State v. Spencer, 220
Decision Date | 17 March 1954 |
Docket Number | No. 220,220 |
Citation | 80 S.E.2d 670,239 N.C. 604 |
Court | North Carolina Supreme Court |
Parties | STATE, v. SPENCER. |
Harry McMullan, Atty. Gen., and Ralph Moody, Asst. Atty. Gen., for the State.
Doffermyre & Stewart, Dunn, for defendant, appellant.
The defendant assigns as error the consolidation for trial of the two bills of indictment. This Court said in State v. Combs, 200 N.C. 671, 158 S.E. 252, 254: 'The court is expressly authorized by statute in this state to order the consolidation for trial of two or more indictments in which the defendant or defendants are charged with crimes of the same class, which are so connected in time or place as that evidence at the trial of one of the indictments will be competent and admissible at the trial of the others.' G.S.N.C. § 15-152.
The three defendants were charged with participating in the same crime as principals. The State relied upon the same set of facts at the same place and time as against each defendant. The consolidation was proper. It prevented two trials involving the same facts. State v. Davis, 214 N C. 787, 1 S.E.2d 104 ( ); State v. Jackson (State v. Blackwell) 226 N.C. 760, 40 S.E.2d 417 ( ).
The appellant in his brief in respect to the above assignment of error cites only an excerpt from State v. Norton, 222 N.C. 418, 23 S.E.2d 301, which deals with the lower court's charge to the jury. In that case this Court held the consolidation for trial of the two indictments had statutory authority. G.S.N.C. § 15-152.
The defendant's second assignment of error, based on his exception No. 2, is to the trial court's segregation of his witnesses. Each defendant moved that the State's witnesses be segregated during the trial. The court allowed the motion. The solicitor for the State then moved that the defendants' witnesses be segregated. The defendants objected. Their counsel stated to the court, we do not know at this time whether we will have any witnesses or not; we might rely upon the weakness of the State's case; at this time, we do not know who our witnesses will be; we have only two under subpoena; we feel that it would be prejudicial to be forced to have any prospective witnesses called and sworn in the presence of the jury, until the State has rested. The court said it would not permit any witnesses to testify in the case who were present in court after the evidence began, and directed the defendants to call their witnesses and have them sworn. Whereupon several were sworn--one of whom was Annie Lee Hodges. Each defendant objected and excepted.
The defendant in his brief combined his second assignment of error with his ninth assignment of error, based on his exception No. 17. His exception No. 17 is based on these facts. One afternoon during the trial immediately after the judge had left the courtroom, and while the jury was in the jury box, Annie Lee Hodges came into the bar, and in a loud tone of voice said to Mr. Doffermyre, one of the defendant's counsel, The next day when court convened counsel for defendant, in the absence of the jury, brought this to the attention of the judge by the testimony of the Clerk of the Court. Then Mr. Doffermyre stated to the judge that he had never seen Annie Lee Hodges before. Whereupon the defendants, and each of them, moved that a juror be withdrawn and a mistrial ordered.
The judge then ordered the jury to be brought into the courtroom. The judge inquired if any of the jury heard what Annie Lee Hodges said to Mr. Doffermyre. One juror replied he heard a girl he did not know, inquire of Mr. Doffermyre why she was sworn as a witness, and say 'you had better not put me on the stand,' and that was all he heard.
Another juror by the name of Tudor replied he heard the same thing, and heard her say she told Mr. Hooks she knew nothing about the trial, and didn't know why she was called. The judge then asked Tudor did he consider that would affect his consideration of the case. Tudor replied it might have some bearing on it; of course, I haven't heard all the evidence. The judge said that is not evidence. Tudor replied, I realize that. The judge: do you consider that would prejudice you in any way against either of the defendants? Tudor: well, I can't help from feeling it would have some bearing; if there was some doubt in my mind, that would add to it. The juror Tudor then stated in response to questions by the judge that he could sit in the jury box, and hear the evidence in the case and the charge of the court, and return a verdict uninfluenced by anything he had heard, except the evidence and the charge. The judge then stated: 'Gentlemen, the Court holds the juror is impartial.' The court denied the motion to withdraw a juror, and order a new trial. The defendants, and each of them, excepted.
The defendant contends that the manner in which his witnesses were segregated, the words of Annie Lee Hodges before the jury, and the judge's interrogations of the jurors as to the language of Annie Lee Hodges were highly prejudicial. And further that the other ten members of the jury were not given an opportunity to say whether they heard the remarks of Annie Lee Hodges, and if so, were they influenced thereby.
This jurisdiction, and the great majority of jurisdictions, follow the early English rule that the segregation, separation, exclusion of witnesses, or 'putting witnesses under the rule,' as the procedure is variously termed, is a matter not of right, but of discretion on the part of the trial judge. The exercise of such discretion is not reviewable, except in cases of abuse of his discretion. State v. J. H. Hodge, 142 N.C. 676, 55 S.E. 791; State v. Lowry, 170 N.C. 730, 87 S.E. 62; Lee v. Thornton, 174 N.C. 288, 93 S.E. 788; 53 Am.Jur., Trial, Sec. 31. The State moved 'to put the defendants' witnesses under the rule' only after the court had granted a similar motion of the defendants to exclude the State's witnesses. No abuse of the trial judge's discretion appears.
The evidence in the Record does not bear out the defendant's contention that the other ten members of the jury were not given an opportunity by the court to say whether they heard the remarks of Annie Lee Hodges, and if so, were they influenced by them. The judge asked the jury twice, if any of them had heard the words of Annie Lee Hodges. Only two said they had. The other ten could have spoken up in response to the two questions, if they had heard her remarks.
The juror Tudor stated to the court that he could hear the evidence and the charge of the court, and return a verdict uninfluenced by anything he had heard except the evidence and the charge. That suffices to support the court's finding that Tudor was impartial or indifferent. State v. DeGraffenreid, 224 N.C. 517, 31 S.E.2d 523; State v. Foster, 172 N.C. 960, 90 S.E. 785; State v. English, 164 N.C. 497, 80 S.E. 72; State v. Banner, 149 N.C. 519, 63 S.E. 84.
G.S.N.C. § 9-14 provides that the judge 'shall decide all questions as to the competency of jurors', and his rulings thereon are not subject to review on appeal, unless accompanied by some imputed error of law. The ruling in respect of the impartiality of the juror Tudor presents no reviewable question of law. State v. DeGraffenreid, supra; State v. Bailey, 179 N.C. 724, 102 S.E. 406; State v. Bohanon, 142 N.C. 695, 55 S.E. 797.
According to the Record only one other juror spoke up. He stated he heard a girl he didn't know inquire of Mr. Doffermyre why she was sworn as a witness, and say he had better not put her on the stand. It would seem that the hearing of such remark was not prejudicial. Upon the evidence in the Record sufficient facts were not shown to withdraw a juror, and order a mistrial in this capital case. State v. Crocker, 239 N.C. 446, 80 S.E.2d 243; State v. Suddreth, 230 N.C. 239, 52 S.E.2d 924; State v. Hart, 226 N.C. 200, 37 S.E.2d 487; State v. Hawkins, 214 N.C. 326, 199 S.E. 284; State v. Plyler, 153 N.C. 630, 69 S.E. 269; State v. Boggan, 133 N.C. 761, 46 S.E. 111; State v. Kinsauls, 126 N.C. 1095, 36 S.E. 31; State v. Brittain, 89 N.C. 481. See also State v. Burton, 172 N.C. 939, ...
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