State v. Smith
| Decision Date | 11 January 2022 |
| Docket Number | No. SC 99086,SC 99086 |
| Parties | STATE of Missouri, Respondent, v. Rodney A. SMITH, Appellant. |
| Court | Missouri Supreme Court |
Smith was represented by Nina McDonnell of the public defender's office in St. Louis, (314) 340-7662.
The state was represented by Kristen S. Johnson of the attorney general's office in Jefferson City, (573) 751-3321.
A jury found Rodney A. Smith guilty of two counts of statutory rape in the second degree. Smith appeals, arguing the circuit court erred in permitting witness testimony via two-way live video because it violated his right to confrontation under the United States Constitution and the Missouri Constitution. The circuit court's judgment is reversed, and the case is remanded.
The State charged Smith in connection with allegations of sexual assault by I.S., who was 16 years old at the time and the daughter of Smith's then girlfriend. During the course of the investigation, I.S. underwent an examination at a hospital, where an emergency-room physician took swabs from I.S.’s body for a sexual assault kit. Upon arriving at the hospital, Detective Julie Johnson, the investigating officer, identified Smith as a suspect and put out a "wanted" for him. I.S. later recanted her allegations, so Detective Johnson cancelled the "wanted" but did not close the case due to pending lab results. When Detective Johnson received those results, she collected a buccal swab from I.S. and identified sources of DNA from an unknown male in the sexual assault kit. Erik Hall, the Biology Technical Leader for the St. Louis Metropolitan Crime Laboratory, collected a buccal swab from Smith, and completed a DNA analysis and laboratory report. Hall's work showed the unknown male DNA from I.S.’s sexual assault kit matched the DNA from Smith. Anne Kwiatkowski, the DNA Section Supervisor in the St. Louis Metropolitan Crime Laboratory, reviewed, analyzed, and approved the report. Thereafter, Detective Johnson attempted to contact Smith, but when that was unsuccessful, she sought criminal charges against him.
At trial, the State presented in-person testimony from I.S., I.S.’s mother, the emergency-room physician, Detective Johnson, and Kwiatkowski. I.S., I.S.’s mother, and Detective Johnson testified that I.S. recanted her allegations against Smith prior receiving results from the lab tests. Detective Johnson further testified law enforcement was not actively pursuing Smith until lab results showed Smith's DNA matched the DNA from I.S.’s sexual assault kit. The emergency-room physician's testimony supported elements of the charged crimes. Kwiatkowski testified about testing I.S.’s samples and the DNA on such samples matching unknown male DNA. The State introduced the DNA laboratory report, subject to limitations,1 prepared by Hall into evidence through Kwiatkowski. The State did not initially call Hall to testify because Hall was on paternity leave pursuant to the Family Medical Leave Act ("FMLA").2 The State sought to present evidence of Smith's buccal swabs through Kwiatkowski, but Smith objected. As a result, the parties discussed possible remedies to allow presentation of this evidence, including bringing in a different witness, seeking a continuance, or calling Hall to testify via two-way live video feed. Ultimately, the circuit court allowed Hall's virtual testimony, over Smith's objection. Hall testified he took the buccal swabs from Smith and performed a DNA analysis, which revealed Smith's DNA matched the DNA samples taken from I.S.’s sexual assault kit.
The jury found Smith guilty of two counts of statutory rape and not guilty of one count of statutory rape and three counts of statutory sodomy. The circuit court sentenced him to two concurrent terms of seven years in prison, suspended execution of sentence, and placed Smith on probation for five years. Smith filed a motion for new trial, which was overruled. Smith appealed. The court of appeals issued an opinion but transferred the case to this Court pursuant to Rule 83.02. This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to article V, § 10 of the Missouri Constitution.
Typically, this Court reviews evidentiary rulings for an abuse of discretion. State v. March , 216 S.W.3d 663, 664 (Mo. banc 2007). Whether a criminal defendant's rights were violated under the Confrontation Clause however, is a question of law this Court reviews de novo. State v. Justus , 205 S.W.3d 872, 878 (Mo. banc 2006).
"Properly preserved confrontation clause violations are presumed prejudicial." Id. at 881. Violations of the Confrontation Clause are subject to the harmless error test: "the error [must] be harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, meaning that there is no reasonable doubt that the error's admission failed to contribute to the jury's verdict." March , 216 S.W.3d at 667.
Smith argues Hall's two-way live video feed testimony at trial violated his right to confrontation and due process under the United States Constitution, U.S. Const. amends. VI and XIV, and the Missouri Constitution, Mo. Const. art. I, §§ 10, 18(a). Smith properly preserved this issue for appeal by objecting to Hall's virtual testimony and including the issue in his motion for new trial.
The Sixth Amendment's Confrontation Clause states "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right ... to be confronted with the witnesses against him." U.S. Const. amend. VI. Article I, § 18(a) of the Missouri Constitution states "in criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right ... to meet the witnesses against him face to face." "The confrontation rights protected by the Missouri Constitution are the same as those protected by the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution." Justus , 205 S.W.3d at 878.
Neither the United States Supreme Court nor this Court has addressed the use of two-way live video feed in a criminal proceeding and its impact on a defendant's right to confrontation. Three United States Supreme Court cases, however, examine a defendant's right to confront adverse witnesses against him or her when that witness testimony falls short of in-person, face-to-face confrontation: Coy v. Iowa , 487 U.S. 1012, 108 S.Ct. 2798, 101 L.Ed.2d 857 (1988), Maryland v. Craig , 497 U.S. 836, 110 S.Ct. 3157, 111 L.Ed.2d 666 (1990), and Crawford v. Washington , 541 U.S. 36, 124 S.Ct. 1354, 158 L.Ed.2d 177 (2004).
In Coy , the Supreme Court found a defendant's confrontation rights were violated when, pursuant to an Iowa statute, a large screen was placed between the defendant and minor witnesses testifying about alleged sexual abuse. 487 U.S. at 1014, 108 S.Ct. 2798. After a discussion about the historical significance of the right to confrontation, the Supreme Court stated: "We have never doubted ... that the Confrontation Clause guarantees the defendant a face-to-face meeting with witnesses appearing before the trier of fact." Id. at 1016, 108 S.Ct. 2798. This guarantee, the Supreme Court said, "relate[s] both to appearances and to reality," id. at 1017, 108 S.Ct. 2798, and "[t]he perception that confrontation is essential to fairness has persisted over the centuries because there is much truth to it," id. at 1019, 108 S.Ct. 2798. The Supreme Court noted, although "[t]he Confrontation Clause does not, of course, compel the witness to fix his eyes upon the defendant," the Clause "ensure[s] the integrity of the fact-finding process" by allowing the trier of fact to observe the witness and "draw its own conclusions." Id. at 1019-20, 108 S.Ct. 2798 (alteration omitted). Ultimately, the Supreme Court said the "rights conferred by the Confrontation Clause are not absolute, and may give way to other important interests." Id. at 1020, 108 S.Ct. 2798. The Supreme Court found the Iowa statute authorizing the testimony behind a screen violated the defendant's confrontation rights because there were "no individualized findings that these particular witnesses needed special protection." Id. at 1021, 108 S.Ct. 2798. The Supreme Court added "something more than the type of generalized finding underlying such a statute is needed." Id. The Supreme Court declined to address "whether any exceptions exist" to the right of confrontation. Id.
The Supreme Court revisited the issue in Craig and rejected a Confrontation Clause challenge to a Maryland statute allowing a child abuse victim to testify via one-way, closed-circuit television, in certain circumstances. 497 U.S. at 860, 110 S.Ct. 3157. The Maryland statute "permits a judge to receive, by one-way closed circuit television, the testimony of a child witness who is alleged to be a victim of child abuse." Id. at 840, 110 S.Ct. 3157. "To invoke the procedure, the trial judge must first ‘determin[e] that testimony by the child victim in the courtroom will result in the child suffering serious emotional distress such that the child cannot reasonably communicate.’ " Id. at 840-41, 110 S.Ct. 3157 (alteration in original) ).
Once the procedure is invoked, the child witness, prosecutor, and defense counsel withdraw to a separate room; the judge, jury, and defendant remain in the courtroom. The child witness is then examined and cross-examined in the separate room, while a video monitor records and displays the witness’ testimony to those in the courtroom. During this time the witness cannot see the defendant. The defendant remains in electronic communication with defense counsel, and objections may be made and ruled on as if the witness were testifying in the courtroom.
Id. at 841-42, 110 S.Ct. 3157. The trial court allowed the testimony, the Maryland Court of Special Appeals affirmed, and the Court of Appeals of Maryland reversed and remanded for a new trial but rejected the Confrontation Clause violation argument. Id. at 843, 110 S.Ct. 3157. The Supreme Court of the United States vacated and remanded. Id. at 860, 110...
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