all of Columbia; and Solicitor Ernest Adolphus Finney, III, of Sumter, all for Respondent.
In this criminal appeal, Jon Smart appeals the trial court's sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole (LWOP) for an offense committed as a juvenile following a resentencing hearing pursuant to Aiken v. Byars .1 Smart argues the trial court erred in its consideration of the factors required by Miller v. Alabama2 and Byars . We affirm.
On August 12, 1999, Smart and Stephen Hutto murdered Tracey Pack (Victim). At the time of the murder, Smart—who was sixteen years old—and Hutto were in the custody of the Department of Juvenile Justice (DJJ) at the Rimini Marine Institute (Rimini) in Clarendon. Victim's family had a farm with chicken houses (the Farm) near Rimini, and the family allowed juveniles at Rimini to work on the Farm. Smart and Hutto regularly worked with Victim but would occasionally break machinery in the chicken houses in order to sneak off and huff gasoline.
Two days before the murder, a juvenile at Rimini overheard a conversation between Smart and Hutto. He heard Smart tell Hutto that he did not think Hutto had "the guts to do it" and that Smart "would do it if Hutto" could not. He also heard Smart and Hutto remark that "in a couple of days[,] there would be no more chicken house." Another juvenile observed a second conversation between Smart and Hutto in which Smart said he did not think Hutto had "the guts to do it." He also heard a conversation between Victim, Smart, and Hutto wherein Smart and Hutto asked what would happen if they killed Victim and took his truck.
Smart testified that two days before the murder, while he and Hutto were huffing gasoline, Hutto produced a box cutter and suggested they cut Victim's throat and take his truck. Smart stated he believed Hutto was joking, but the State provided a statement from Hutto's cellmate regarding the same conversation. According to the cellmate, Hutto said they were going to kill Victim with the box cutter but abandoned the plan because Victim's family arrived. Hutto also told the cellmate that he and Smart wanted to see what it was like to kill someone.
On the day of the murder, Smart and Hutto were working with Victim in the chicken houses. While Victim was on a ladder attempting to fix machinery that Smart and Hutto broke, Smart inhaled from a gasoline-soaked rag, and Hutto gave Smart a four-foot metal pipe. Hutto encouraged Smart to hit Victim, and Smart struck Victim with the pipe and beat him to death. Smart tried to wash away Victim's blood, and he and Hutto wrapped Victim in a tarp and hid Victim's body and the pipe in a nearby wood line.
Smart and Hutto took Victim's truck and drove to Hutto's home in Bamberg where they changed clothes, consumed alcohol, and obtained a shotgun. Smart and Hutto drove to a store, and Smart entered and robbed it with the shotgun while Hutto stayed in the truck. Afterwards, they purchased marijuana and drove to Myrtle Beach. Police officers stopped Smart and Hutto for a traffic violation and learned the truck was stolen after checking the truck's license plate. Hutto and Smart fled and led officers on a high-speed chase for thirty miles. During the chase, Smart fired the shotgun at the pursuing officers. Hutto eventually lost control of and wrecked the truck, and Smart fled into nearby trees. Officers found and arrested Smart the following morning.
Initially, Smart told officers he struck Victim after Hutto and Victim started arguing and shoving each other. However, while Smart and Hutto were in custody, Smart sent Hutto two letters: one urging him to "stick to this story" and another describing the murder but adding that he was hallucinating when he hit Victim. Smart later admitted he fabricated this story because it sounded good. At his initial sentencing hearing, Smart admitted to the facts of Victim's murder and his and Hutto's subsequent actions as described above.
On May 25, 2001, Smart pled guilty to Victim's murder, armed robbery, grand larceny of a motor vehicle, criminal conspiracy, and escape and promised to testify against Hutto in exchange for the State declining to seek the death penalty. On August 9, 2001, the trial court held a sentencing hearing for Smart and Hutto. Following the State's presentation, Smart's family addressed the court. They told the court Smart had an issue with drugs and inhaling substances but they did not have the means to get help. They also said Smart was in DJJ's custody because after Smart burglarized their neighbors' house, they convinced the neighbors to press charges with the hope that Smart would get help while in DJJ's custody. The trial court issued an LWOP sentence for Smart on the murder charge and ordered it to run concurrently with his sentences for the other charges.
On May 26, 2016, Smart moved for reconsideration of his sentence pursuant to Byars . On June 7, 2016, our supreme court granted Smart's motion. Smart v. State , 416 S.C. 583, 787 S.E.2d 845 (2016).
On May 24, 2017, the trial court held a resentencing hearing (Resentencing Hearing). The court heard arguments by Smart and the State, and it heard testimony from multiple witnesses, including Smart's sister (Sister) and Dr. David Price. Sister testified regarding Smart's childhood and family environment, and Dr. Price testified as to his psychological evaluation of Smart. The court also admitted without objection the transcripts of the plea and sentencing hearings. On August 10, 2017, the court found Smart's LWOP sentence was appropriate and denied his motion for resentencing. This appeal followed.
I. Did the trial court err in applying the Byars factors and imposing an LWOP sentence?
II. Did the trial court err in failing to place on the State the burden of proof that Smart was irreparably corrupt?
"When considering whether a sentence violates the Eighth Amendment's prohibition on cruel and unusual punishments, the appellate court's standard of review extends only to the correction of errors of law." State v. Finley , 427 S.C. 419, 423, 831 S.E.2d 158, 160 (Ct. App. 2019). This court will not overturn a sentence absent an abuse of discretion. In re M.B.H. , 387 S.C. 323, 326, 692 S.E.2d 541, 542 (2010). A trial court commits an abuse of discretion when it commits an error of law, makes a factual finding that lacks evidentiary support, or fails to exercise any of its vested discretion. See State v. Allen , 370 S.C. 88, 94, 634 S.E.2d 653, 656 (2006). When interpreting the Constitution, state courts must faithfully apply the Supreme Court's precedent without expanding its protections. See State v. Slocumb , 426 S.C. 297, 306, 827 S.E.2d 148, 153 (2019) (); id. at 307, 827 S.E.2d at 153 ().
In Miller , the United States Supreme Court held state laws that mandate LWOP sentences violate the Eighth Amendment's prohibition of "cruel and unusual punishment" when applied to juvenile offenders. 567 U.S. at 465, 132 S.Ct. 2455 ; see also U.S. Const. amend VIII (). The Court stated juveniles differ from adults in that they have greater prospects for reform and diminished culpability due to their lack of maturity and a developed sense of responsibility, vulnerability to peer pressure, limited control over their environment, and malleable character. 567 U.S. at 471, 132 S.Ct. 2455. The Court held mandatory LWOP sentences violate the Eighth Amendment because they fail to distinguish "between ‘the juvenile offender whose crime reflects unfortunate yet transient immaturity, and the rare juvenile offender whose crime reflects irreparable corruption.’ " Id. at 479–80, 132 S.Ct. 2455 (). However, the Court did not "foreclose a [court's] ability to make that judgment in homicide cases, [but] require[d] it to take into account how children are different, and how those differences counsel against irrevocably sentencing them to a lifetime in prison." Id. at 480, 132 S.Ct. 2455.
Following Miller , our supreme court in Byars held juveniles serving an LWOP sentence were eligible for reconsideration. See 410 S.C. at 539–45, 765 S.E.2d at 575–78. Our court held an LWOP sentence may nevertheless be appropriate for a juvenile offender but only after the juvenile "receive[d] an individualized hearing where the mitigating hallmark features of youth [were] fully explored." Id. at 545, 765 S.E.2d at 578. The court enumerated five factors from Miller that a sentencing court is required to consider:
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