State v. Snyder

• Decision Date: 07 October 2016
• Docket Number: No. 2 CA–CR 2015–0077,2 CA–CR 2015–0077
• Citation: 240 Ariz. 551,382 P.3d 109,749 Ariz. Adv. Rep. 5
• Parties: The State of Arizona, Appellee, v. Matthew Thomas Snyder, Appellant.
• Court: Arizona Court of Appeals

240 Ariz. 551

382 P.3d 109

749 Ariz. Adv. Rep. 5

The State of Arizona, Appellee,

v.Matthew Thomas Snyder, Appellant.

No. 2 CA–CR 2015–0077

Court of Appeals of Arizona, Division 2.

Filed October 7, 2016

Mark Brnovich, Arizona Attorney General, Joseph T. Maziarz, Section Chief Counsel, Phoenix, By Amy M. Thorson, Assistant Attorney General, Tucson, Counsel for Appellee

Steven R. Sonenberg, Pima County Public Defender, By Erin K. Sutherland, Assistant Public Defender, Tucson, Counsel for Appellant

Judge Staring authored the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Judge Eckerstrom and Judge Espinosa concurred.

OPINION

STARING

, Judge:

¶ 1 Matthew Snyder was convicted after a jury trial of two counts of possession of a deadly weapon by a prohibited possessor, one count of possession of a dangerous drug, and one count of possession of drug paraphernalia. The trial court sentenced him to concurrent prison terms, the longest of which was 2.5 years. On appeal, Snyder challenges the court's denial of his motion to suppress evidence obtained during the search of his backpack, the sufficiency of evidence related to the possession of an antique pistol, and the jury instructions and testimony related to the operability of the antique pistol. On the record before us, we conclude the search of Snyder's backpack was unconstitutional and reverse the court's ruling and vacate Snyder's convictions and sentences.¹

Factual and Procedural Background

¶ 2 When reviewing the denial of a motion to suppress, we consider only the evidence presented at the suppression hearing, viewing those facts in the light most favorable to upholding the trial court's ruling. See State v. Wyman , 197 Ariz. 10, ¶ 2, 3 P.3d 392, 394 (App. 2000)

. In January 2013, S.D., a loss-prevention officer at a Tucson grocery store, observed Snyder select two steaks at the butcher's counter, place them in a shopping bag from another store, and walk towards the exit. Snyder was carrying a backpack, but S.D. did not see him place anything in it. S.D. confronted Snyder and, with the help of another person, detained him. During the confrontation, Snyder suffered a broken knee cap.

¶ 3 Tucson Police Department (TPD) Officer Ives arrived approximately ten minutes later in response to a shoplifting dispatch, and store employees told him Snyder was being held in the security office. According to Ives, the security office was “oddly shaped,” consisting of two separate rooms: a smaller one in which Snyder was detained and a larger one for employees only. Ives testified there was “either no door” to the smaller room “or the door was open.”

¶ 4 At the security office, Ives spoke with S.D., who told Ives his version of what had taken place. Ives then advised Snyder of his Miranda²

rights before questioning him. Snyder told Ives he was about to purchase the steaks when he realized he did not have a certain “card” he had intended to use to pay for them, and that he started to walk out of the store to get the card from his car. Throughout Ives's questioning, Snyder remained bound in handcuffs S.D. had placed on him when he was detained.

¶ 5 After speaking to S.D. and Snyder, Ives decided to arrest Snyder for shoplifting. Snyder, however, was never arrested or issued a citation for that offense. Before Ives replaced S.D.'s handcuffs with his own, he instructed TPD Officer Dave, who had just arrived, to search Snyder's backpack. The backpack was in the other room, an area of the security office designated for employees, next to the doorway leading into the room where Snyder was detained. Inside the backpack, Dave found an antique flintlock pistol, a .22–caliber handgun, a small bag containing “white crystalline powder that [he] believe[d] to be methamphetamine,” and several rounds of ammunition.

¶ 6 Because Snyder had injured his knee

during the confrontation with S.D., paramedics were called, and he was transported by ambulance to a hospital. Dave took Snyder's backpack to the police station. After Snyder was released from the hospital, he was indicted for the offenses noted above.

¶ 7 Snyder moved to suppress the evidence obtained from the search of his backpack. At the suppression hearing, Snyder argued he was never placed under arrest by Ives and thus his backpack could not have been searched incident to arrest. He also argued no exigent circumstances existed to justify searching the backpack without a warrant because it was not in an area where he could reach it and he was in handcuffs throughout the encounter. The trial court found Snyder had been arrested as of the time the backpack was searched, but did not rule on whether the search was a valid search incident to arrest. Rather, the court found the search “would [have been] inevitable due to the defendant's property being searched upon arrest and transport[ ]” and denied the motion to suppress. This appeal followed his convictions and sentences. We have jurisdiction pursuant to A.R.S. §§ 12–120.21(A)(1)

and 13–4033(A).

Motion to Suppress

¶ 8 Snyder challenges the suppression ruling on three bases: he was never placed under arrest, therefore a search of his backpack could not be justified as a search incident to arrest; even if he had been placed under arrest, his backpack was not within an area under his immediate control; and, any search of his backpack was not inevitable. We review a trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress for an abuse of discretion, but we review constitutional and purely legal issues de novo. State v. Moody , 208 Ariz. 424, ¶ 62, 94 P.3d 1119, 1140 (2004)

.

Arrest

¶ 9 Whether an arrest has occurred is a mixed question of fact and law. See State v. Blackmore , 186 Ariz. 630, 632, 925 P.2d 1347, 1349 (1996)

. While we defer to the trial court's factual determinations, we review its legal conclusion de novo. See id.

¶ 10 “An arrest is complete when the suspect's liberty of movement is interrupted and restricted by the police.” State v. Winegar , 147 Ariz. 440, 447–48, 711 P.2d 579, 586–87 (1985)

. Whether an arrest has occurred is based on an objective view of the evidence, not the subjective beliefs of the parties. Id. at 448, 711 P.2d at 587 (“Indeed, ‘[a] certain set of facts may constitute an arrest whether or not the officer intended to make an arrest and despite his disclaimer that an arrest occurred.’ ”), quoting

Taylor v. Arizona , 471 F.2d 848, 851 (9th Cir. 1972) (alteration in Winegar ). “The issue turns upon an evaluation of all the surrounding circumstances to determine whether a reasonable person, innocent of any crime, would reasonably believe that he was being arrested.” Id.

¶ 11 A significant factor in determining whether an arrest has occurred “is the extent that freedom of movement is curtailed and the degree and manner of force used.” State v. Ault , 150 Ariz. 459, 464, 724 P.2d 545, 550 (1986)

. “Another significant factor is the display of official authority, such that ‘a reasonable person would ... not [feel] free to leave.’ ” Id. , quoting

Winegar , 147 Ariz. at 448, 711 P.2d at 587. “[H]andcuffing a suspect is an indicia of arrest.” State v. Rowland , 172 Ariz. 182, 184, 836 P.2d 395, 397 (App. 1992). Giving a defendant Miranda warnings is also “considered a factor weighing in favor of concluding that there was an arrest because most people associate the warnings with arrest.” Id.

¶ 12 Snyder argues he was not placed under arrest because the police did not restrict his freedom of movement; rather, “the only restriction of freedom of movement came from the loss prevention officer who handcuffed [him] and placed him in the manager's office to wait for the police to arrive.” Snyder further argues there was no indication from either police officer that he was being placed under arrest and there was no show of authority by either officer to which he could submit.

¶ 13 We disagree. Snyder was detained by S.D., placed in handcuffs, and kept in a separate room located in a security office to await the police. When Ives arrived, he gave Snyder Miranda

warnings and questioned him about the incident. Then, after speaking to S.D. and Snyder, Ives replaced S.D.'s handcuffs on Snyder with his own. Viewing the facts objectively, a reasonable person would reasonably believe he was being arrested by at least that point and would not believe he was free to leave. See

Ault , 150 Ariz. at 464, 724 P.2d at 550 (“No reasonable person would have believed that he was free to leave the scene at this point.”). The trial court correctly concluded Snyder had been placed under arrest.³

Search Incident to Arrest

¶ 14 Snyder argues the search of his backpack “cannot be justified as a search incident to arrest because the reasons justifying a search incident to arrest were not present” and the “backpack was not in [an] area under his immediate control.” Based on the record before us, we agree.

¶ 15 In reviewing a motion to suppress for an alleged Fourth Amendment violation, “we defer to the trial court's factual findings, but we review de novo mixed questions of law and fact and the trial court's ultimate legal conclusion.” See Wyman , 197 Ariz. 10, ¶ 5, 3 P.3d at 395

. Notably, the state bears the burden of proving the lawfulness of a search by a preponderance of the evidence.

Ariz. R. Crim. P. 16.2(b)

. And, “a search must be justified at its inception, not by what it turns up.” State v. Taylor , 167 Ariz. 439, 440, 808 P.2d 324, 325 (App. 1990).

¶ 16 The Fourth Amendment prohibits unreasonable searches. U.S. Const. amend. IV

.⁴ Warrantless “searches conducted outside the judicial process, without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable ... subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions.” Katz v. United States , 389 U.S. 347, 357, 88 S.Ct. 507, 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967). One exception to the warrant requirement “is a search incident to a lawful arrest.” Arizona v. Gant , 556 U.S. 332, 338, 129 S.Ct. 1710, 173 L.Ed.2d 485 (2009). “The exception derives from interests in officer...