State v. Snapp

• Decision Date: 09 November 2009
• Docket Number: No. 37210-0-II.,37210-0-II.
• Citation: 153 Wn. App. 485,219 P.3d 971
• Court: Washington Court of Appeals
• Parties: STATE of Washington, Respondent, v. Daniel Gerald SNAPP, Appellant.

219 P.3d 971

153 Wn. App. 485

STATE of Washington, Respondent, v. Daniel Gerald SNAPP, Appellant.

No. 37210-0-II.

Court of Appeals of Washington, Division 2.

November 9, 2009.

Sheri Lynn Arnold, Attorney at Law, Tacoma, WA, for Appellant.

Stephen D. Trinen, Pierce County Prosecutors Ofc., Tacoma, WA, for Respondent.

PUBLISHED IN PART OPINION

BRIDGEWATER, P.J.

¶ 1 Daniel Gerald Snapp entered a Newton¹ plea to six counts of second degree identity theft on November 16, 2007. Within the plea agreement, the prosecutor's handwritten recommendation includes language stating that Snapp could appeal the trial court's decision regarding his CrR 3.6 suppression motion. Even though Snapp does not appeal the voluntariness of his plea, we hold that the State waived any objection to Snapp's appeal of the trial court's denial of his motion to suppress by including that language in his statement on plea of guilty. We also hold that under Arizona v. Gant, ___ U.S. ___, 129 S.Ct. 1710, 173 L.Ed.2d 485 (2009), the search incident to arrest that resulted in the collection of evidence of identity theft was proper because the officer searched the car for evidence related to the crime for which Snapp was arrested. In the unpublished portion of this opinion, we also reject Snapp's argument that the officer's stop was pretextual. We affirm the convictions.

FACTS

¶ 2 At approximately 8:00 am on July 22, 2006, Washington State Trooper Keith Pigott observed a blue Ford Escort driving eastbound in the lane next to him. He initially noticed some debris hanging from the rearview mirror. As he got closer to the vehicle, Trooper Pigott thought that the seat belt was patched together with what appeared to be an aluminum rock-climbing carabiner. As a result, Trooper Pigott dropped back behind the Escort and pulled the car over.

¶ 3 The driver, later identified as Snapp, pulled into the Silver Dollar Casino parking lot. Trooper Pigott observed Snapp lean forward, as if hiding something under the seat. Trooper Pigott called for assistance, then approached Snapp and asked for his driver's license, registration, and proof of insurance. Snapp did not have a license, but he provided his Washington State Department of Corrections inmate identification card. Snapp quickly opened the glove box, grabbed the registration, and immediately closed the glove box. Nevertheless, Trooper Pigott observed what appeared to be a plastic bag with white powder in the glove box. The trooper, who is a drug recognition expert, also believed Snapp was under the influence of drugs because of his fidgety, restlessness, quick, and jerky movements.

¶ 4 Based on these observations, Trooper Pigott asked Snapp to exit the car. After he asked Snapp if he had any weapons, Snapp produced one knife voluntarily and Trooper Pigott recovered another knife during a pat down. He then conducted a field sobriety test and concluded that Snapp exhibited signs of someone who was under the influence but not to the point where Trooper Pigott believed an arrest was warranted. Trooper Pigott asked Snapp if there were any drugs or paraphernalia in the car. Snapp admitted there was a methamphetamine pipe but no methamphetamine. Trooper Pigott retrieved the pipe from underneath the driver's seat.

¶ 5 Subsequently, Trooper Pigott advised Snapp of his Miranda² rights, arrested Snapp for drug paraphernalia, and placed Snapp in the trooper's patrol car. In addition, a driver's license check revealed that Snapp's license was revoked [and he had a no-bail felony warrant]. Meanwhile, a second trooper arrived on the scene and removed the passenger from the car.

¶ 6 Trooper Pigott searched the car incident to Snapp's arrest. During the search, he recovered a clear, plastic, blue accordion file folder with items containing persons' identities. In addition, he found a black compact disc (CD) wallet containing identification cards and credit cards of various other people.³ Neither the accordion file nor the CD wallet was locked or capable of being locked. The trooper was not looking for weapons, nor was he concerned that either item contained evidence that could be immediately destroyed. But he was searching for drugs. In addition, Trooper Pigott found three credit cards not belonging to Snapp in Snapp's wallet. Finally, Trooper Pigott folded down the back seat of the car and observed in the trunk area a large number of items. Snapp stated that the items were not his and that he had borrowed the car from his girlfriend. At that point, Trooper Pigott stopped his search, had the car impounded, and obtained a search warrant for the items in the rear of the car.

¶ 7 The State charged Snapp with one count of first degree identity theft and twenty-one counts of second degree identity theft. The following July, Snapp filed a motion to suppress evidence, contending that (1) Trooper Pigott did not have probable cause to stop the car Snapp was driving for obstructed vision or defective equipment, (2) the search of the car was illegal, and (3) it exceeded the legal scope of a search incident to arrest. On October 3, 2007, after a CrR 3.6 hearing, the superior court denied Snapp's motion.

¶ 8 On November 16, 2007, the State filed an amended information, charging Snapp with six counts of second degree identity theft. That same day, Snapp entered a Newton plea, in which he pleaded guilty to all six counts. On Snapp's statement of defendant on plea of guilty, the prosecutor included a handwritten statement stating: "Alford [defendant] can appeal 3.6 motion." CP at 48. Snapp, his defense counsel, the prosecutor, and the trial court failed to address this notation during the plea and sentencing hearing. In fact, during the standard colloquy with the trial court, Snapp admitted that the declaration of probable cause established facts sufficient for a trial court to find him guilty of all six charges.

¶ 9 Snapp appeals the trial court's denial of his CrR 3.6 motion to suppress evidence.⁴

ANALYSIS

I. Appealability

¶ 10 As an initial matter, we must determine whether we can reach the merits of Snapp's appeal, given that he entered a guilty plea. The State maintains that Snapp's plea was voluntary and thus he waived his right to appeal pretrial motions.

¶ 11 Generally, a voluntary guilty plea acts as a waiver of the right to appeal. State v. Smith, 134 Wash.2d 849, 852, 953 P.2d 810 (1998). "Due process requires that a defendant's guilty plea be knowing, voluntary, and intelligent." In re Pers. Restraint of Isadore, 151 Wash.2d 294, 297, 88 P.3d 390 (2004). Moreover, a valid guilty plea generally waives all constitutional violations that occurred before the guilty plea, except those related to the circumstances of the plea or to the State's legal power to prosecute regardless of factual guilt. Smith, 134 Wash.2d at 853, 953 P.2d 810; see also State v. Amos, 147 Wash.App. 217, 225, 195 P.3d 564 (2008). When a defendant completes a plea statement and admits to reading, understanding, and signing it, this creates a strong presumption that the plea is voluntary. Smith, 134 Wash.2d at 852, 953 P.2d 810. But a plea is not voluntary when the defendant, his or her attorney, and the trial court labor under a false impression that the defendant has a right to appeal. Smith, 134 Wash.2d at 853, 953 P.2d 810. The sole remedy available for an involuntary plea is for the appellate court to reverse and remand to the superior court to allow Snapp an opportunity to withdraw his guilty plea. State v. Lusby, 105 Wash. App. 257, 263, 18 P.3d 625, review denied, 144 Wash.2d 1005, 29 P.3d 718 (2001); see also State v. Olson, 73 Wash.App. 348, 353, 869 P.2d 110, review denied, 124 Wash.2d 1029, 883 P.2d 327 (1994).

¶ 12 This case presents a curious scenario because Snapp does not appeal the voluntariness of his plea. Rather, he appeals the superior court's CrR 3.6 rulings and does not assign error to his plea agreement. In his reply brief, however, Snapp cites Olson for the proposition that he has a right to appeal his pretrial motion.

¶ 13 Olson is distinguishable from the facts presented here. In Olson, the parties agreed during oral argument before this court that Olson had not intended to enter a guilty plea. Olson, 73 Wash.App. at 353, 869 P.2d 110. Instead, the defendant had intended to have a bench trial on stipulated facts. Olson, 73 Wash.App. at 353, 869 P.2d 110. The Olson court then distinguished a stipulated bench trial from a guilty plea, stating, "In a bench trial on stipulated facts, it is the trial court, not the defendant, that makes the determination of guilt or innocence. Unlike a guilty plea, a stipulation preserves legal issues for appeal." Olson, 73 Wash.App. at 353, 869 P.2d 110.

¶ 14 Contrary to the circumstances of Olson, there is no evidence or admission here that Snapp intended to engage in a stipulated bench trial rather than to plead guilty to the charges. The verbatim report of proceedings from the plea and sentencing hearing, held on November 16, 2007, clearly show that Snapp intended to plead guilty to six counts of second degree identity theft. And Snapp does not argue that he did not intend to plead guilty in his appellate briefs. Accordingly, Olson does not aid Snapp in his argument that he has a right to appeal his pretrial motion.

¶ 15 The circumstances in Smith are closer to the circumstances presented here. In Smith, the State charged the defendant with possession of cocaine. Smith, 134 Wash.2d at 851, 953 P.2d 810. The defendant moved to suppress the cocaine evidence, claiming that officers illegally seized him. Smith, 134 Wash.2d at 851, 953 P.2d 810. The trial court denied Smith's motion, and Smith subsequently pleaded guilty, assuming that he could appeal the suppression ruling. Smith, 134 Wash.2d at 851, 953 P.2d 810. Defense counsel even stated in court that the defendant was reserving his right to appeal the suppression ruling. Smith, 134 Wash.2d at 851, 953 P.2d 810. The plea...