State v. Smith
| Decision Date | 02 June 1977 |
| Docket Number | No. 44674,44674 |
| Citation | 564 P.2d 1154,88 Wn.2d 639 |
| Parties | The STATE of Washington, Respondent, v. Edward Joseph SMITH, Jr., Appellant. |
| Court | Washington Supreme Court |
Butler, Heye, Cowan & Wolcott,
Thomas A. Cowan, Richland, for appellant.
C. J. Rabideau, Pros. Atty. for Franklin County, Pasco, for respondent.
James E. Sedney, Legal Services Center, Medical Lake, Richard Emery, Institutional Legal Serv. Proj., Seattle, for amicus curiae.
Defendant appeals a judgment of acquittal and order of commitment entered by the superior court after a jury found defendant not guilty by reason of insanity. We accepted certification from the Court of Appeals, Division 3.
On October 13, 1973 defendant was on board an eastbound Amtrak passenger train travellinb through Franklin County in Eastern Washington. It had left Seattle earlier that day. According to defendant an elderly woman sitting near him was invading his privacy by using 'ESP' and attempting to kidnap him. As a result, defendant forced the woman to the aisle floor and threatened her with the pool cue he was carrying. When three train employees rushed into the car to quell the fracas, defendant beat the woman about the head and arms until he was subbued. He was transferred to Franklin County jail by a deputy sheriff after the train made a special stop in Kahlotus, Washington.
Defendant was charged by information with second degree assault while armed with a deadly weapon. RCW 9.11.020(4) (since replaced by RCW 9A.36.020(c)); RCW 9.95.040. He apparently pleaded not guilty by reason of insanity on advice of his court appointed attorney. On December 14, 1973, defendant's attorney filed a notice of intent to rely on the insanity defense.
After defendant was found incompetent to stand trial in December 1973, March 1974 and July 1974, the parties stipulated to his competence shortly before July 29, 1975 because of letters to that effect from doctors at Eastern State Hospital. At trial the superior court judge, in view of the record, refused to permit defendant to withdraw the not guilty by insanity plea. Defendant and his attorney wanted to proceed only on a not guilty plea because defendant did not want to return to Eastern State Hospital. In partial satisfaction of defendant's request, the judge permitted the case to proceed on both the not guilty and the insanity plea. The jury found defendant not guilty by reason of insanity.
Defendant on appeal makes three basic contentions: (1) the trial judge erred in not permitting withdrawal of the insanity plea; (2) the jury lacked sufficient evidence to determine if defendant would be dangerous if at large after the insanity acquittal; and (3) he was held beyond the maximum period allowed under RCW 10.77.090 to determine competency. We disagree and affirm his insanity acquittal. We will consider these issues in the order stated.
We first point out the original not guilty by insanity plea was invalid. Defendant was not found competent until immediately before the trial July 29, 1975. The record indicates, and both parties expressly agree, defendant was incompetent when the original plea was entered. As stated in State v. Walker, 13 Wash.App. 545, 555, 536 P.2d 657, 665 (1975) (quoted State v. Coville, 88 Wash.2d 43, 46, 558 P.2d 1346, 1348 (1977)): '(i)nherent within this determination that an accused . . . is not competent to stand trial is a tacit finding that the accused . . . cannot rationally enter or waive a plea of not guilty by reason of insanity.' Other courts have similarly held that an incompetent defendant cannot enter a plea. See, e.g., White v. United States, 470 F.2d 727, 728 (5th Cir. 1972); Forthoffer v. Swope, 103 F.2d 707, 709 (9th Cir. 1939); Johnson v. Wyrick, 381 F.Supp. 747, 758 (W.D.Mo.1974, Aff'd), 508 F.2d 123 (8th Cir. 1974); State v. English, 198 Kan. 196, 424 P.2d 601 (1967); Van Dusen v. State, 197 Kan. 718, 421 P.2d 197 (1966). Nor may the defense of incompetency be waived by the incompetent (Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 384, 86 S.Ct. 836, 15 L.Ed.2d 815 (1966)) or by his counsel. Kibert v. Peyton, 383 F.2d 566, 569 (4th Cir. 1967); In re Davis, 8 Cal.3d 798, 808, 106 Cal.Rptr. 178, 505 P.2d 1018 (1973).
Although the original plea was not valid, the judge had inherent power to impose the insanity defense sua sponte over objection of defendant and his counsel. The trial judge was faced with a dilemma. On the one hand he could not take unwarranted liberties with the manner in which a competent defendant chose to conduct his defense, including his choice of plea. We have recognized that when a defendant, after being apprized of the consequences of his act, knowingly refuses to enter an insanity plea, the trial judge does not abuse his discretion in permitting the case to proceed on the not guilty plea alone. State v. Johnston, 84 Wash.2d 572, 577, 527 P.2d 1310 (1974).
On the other hand, the trial judge has a duty to uphold the constitution of this state and of the United States, and to discharge the duties of judge to the best of his ability. See Const. art. 4, § 28; RCW 2.08.080. It would clearly be unconstitutional to permit the conviction of a defendant who was legally insane at the time of the commission of the crime. State v. Strasburg, 60 Wash. 106, 110 P. 1020 (1910). Given these competing interests, the trial court was correct in choosing the course which would uphold the constitution and fulfill his obligation. The trial judge himself recognized he 'would be remisss in (his) duty' if he had not required the insanity defense.
As the United States Court of Appeals, District of Columbia Circuit explained:
One of the major foundations for the structure of the criminal law is the concept of responsibility, and the law is clear that one whose acts would otherwise be criminal has committed no crime at all if because of . . . mental condition he is not responsible for those acts.
In the courtroom confrontations between the individual and society the trial judge must uphold this structural foundation by refusing to allow the conviction of an obviously mentally irresponsible defendant, and when there is sufficient question as to a defendant's mental responsibility at the time of the crime, that issue must become part of the case . . .
Whalem v. United States, 120 U.S.App.D.C. 331, 346 F.2d 812, 818 (1965), Cert. den., 382 U.S. 862, 86 S.Ct. 124, 15 L.Ed.2d 100 (1965). Accord, United States v. Wright, 167 U.S.App.D.C. 309, 511 F.2d 1311 (1975); United States v. David, 167 U.S.App.D.C. 117, 511 F.2d 355 (1975); Beathea v. United States, D.C.Cir., 365 A.2d 64, 91 (footnote 59) D.C.App.1976); State v. Pautz, 299 Minn. 113, 117, 217 N.W.2d 190 (1974).
Indeed, this court long ago recognized this function of the trial judge when it held a judge possessed the inherent power to inquire into a defendant's competence to stand trial in the absence of any statutory authority so to do. State ex rel. Mackintosh v. Superior Court, 45 Wash. 248, 88 P. 207 (1907). This use of inherent power was noted approvingly in State v. Tate, 74 Wash.2d 261, 263, 444 P.2d 150 (1968). The ABA Standards Relating to the Function of the Trial Judge, 1.1(a) p. 7 (Approved Draft 1972) also emphasize the trial judge's obligation to raise on his own initiative 'matters which may significantly promote a just determination of the trial.' See generally A. Gitelson, and B. Gitelson, A Trial Judge's Credo Must Include His Affirmative Duty to be an Instrumentality of Justice, 7 Santa Clara Lawyer 7 (1966).
The facts here show the trial judge was justified in using this inherent power. The initial insanity plea, though invalid, brought the matter of defendant's insanity to his attention. The judge had before him defendant's testimony at the July 1974 incompetency hearing, where he gave his explanation of the incident. Defendant said he knew the victim was using 'ESP' to read his mind because a passenger he had been thinking of looked at him and because at dinner the green peas did not have skins. He also thought she was kidnapping him because when he awoke from a 15 minute nap, the moon was on the opposite side of the train, indicating to defendant the victim had turned the train around while he slept. Under these delusions, to which doctors testified he was subject, defendant attacked the victim. In addition to defendant's testimony and doctor's reports, the three railroad employees who witnessed the beating testified defendant condemned the victim for her 'ESP' when he began his attack. One employee further testified to the wild stare in defendant's eyes and his abnormal appearance. The jury confirmed the wisdom of the judge's decision to impose the insanity defense by finding defendant not guilty by reason of insanity, although they could have found him simply not guilty. Moreover, there was expert testimony at trial defendant was insane at the time of the crime, and defendant does not challenge the jury's findings that he committed the criminal act or that he was insane at the time of the crime.
Imposition of the insanity plea did not prejudice defendant's defense on the merits. He had the opportunity to show he did not commit the act. Not only was the not guilty plead submitted to the jury, but before it could find defendant not guilty by reason of insanity, the jury first had to find that he committed the act charged. RCW 10.77.040. In addition, defendant had no viable defense on the merits. He admitted committing the act at the July 1974 incompetency hearing and that admission was supported by the testimony of three independent eye witnesses. His only defense was the invasion of privacy and kidnapping claims, useful only in revealing the defense of insanity. See United States v. Ashe, 138 U.S.App.D.C. 356, 427 F.2d 626 (1970); Patton v. United States, 131 U.S.App.D.C. 197, 403 F.2d 923 (1968). 1
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