State v. Snyder

• Decision Date: 10 October 2001
• Docket Number: No. 00-1339.,00-1339.
• Citation: 634 N.W.2d 613
• Parties: STATE of Iowa, Appellee, v. Thomas Alan SNYDER, Appellant.
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

634 N.W.2d 613

STATE of Iowa, Appellee, v. Thomas Alan SNYDER, Appellant.

No. 00-1339.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

October 10, 2001.

Tricia Johnston, Assistant Appellate Defender, for appellant.

Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Kevin Cmelik, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.

LAVORATO, Chief Justice.

In State v. Peters, 525 N.W.2d 854 (Iowa 1994), we held that "motor vehicle" in Iowa Code section 321J.2—the OWI statute—included a snowmobile. The decisive issue here is whether "motor vehicle" in Iowa Code section 321.561—the driving while barred statute—includes a snowmobile. The district court concluded that it did, and convicted the defendant, Thomas Snyder, of driving while barred. Snyder appeals, challenging his conviction. We affirm.

I. Background Facts and Proceedings.

On December 27, 1999, an Iowa Department of Natural Resources officer saw Snyder and another man driving snowmobiles on the road right-of-way of Wheeler-wood Drive in Cerro Gordo County, Iowa. The snowmobile Snyder was driving was missing a bright orange flag required by Iowa Code section 321G.13(9) (1999). The officer stopped both vehicles and asked to see Snyder's driver's license. Snyder told the officer that his license was suspended for non-payment of fines. The officer advised Snyder that the county attorney would charge him with driving while barred. The officer then issued Snyder a citation for operating a snowmobile on a public roadway without a bright orange flag.

Snyder's driving record shows the following relevant violations:

10-27-98: Non-payment of fines, indefinite suspension.

04-07-99: Non-payment of fines, indefinite suspension.

11-29-99: Habitual violator, remains under suspension until 02-27-00 and until financial responsibility is met ($200 civil penalty not paid).

12-03-99: Habitual offender, barred for two years, remains barred until 12-03-01.

On January 27, 2000, the State charged Snyder with driving while barred. See Iowa Code § 321.561. Later, Snyder moved to dismiss. He contended that operation of a snowmobile on the public roadway while one's license is revoked under the habitual offender provision of Iowa Code chapter 321 is not a violation of section 321.561. The district court denied the motion.

Following Snyder's waiver of a jury trial, the parties tried the case to the district court based on minutes of testimony. The court found Snyder guilty.

II. Issues.

On appeal, Snyder contends the district court erred in finding sufficient evidence to support his conviction. In support of this contention, Snyder again argues the operation of a snowmobile on the public roadway, while one's license is revoked under the habitual offender provision of Iowa Code chapter 321, is not a violation of section 321.561.

III. Scope of Review.

Our review of Snyder's sufficiency-of-the-evidence challenge is for correction of errors of law. State v. Hopkins, 576 N.W.2d 374, 377 (Iowa 1998). We uphold a verdict provided substantial evidence supports the charge. State v. Mitchell, 568 N.W.2d 493, 502 (Iowa 1997). We view the evidence in the light most favorable to the State. Id. Substantial evidence is such evidence as could convince a rational fact finder that the defendant is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Hopkins, 576 N.W.2d at 377.

Although Snyder's contention is the alleged insufficiency of the evidence to support his conviction, the decisive issue is whether section 321.561 applies to Snyder's conduct. See State v. Casey's Gen. Stores, Inc., 587 N.W.2d 599, 600-01 (Iowa 1998)

. Our analysis must therefore begin with our interpretation of section 321.561 and end with our determination of whether the evidence was sufficient to sustain the conviction based on that interpretation. See State v. Slayton, 417 N.W.2d 432, 434-35 (Iowa 1987) (court interpreted "intent to use" under going armed with intent statute, then determined whether sufficient evidence sustained defendant's conviction under its interpretation of the statute).

To the extent Snyder's challenge turns on the interpretation of section 321.561, our review is for correction of errors at law. State v. Ceron, 573 N.W.2d 587, 589 (Iowa 1997). In interpreting statutes, our goal is to ascertain and give effect to legislative intent. Id. at 590. When more than one statute is relevant, we consider the statutes together and try to harmonize them. Id. We may not search for meaning beyond the express terms of a statute when the statute is plain and its meaning clear. State v. Chang, 587 N.W.2d 459, 461 (Iowa 1998).

IV. Whether Iowa Code Section 321.561 Covers the Conduct of a Habitual Offender Who Operates a Snowmobile.

A. Applicable law.

Iowa Code section 321.561 provides in relevant part:

It shall be unlawful for any person found to be a habitual offender to operate any motor vehicle in this state during the period of time specified in section 321.560 ...

B. Analysis.

Iowa Code section 321.1(42)(a) defines a motor vehicle as a

vehicle which is self-propelled, but not including vehicles known as trackless trolleys which are propelled by electric power obtained from overhead trolley wires and are not operated upon rails.

A "vehicle," with certain exceptions not applicable here, is "every device in, upon, or by which any person or property is or may be transported or drawn upon a highway." Iowa Code § 321.1(90).

Before 1989, the legislature defined a snowmobile as

any self-propelled vehicle weighing less than one thousand pounds which utilizes wheels with low pressure tires and is designed to operate on land or ice or is equipped with sled-type runners or skis, endless belt-type tread, or any combination thereof, and is designed for travel upon snow, land or ice, except any vehicle registered as a motor vehicle under chapter 321.

Iowa Code § 321G.1(2) (1981) (emphasis added).

In 1989, the legislature eliminated the italicized language, thus defining a "snow-mobile" as a

motorized vehicle weighing less than one thousand pounds which uses sled-type runners or skis, endless belt-type tread, or any combination of runners, skis, or tread, and is designed to travel on snow or ice.

1989 Iowa Acts ch. 244, § 1 (codified at Iowa Code § 321G.1(18) (1999)).

When the legislature amends a statute, a presumption arises that it intended to change it. State v. Dean, 357 N.W.2d 307, 309 (Iowa 1984). The legislature's 1989 change to the definition of "snowmobile" removed the exception that excluded "snowmobile" from the definition of "motor vehicle" in Iowa Code chapter 321. In addition, the legislature changed the definition of "snowmobile" from a "self-propelled vehicle" to a "motorized vehicle." With these changes, we think the legislature intended to bring the definition of "snowmobile" within the broad definition of "motor vehicle" in section 321.1(42)(a). We therefore conclude that "motor vehicle" in section 321.561 includes a snowmobile. See Iowa Code § 321.1 (providing that definitions in section 321.1 apply to all provisions of chapter 321).

Nevertheless, Snyder insists that an Iowa Court of Appeals decision—State v. Gobeli, 342 N.W.2d 898 (Iowa Ct.App. 1983)—controls and dictates a reversal of his conviction. For reasons that follow, we disagree.

In Gobeli, the court of appeals reversed a defendant's conviction under Iowa Code section 321.561. The facts in Gobeli are similar to the facts here. The defendant operated a snowmobile on the shoulder of a city street and crossed a highway "while his license was suspended as a habitual violator." Id. at 899. The issue was "whether a snowmobile is a motor vehicle under section 321.561." Id.

The court in Gobeli agreed with the State that the definition of "motor vehicle" in chapter 321 was broad enough to include snowmobiles. Id. Nevertheless, the court concluded that chapter 321 did not cover snowmobiles. The court based its conclusion on the following: (1) chapter 321G is a special statute enacted to exclusively regulate snowmobiles, thereby removing them from chapter 321, a general statute regulating all motor vehicles; (2) registration and licensing requirements for snowmobiles found in chapter 321G differ from those for motor vehicles in chapter 321; (3) the definition of "snowmobile" in section 321G.1(2) (1981) includes "any self-propelled vehicle ... except any vehicle registered as a motor vehicle under chapter 321"; and (4) a person cannot be convicted of driving a snowmobile without a license when chapter 321G does not require a license for operation of a snowmobile. See id. at 899-900.

Snyder insists that Gobeli is still good law and applies in this case. He relies on the reasoning in Gobeli that related statutes must be read in pari materia and the provisions of the specific statute regulating snowmobiles, chapter 321G, should control over the general statute, chapter 321. See id. at 899. He argues that the only part of the Gobeli reasoning that no longer applies is the changed definition of "snowmobile."

As mentioned, the legislature eliminated the exception that excluded snowmobiles from the definition of motor vehicle in chapter 321. It did so following the Gobeli decision. By the change, we think the legislature signaled its intention to subject the operators of snowmobiles to the provisions of chapter 321 where those provisions are applicable and not in conflict with the provisions of chapter 321G.

Chapter 321G contains no prohibition against driving while barred. There is, therefore, no conflict between section 321.561 and any of the provisions of chapter 321G. If the goal of the legislature, as the States argues, is to preclude a person from operating any motor vehicle during a period when that person has proven too irresponsible to have driving privileges, operation of a snowmobile—a "motor vehicle" by definition—should fall under section 321.561.

In Peters, we questioned the viability of Gobeli.525 N.W.2d at 859. In Peters, an officer had seen the defendant operating a snowmobile on a...