State v. Snider
| Decision Date | 05 May 2022 |
| Docket Number | 99310-6 |
| Parties | STATE OF WASHINGTON, Respondent, v. RONALD HARRISON SNIDER, Petitioner. |
| Court | United States State Supreme Court of Washington |
Washington law requires most people convicted of sex offenses to register with their county sheriff and to update their registration whenever they change or lose their residence. RCW 9A.44.132 makes it a crime to knowingly fail to comply with those requirements. Ronald Snider, who was convicted of third degree rape in 2003, failed to update his registration with the Pierce County sheriff when he moved out of a residential treatment facility in mid-2017. This was at least the fifth time Snider had failed to register since 2003. Snider pleaded guilty, as he did the last time he was charged with failure to register.
Snider now seeks to withdraw his plea. He argues that his plea was not knowing, voluntary, and intelligent because the trial court misinformed him about the knowledge element of failure to register. The Court of Appeals rejected this argument, concluding the trial court's descriptions of the knowledge element were accurate and Snider's plea was constitutionally valid. We agree with the Court of Appeals and affirm Snider's conviction.
In August 2016, Snider pleaded guilty to an earlier failure to register charge. As a condition of that plea, Snider agreed to engage in mental health treatment and live at a residential treatment facility in Pierce County called the Place of Restoration. Snider moved in and properly registered at that address. But in June 2017, the Department of Corrections learned that Snider was no longer living at the Place of Restoration. Around the same time, the United States Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) modified Snider's medications. Because Snider had changed his residence without updating his registration with the Pierce County sheriff, a warrant was issued for his arrest.
The State charged Snider with failure to register in September 2017. Snider was not arrested until April 2018-10 months after he had moved out of the Place of Restoration-and he still had not updated his registration with the Pierce County sheriff. The State amended the charge accordingly. Clerk's Papers (CP) at 4.
Snider decided to represent himself at trial with the assistance of standby counsel. On the week trial was originally scheduled to begin, Snider requested a 60-day continuance so he could gather more evidence to prepare his defense. The trial court granted Snider's request but noted it would not grant any further continuances. Trial was ultimately set for the first week of October 2018.
Snider planned to present a diminished capacity defense, which allows a defendant to argue that they are not guilty because they have "a mental disorder . . . [that] impaired [their] ability to form the culpable mental state to commit the crime charged." State v. Atsbeha, 142 Wn.2d 904, 914, 16 P.3d 626 (2001) (citing State v. Ellis, 136 Wn.2d 498, 521, 963 P.2d 843 (1998)). But the defense of "diminished capacity requires an expert diagnosis of a mental disorder and expert opinion testimony connecting the mental disorder to the defendant's inability to form a culpable mental state in a particular case." State v. Clark, 187 Wn.2d 641, 651, 389 P.3d 462 (2017) (citing Atsbeha, 142 Wn.2d at 918). On the day trial was set to begin, Snider still had not produced the expert testimony necessary to establish his diminished capacity defense.
Snider and the State each filed pretrial motions related to that lack of evidence. Snider asked for another continuance, and the State asked the trial court to bar Snider from presenting a diminished capacity defense to the jury. Three interrelated conversations followed. In each, the trial court described the knowledge element of failure to register in slightly different ways. Snider argues some of the trial court's statements affirmatively misinformed him about that element.
First Snider argued for another continuance because he had not yet received documents from the VA relating to his mental health diagnoses and related medications, which he claimed would show that he lacked "the ability to have the knowledge of certain issues of responsibility in my life." Verbatim Report of Proceedings (Oct. 2, 2018) (VRP) at 7-9. The trial court told Snider:
The only thing you need to know about in this case is that you had a prior responsibility to report. That's it. That's the only knowing thing that's an issue in this case at all, unless you 're trying to argue something else I'm missing. ... And I don't-what you've told me so far [about the VA records] doesn't seem to go to that specific issue.
VRP at 9 (emphasis added).
Snider replied that "in reference to the medical records there's a history here with registration," suggesting his medical records would show that "there was not just one but multiple mishaps with the medications and just knowing how to take care of [him]self' that had caused not only this failure to register but at least some of Snider's prior failures to register. VRP at 9, 11. Snider also argued he could call lay witnesses to testify about "how distorted [Snider be]came" because of these disruptions to his medication. VRP at 11.
VRP at 13 (emphasis added). Because Snider had no plans to use this further continuance to obtain the expert testimony he needed for his diminished capacity defense, the trial court denied Snider's motion: "Case will go to trial today." VRP at 14.
Snider asked if that ruling meant he could not present a diminished capacity defense, explaining that VRP at 16. The trial court replied that it had not yet ruled on the State's motion to bar Snider from presenting that defense and that its only ruling so far was to deny Snider's motion for a continuance.
The trial court then asked Snider how he wished to plead. Snider pleaded not guilty, and the trial court turned to the State's motions in limine.
The State moved, among other things, to bar Snider from presenting a diminished capacity defense because he did not have the required expert testimony. Snider responded that he planned to call lay witnesses-including his son and sister-who could testify that he had mental health conditions and struggled with his recent change in medication. The trial court explained the issue was not whether Snider had mental health conditions but whether those conditions "impacted Snider's] ability to know whether or not [he was] required to register.'" VRP at 21 (emphasis added). The trial court reminded Snider that testimony from lay witnesses was not enough to establish a diminished capacity defense; he needed an expert to testify.
Snider then seemed to say that he understood he was required to update his registration after leaving the Place of Restoration, but he had failed to do so because his mental health conditions left him overwhelmed by the instability caused by his change in address, change in medication, and other factors:
VRP at 21-23. But Snider had no expert who could testify that a "particular mental disorder . . . interfere[d] with [Snider]'s ability to know he has a responsibility to report" so the trial court found Snider's proffered evidence did not establish a diminished capacity defense. VRP at 25 (emphasis added). However, the trial court clarified, the State still had the burden to prove the knowledge element of failure to register.
When Snider again insisted his VA records would establish his diminished capacity defense because they contained the opinions of medical experts in the form of his diagnoses, the trial court responded:
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