State v. Smith

• Decision Date: 11 June 1982
• Citation: 639 S.W.2d 677
• Parties: STATE of Tennessee, Appellee, v. Harold Vernon SMITH, Appellant. 639 S.W.2d 677
• Court: Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals

Page 677

639 S.W.2d 677

STATE of Tennessee, Appellee, v. Harold Vernon SMITH, Appellant.

639 S.W.2d 677

Court of Criminal Appeals of Tennessee at Knoxville.

June 11, 1982.

Permission to Appeal Denied by the

Supreme Court Sept. 7,

1982.

C. Dwaine Evans, Mindy Seals, Morristown, for appellant.

William M. Leech, Jr., Atty. Gen., Steven A. Hart, Asst. Atty. Gen., Nashville, Heiskell H. Winstead, Dist. Atty. Gen., Rogersville, Edward H. Moody, Asst. Dist. Atty. Gen., Morristown, for appellee.

OPINION

SCOTT, Judge.

The appellant was convicted of five counts of armed robbery and his punishment was fixed at ten years in the state penitentiary on each count. He was also found to be an habitual criminal and his punishment was enhanced to life imprisonment. Much aggrieved by the verdict, the appellant has presented seven issues for our consideration. In the first he questions the sufficiency of the convicting evidence.

On October 27, 1980, shortly before 5:43 P.M., the appellant and another man held up Stinson's Drug Store in Bulls Gap. At the time they entered the store James W. Stinson, a registered pharmacist and the owner of the store, was on duty behind the prescription counter. His wife, Jean Stinson, their son, James Michael Stinson, and his wife, Cathy Stinson, were also on duty in the family business. During the robbery, a customer, Carl Hawkins, entered the store and was also robbed.

When the men entered the store, Mrs. Jean Stinson immediately recognized the appellant. She had known him for twenty-two years and had watched him grow up. As a youngster he had bought toys in their store.

The men donned ski masks, and at gunpoint, forced all of the people to lie down in the floor. Their hands and feet were taped with duct tape. As the appellant tended to the other employees and the customer, his accomplice demanded various drugs from the pharmacist in the manner of one reading from a shopping list. As the names of various drugs were called, the pharmacist was required at gunpoint to find the various drugs on the shelves and to place them in a plastic garbage bag. The men then took the day's receipts from the store totalling $1,478.57 and the wallets from each of the victims. They escaped by taking Mr. James W. Stinson's station wagon which they abandoned at nearby McCullouck Cemetery, switching to the appellant's Chevrolet Monte Carlo automobile.

On October 28, 1980, Knoxville police officers, unaware of the Stinson Drug Store armed robbery in Hawkins County, were searching for the appellant who was an escapee from Brushy Mountain State Penitentiary. They received a tip that he would be in the Magnolia Avenue area of Knoxville. Four officers were riding around looking for him. He was spotted standing on the second floor balcony of the Magnolia Motel. One of the officers had known the appellant since high school days and recognized him on sight. When the officers stopped in the motel parking lot, the appellant jumped off the second floor balcony and fled on foot. They caught him about two and one-half blocks away.

When asked for his identification, the appellant identified himself as Roger Meyers and showed Roger Meyers' driver's license. The officers knew that Mr. Meyers' residence had recently been burglarized. In his billfold the appellant also had a variety of James W. Stinson's credit cards and James Michael Stinson's credit cards and identification cards. These included James Michael Stinson's driver's license, social security card, Selective Service card, automobile insurance identification card, bank electronic identification card, voter registration card, and an OSHA card. A bottle of various pills was found in one of his pockets.

When the officers brought the appellant back to the motel he was standing by a 1973 Chevrolet Monte Carlo in which the officers could see a bag containing a number of items. A gun was sticking out of the bag. When the officers inquired as to whether they could search the car, he replied, "certainly". Their search revealed two guns.

The appellant presented proof that he bought the pills and the credit cards from an unnamed person in late October. Only a witness to the transaction testified. Neither the appellant nor his mystery supplier took the stand.

A jury verdict of guilty, approved by the trial judge, accredits the testimony of the state's witnesses and resolves all conflicts in favor of the theory of the state. State v. Hatchett, 560 S.W.2d 627, 630 (Tenn.1978). On appeal the state is entitled to the strongest legitimate view of the evidence and all reasonable and legitimate inferences which may be drawn therefrom. State v. Cabbage, 571 S.W.2d 832, 835 (Tenn.1978).

There was ample, indeed overwhelming, evidence from which any rational trier of fact could find that the appellant was guilty of the armed robbery beyond a reasonable doubt. Rule 13(e), T.R.A.P., Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 2786-2792, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979). There was no attack on the sufficiency of the evidence that the appellant is an habitual criminal.

In the next issue the appellant contends that the trial judge erred in denying his pre-trial motion to suppress the items seized from his person. He contends that when he was first apprehended that he was patted down for weapons, and that there was no justification for the further search of his person, which revealed his wallet containing the credit cards stolen from the victims of the drug store robbery. The trial judge held that this was a proper search incident to a valid arrest.

It is well settled that a search incident to a valid arrest is an exception to the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment. United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 224, 94 S.Ct. 467, 471, 38 L.Ed.2d 427 (1973). It is equally well settled that a warrantless arrest may be made in a public place upon probable cause, even without exigent circumstances. United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 417, 96 S.Ct. 820, 824, 46 L.Ed.2d 598 (1976), citing Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 156, 45 S.Ct. 280, 286, 69 L.Ed. 543 (1925).

In this case law enforcement officers were aware that the appellant was an escapee from Tennessee's maximum security penitentiary. Escape from a penitentiary is a felony in violation of TCA Sec. 39-3802. One of the officers searching for him recognized the appellant on sight. There was clearly probable cause to arrest him, and there can be no doubt that the arrest was, therefore, valid. The search of his person was, likewise, valid.

Despite the officer's knowledge of his identity, the appellant maintained that he was Roger Meyers even after he was arrested. A search of his wallet for identification was reasonable under those circumstances. See: State v. Hlady, 43 Or.App. 921, 607 P.2d 733, 734 (1979), citing State v. Florance, 270 Or. 169, 527 P.2d 1202, 1211-1212 (1974). This issue has no merit.

In the next issue the appellant contends that the trial judge erred in denying his pre-trial motion to bring a witness from the penitentiary to testify in his behalf. According to the affidavit accompanying the motion, the appellant's attorney received a call from Doug Shelton, an inmate at Brushy Mountain State Penitentiary, who claimed that he had received letters from an individual, stating that the individual gave the credit cards and identification cards stolen at Stinson's Drug Store to the appellant. The trial judge denied the motion, noting that the evidence would be inadmissible because it was all hearsay, and that the evidence would be cumulative, since he had already ordered another person with personal knowledge about that information to be present to testify for the appellant. Larry Dew, the other person referred to by the trial judge, testified concerning the appellant's purchase of the pills and credit cards.

Although an accused in a criminal trial has a constitutional right to the compulsory attendance of witnesses under the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution, and Article I, Section 9, of the Constitution of Tennessee, the right to compulsory process is not unlimited. In Bacon v. State, 215 Tenn. 268, 385 S.W.2d 107, 109 (1964), the Supreme Court cited with approval the following statement from 97 C.J.S. (Witnesses), Sec. 9, p. 358:

A court is not required to issue compulsory process for any one whom accused may designate as a witness; the constitutional right to compulsory process requires such process for, and only for, competent, material, and resident witnesses whose expected testimony will be admissible. Within these limitations accused may obtain the attendance of any witnesses he cares to use.

Doug Shelton's testimony would have clearly been hearsay and, therefore, inadmissible. However, the appellant contends that Mr. Shelton's testimony was an exception to the hearsay rule, because the letter from the unidentified individual contained declarations against penal interest.

The declaration against penal interest exception is applicable to criminal cases in Tennessee. However, before hearsay declarations against penal interest made by an unavailable declarant are admitted, they must be proven trustworthy by "independent corroborative evidence that bespeaks reliability". Smith v. State, 587 S.W.2d 659, 661 (Tenn.1979), adopting the threshold test articulated by the Supreme Court of Minnesota in State v. Higginbotham, 298 Minn. 1, 212 N.W.2d 881, 883 (1973).

In this case the appellant offered no independent corroborative evidence which bespoke reliability to demonstrate the truthfulness of the out of court declarant's allegations in his letter. In the absence of such a showing, the testimony about the alleged declaration against penal interest was inadmissible. The failure to subpoena Doug Shelton was not error, and this issue has no merit.

In the next issue the appellant contends that the trial judge erred by failing to grant a mistrial when the jury observed the appellant being...