State v. Speights

• Decision Date: 15 December 1971
• Docket Number: No. 90,90
• Citation: 185 S.E.2d 152,280 N.C. 137
• Court: North Carolina Supreme Court
• Parties: STATE of North Carolina v. John Peurifoy SPEIGHTS.

Page 152

185 S.E.2d 152

280 N.C. 137

STATE of North Carolina v. John Peurifoy SPEIGHTS.

No. 90.

Supreme Court of North Carolina.

Dec. 15, 1971.

Atty. Gen. Robert Morgan, Asst. Atty. Gen. I. Beverly Lake, Jr., and Staff Atty. Ronald M. Price, Raleigh, for the State.

Manning, Fulton & Skinner by John B. McMillan, Raleigh, for defendant-appellant.

MOORE, Justice.

Defendant first contends that as an indigent his rights under the Sixth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States were violated in that he was tried without benefit of counsel on two charges arising out of the same incident, the combined punishment for which could have been in excess of six months' imprisonment. The maximum punishment for resisting arrest is six months' imprisonment and a $500 fine. G.S. § 14--223. The maximum punishment for operating a motor vehicle with improper equipment is imprisonment not to exceed thirty days and a $50 fine. G.S. § 20--125 and G.S. § 20--176(b).

G.S. 7A--451(a)(1) provides that an indigent person is entitled to services of counsel in any felony case, and in any misdemeanor case for which the authorized punishment exceeds six months' imprisonment or a $500 fine.

In State v. Green, 277 N.C. 188, 176 S.E.2d 756 (1970), in which the trial court refused to appoint counsel for an indigent charged with a misdemeanor for which punishment could not exceed six months' imprisonment, it is stated:

'Whether an offense is Petty or Serious is measured, in both state and federal courts, by the punishment authorized by law For the particular offense in question. 18 U.S.C. § 1; G.S. 7A--451. Under these statutory yardsticks Any crime the maximum authorized punishment for which does not exceed six months in prison is a petty offense for which the offender may be tried without a jury and Without the assistance of counsel. State v. Morris, 275 N.C. 50, 165 S.E.2d 245 (1969); Blue Jeans Corp. v. (Amalgamated) Clothing Workers, 275 N.C. 503, 169 S.E.2d 867 (1969); Cheff v. Schnackenberg, 384 U.S. 373, 86 S.Ct. 1523, 16 L.ed.2d 629 (1966); Dyke v. Taylor Implement Mfg. Co., 391 U.S. 216, 88 S.Ct. 1472, 20 L.Ed.2d 538 (1968); Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 88 S.Ct. 1444, 20 L.Ed.2d 491 (1968); Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194, 88 S.Ct. 1477, 20 L.Ed.2d 522 (1968).' (Emphasis added.)

The fact that defendant was charged with separate offenses in separate warrants does not change the punishment authorized for either offense. Defendant was arrested for driving an automobile without a horn, a violation of a statute designed to protect the traveling public but a comparatively monor criminal offense. When arrested on that charge, he elected to resist the arresting officer, a violation of another statute. Neither of the charges was a 'serious' offense as defined by either State or Federal courts. Each was a 'petty' offense for which appointed counsel was not required by the decisions of this Court or of the Supreme Court of the United States. While no loss of liberty is a trivial matter, the need of the individual for legal assistance must be weighed against the State's ability reasonably to furnish it. We think the distinction made between petty and serious offenses achieves a reasonable balance between the individual's need and the State's duty to furnish counsel. This duty on the part of the State should not be extended to include those cases consolidated for trial in which an individual charged with more than one petty offense. To do so would tend to encourage a multiplicity of separate trials for petty offenses, further adding to the already congested condition of the criminal dockets within the State. Since defendant was not charged with a serious offense, his trial without counsel did not violate his constitutional rights under the Sixth Amendment.

Defendant next contends that it was error for the Superior Court to impose a more severe sentence than had been imposed in the District Court, citing Rice v. State of North Carolina, 434 F.2d 297 (4th Cir. 1970). Rice was convicted in the General County Court of Buncombe County and sentenced to nine months' imprisonment, suspended upon payment of a fine of $100 and costs. On appeal to the Superior Court he was found guilty and sentenced to two years' imprisonment. Rice applied to the Federal District Court for the Western District of North Carolina for habeas corpus. The District Judge denied the application for habeas corpus for the reason that Rice had failed to exhaust his State remedies by not appealing to the North Carolina Court of Appeals. The Circuit Court, in reversing the ruling of the District Court, said:

'We think the District Court was in error in dismissing for Rice's failure to complete the remedies available to him an the State court. It would have been futile. Concededly the Supreme Court of North Carolina had consistently refused to follow Patton (Patton v. North Carolina, 4 Cir., 381 F.2d 636). State v. Morris, 275 N.C. 50, 165 S.E.2d 245 (1969); State v. Stafford, 274 N.C. 519, 164 S.E.2d 371 (1968); State v. Tolley, 271 N.C. 459, 156 S.E.2d 858 (1967). In these circumstances, exhaustion of State remedies is not indispensable. Hayes v. Boslow, 336 F.2d 31, 32 (4 Cir. 1964); cf Wright v. Maryland Penitentiary, 429 F.2d 1101 (4 Cir. 1970).

'. . . On the strength of Pearce (North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 89 S.Ct. 2072, 23 L.Ed.2d 656 (1969)), we again see the more drastic sentence on the second trial as a denial of Federal due process, in that by discouragement it impings upon the State-given appeal.

'In today's decision, the court is not insensitive to the logical and persuasive argument to the contrary in Lemieux v. Robbins, 414 F.2d 353 (1 Cir. 1969), cert. denied 397 U.S. 1017, 90 S.Ct. 1247, 25 L.Ed.2d 432 (1970). Likewise we express deference to the opinion in Evans v. City of Richmond, 210 Va. 403, 171 S.E.2d 247 (1969). We simply disagree.'

Justice Huskins, in State v. Spencer, 276 N.C. 535, 545, 173 S.E.2d 765, 772 (1970), involving an appeal as of right from a District Court to the Superior Court, said:

'In Pearce, both sentences were imposed in the same court. To get a retrial, Pearce had to attack the validity of his...