State v. Smith
| Decision Date | 18 March 2020 |
| Docket Number | Appellate Case No. 2018-002050,Opinion No. 27958 |
| Citation | 845 S.E.2d 495,430 S.C. 226 |
| Court | South Carolina Supreme Court |
| Parties | The STATE, Respondent, v. Michael Juan SMITH, Petitioner. |
Appellate Defender David Alexander, of Columbia, for Petitioner.
Attorney General Alan Wilson, Senior Assistant Deputy Attorney General William M. Blitch Jr., and Solicitor Byron E. Gipson, all of Columbia, for Respondent.
After careful consideration of the State's petition for rehearing, the Court grants the petition for rehearing, dispenses with further briefing, and substitutes the attached opinion for the opinion previously filed in this matter.
s/ Donald W. Beatty , C.J.
s/ John W. Kittredge , J.
s/ Kaye G. Hearn , J.
s/ John Cannon Few , J.
s/ George C. James, Jr. , J.
In October 2013, a young woman (the victim) was shot by Petitioner Michael Smith in the Five Points area of Columbia. It was undisputed Smith did not intend to harm her. Rather, Smith claimed he was acting in self-defense by shooting at a group of men who had threatened him. Smith missed his intended target and hit the victim by accident. Smith was subsequently charged with the attempted murder of the victim and a host of other gun-related charges, including possession of a firearm by a person convicted of a felony.
At the outset of trial, in opening statements, counsel for Smith conceded guilt to the felon-in-possession offense, but denied the attempted murder charge and asserted a claim of self-defense. In doing so, Smith implicitly acknowledged he had an express intent to kill the men at whom he was shooting, but asserted his actions were justified given his belief that he faced an imminent threat to his own life. The State ultimately conceded Smith presented evidence he acted in self-defense, and that therefore a jury charge to that effect must be given. Nonetheless, the State inexplicably requested the trial court charge the jury on implied malice.1 The law at the time of trial precluded an implied malice jury charge (based on the use of a deadly weapon) when a viable self-defense claim existed.2 Perhaps recognizing this, the State sought to create a new category of implied malice for "felony attempted-murder," with the predicate felony being the felon-in-possession charge. As noted, Smith had already conceded guilt to this charge. Thus, in requesting the new felony attempted-murder charge, which the trial court accepted over Smith's objection, the State essentially circumvented then-existing law expressly precluding an implied malice charge. Consequently, the trial court erred in accommodating the State's request for an implied malice charge. The error was compounded, for the State relied on a crime—the so-called crime of felony attempted-murder—which South Carolina has not adopted.
Adhering to the majority approach, we find felony attempted-murder is not a recognized crime in South Carolina, and, therefore, any jury charge to that effect was error. Likewise, we hold trial courts may no longer give an implied malice charge when there has been evidence presented that the defendant acted in self-defense.3 We therefore reverse Smith's convictions for attempted murder and the possession of a weapon during the commission of a violent crime and remand for a new trial.4
On the night in question, Smith and four companions were in the Five Points area of Columbia. While waiting on a street corner for the traffic signal, Smith's group was approached by two men (the rival group) who called Smith a "slob"—a derogatory name for a member of the Bloods street gang.5 The two groups parted without exchanging any additional words or insults.
Several minutes later, Smith's group began walking back toward their car. On the way, they were again confronted by the rival group, who had been joined by a third man. The two groups began posturing and exchanging insults.
At this point, the testimony at trial diverged significantly between the State's witnesses and the defense witnesses. According to the State's witnesses, following the verbal altercation, the rival group turned their backs and attempted to leave, and Smith pulled out a gun and fired several shots at the rival group while they were walking away. According to the defense witnesses, following the verbal altercation, an unidentified individual yelled that a member of the rival group had a gun, the rival group began shooting at Smith's group, and Smith pulled out his own gun and fired one shot in return.
Regardless of who shot first, Smith's shot missed the rival group and hit the victim, who was waiting for a taxicab nearby. The bullet severed her spinal cord, causing instant, irreversible paralysis. Law enforcement caught Smith fleeing the scene within seconds of the shooting.
Smith was indicted for the attempted murder of the victim and four gun charges: (1) possession of a weapon by a person convicted of a prior violent felony;6 (2) unlawful possession of a weapon by a person convicted of a prior crime of violence;7 (3) unlawful carrying of a handgun; and (4) possession of a weapon during the commission of a violent crime.8 During opening statements, Smith twice conceded guilt to the first two gun charges, telling the jury he had already pled guilty to those same offenses in federal court.
The State conceded during the trial there was sufficient evidence of self-defense to charge the jury. However, the State additionally requested the trial court charge the jury on felony attempted-murder, claiming it was "another way to infer malice." The State argued that "a person who is not allowed by law to carry a gun would be" committing an inherently dangerous felony, and thus—as in the ordinary application of the felony-murder rule—the jury could infer malice because the attempted murder occurred during the commission of a felony. Notwithstanding then-existing law which expressly disallowed an implied malice charge when evidence of self-defense existed, the trial court relented to the State's request for a charge on felony attempted-murder, instructing the jury:
The jury found Smith guilty of attempted murder and the gun charges. Smith appealed, and the court of appeals affirmed. State v. Smith , 425 S.C. 20, 819 S.E.2d 187 (Ct. App. 2018). This Court granted Smith's petition for a writ of certiorari to review the decision of the court of appeals.
There were multiple errors in the trial below that require reversal of the attempted murder conviction. First, as a majority of states have found, felony attempted-murder is not a recognized crime. Cf. State v. Sanders , 241 W.Va. 590, 827 S.E.2d 214, 219–22 & n.9 (2019) (). As a result, the trial court's instruction to the jury regarding the requirements and consequences of felony attempted-murder was erroneous.
Additionally, the State argued the felony attempted-murder charge was permissible because it was merely "another way to infer malice." In claiming self-defense, Smith admitted he had an express intent to kill , but argued his intent to kill was legally justified due to an imminent threat to his life from the rival group. Thus, there was no need for the jury to infer his malice from the circumstances surrounding the shooting. Rather, the jury was faced with the choice of either believing Smith's story and finding he acted in self-defense, or believing Smith had a self-admitted intent to kill that was not legally justified—the very definition of express malice. See, e.g. , State v. King , 422 S.C. 47, 57, 810 S.E.2d 18, 23 (2017) (). In either case, an implied malice charge was wholly unnecessary to the jury's decision. Cf. id. at 64 n.5, 810 S.E.2d at 27 n.5 ); see also Wilds , 355 S.C. at 276–77, 584 S.E.2d at 142 (). The State's unrelenting quest to obtain an implied malice charge is troubling.
Of course, erroneous jury instructions are subject to a harmless error analysis. See Burdette , 427 S.C. at 496, 832 S.E.2d at 578 (citation omitted). Here, however, the felony attempted-murder charge cannot be considered harmless. During his opening statement, Smith twice conceded guilt to the two felon-in-possession charges. By requesting the felony attempted-murder charge after Smith had already conceded guilt to the predicate felonies, the State essentially eliminated its own burden to prove all of the elements of attempted murder beyond a reasonable doubt, specifically that Smith acted with malice aforethought. For a constitutional error of this magnitude, "We need...
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State v. Williams
...issue. Id. at 150, 829 S.E.2d at 702–03.7 Although not directly on point, our supreme court's more recent opinion in State v. Smith , 430 S.C. 226, 845 S.E.2d 495 (2020), is helpful to our analysis here. Smith involved an attempted murder conviction resulting from the accidental shooting of......
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State v. Geter
...158 n.9, 829 S.E.2d at 707 n.9.In State v. Smith , 425 S.C. 20, 32, 819 S.E.2d 187, 193 (Ct. App. 2018), rev'd and remanded , 430 S.C. 226, 845 S.E.2d 495 (2020), the court of appeals was again presented with the opportunity to consider the doctrine of transferred intent and attempted murde......
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State v. Williams
...this issue.Id. at 150, 829 S.E.2d at 702-03.7Although not directly on point, our supreme court's more recent opinion in State v. Smith, 430 S.C. 226, 845 S.E.2d 495 (2020), is helpful to our analysis here. Smith involved an attempted murder conviction resulting from the accidental shooting ......
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State v. Geter
...crime, and, thus, there would be no question on remand as to the applicability of the doctrine of transferred intent. Id. at 234, 845 S.E.2d at 499 added)(citation omitted). Jurisdictions are split over whether transferred intent can be applied in attempted murder cases. In jurisdictions fi......
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