State v. Spotts, S-98-228
| Decision Date | 04 June 1999 |
| Docket Number | No. S-98-228,S-98-228 |
| Citation | 595 N.W.2d 259,257 Neb. 44 |
| Parties | STATE of Nebraska, Appellant, v. Brian Ernest SPOTTS, Appellee. |
| Court | Nebraska Supreme Court |
Syllabus by the Court
1. Pleadings. Issues regarding the grant or denial of a plea in bar are questions of law.
2. Judgments: Appeal and Error. On questions of law, an appellate court has an obligation to reach a conclusion independent of that of the trial court.
3. Criminal Law: Legislature: Intent. The Nebraska Supreme Court has determined that the Legislature intended forfeiture actions pursuant to Neb.Rev.Stat. § 28-431 (Cum.Supp.1998) to be criminal proceedings.
4. Double Jeopardy. The Double Jeopardy Clause protects against three distinct abuses: (1) a second prosecution for the same offense after acquittal, (2) a second prosecution for the same offense after conviction, and (3) multiple punishments for the same offense.
5. Double Jeopardy: Legislature: Intent. Where the Legislature has demonstrated an intent to permit cumulative punishments, the Double Jeopardy Clause is not violated as long as the cumulative punishments are imposed in a single proceeding.
Kent D. Turnbull, Lincoln County Attorney, for appellant.
R. Bradley Dawson, North Platte, and David T. Schroeder, Grand Island, for appellee.
Brian Ernest Spotts was charged by information with possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver, in violation of Neb.Rev.Stat. § 28-416 (Reissue 1995). The State also filed a petition for disposition of seized moneys, seeking forfeiture of $14,177 found on Spotts' person at the time of his arrest. Following a trial on the forfeiture action, pursuant to Neb.Rev.Stat. § 28-431 (Cum.Supp.1998), the district court found in favor of the State, and Spotts forfeited the $14,177. Spotts filed a plea in bar to the information, alleging that subsequent prosecution would expose him to double jeopardy, contrary to the U.S. and Nebraska Constitutions. The plea in bar was sustained by the district court, and following the procedures set forth in Neb.Rev.Stat. § 29-2315.01 (Reissue 1995), the State timely perfected this appeal.
Issues regarding the grant or denial of a plea in bar are questions of law. See State v. Belmarez, 254 Neb. 467, 577 N.W.2d 264 (1998).
On questions of law, an appellate court has an obligation to reach a conclusion independent of that of the trial court. Id.
In the first week of October 1997, the Nebraska State Patrol obtained a search warrant for property located at 210 West First Street in North Platte, Nebraska. It was suspected that a methamphetamine lab was being operated from the garage located at that residence. At approximately 7:20 p.m. on October 2, the warrant was executed. Around 9 p.m., Spotts was driving Spotts' vehicle was stopped, and upon his arrival at the scene, Sgt. Dan Doggett of the State Patrol approached the vehicle. While standing by the passenger door, Doggett saw a substance on the floor of the car which he believed to be methamphetamine. According to the sheriff's deputy, Spotts consented to a pat-down search for weapons, and during the search, $14,177 was found on Spotts' person.
a vehicle on a public street past the residence. The State Patrol contacted a nearby sheriff's deputy and requested that he stop Spotts' vehicle because it had allegedly been seen in the garage where the methamphetamine lab was located.
Spotts was then given the Miranda warnings and placed under arrest. During an interview with the police, Spotts admitted that he was unemployed, that he had received 2 ounces of methamphetamine for resale, and that he had sold 1 pound of methamphetamine in the prior 2 months.
On October 9, 1997, a petition for disposition of seized moneys was filed by the State, seeking forfeiture of the $14,177 found on Spotts' person at the time of his arrest. On December 18, Spotts was charged by information with possession with intent to distribute a controlled substance (methamphetamine), a Class III felony. Spotts stood mute to the criminal charge, and the district court entered a plea of not guilty on Spotts' behalf. The criminal prosecution was set for jury trial in March 1998. In December 1997, the $14,177 found on Spotts' person at the time of his arrest was forfeited pursuant to § 28-431.
On December 15, 1997, Spotts filed a plea in bar, alleging in pertinent part that the conduct which exposed Spotts to forfeiture of the $14,177 was the same conduct which exposed him to liability and punishment for the possession of methamphetamine. Spotts alleged that in order to forfeit the money found on his person, he would have had to commit one and the same offense as charged in the information. Spotts asserted that the prosecution for possession of methamphetamine was barred because said prosecution would expose him to double jeopardy.
On January 26, 1998, the district court sustained Spotts' plea in bar and dismissed the information with prejudice. The State filed an application for leave to docket an appeal, pursuant to § 29-2315.01, and subsequently filed its notice of appeal.
The State assigns as error that the district court erred (1) in determining that State v. One 1987 Toyota Pickup, 233 Neb. 670, 447 N.W.2d 243 (1989), created or extended double jeopardy protection from multiple prosecution or multiple punishment on forfeiture proceedings; (2) in determining that a separate forfeiture action and a criminal proceeding constitute prosecution for the same offense, in violation of the Double Jeopardy Clause; and (3) in determining that forfeiture proceedings are so punitive as to constitute multiple punishment under the Double Jeopardy Clause.
This case is controlled by our decision in State v. Franco, 257 Neb. 15, 594 N.W.2d 633 (1999). In Franco, we acknowledged that since One 1987 Toyota Pickup, supra, we have determined that the Legislature intended forfeiture actions pursuant to § 28-431 to be criminal proceedings.
The Double Jeopardy Clause protects against three distinct abuses: (1) a second prosecution for the same offense after acquittal, (2) a second prosecution for the same offense after conviction, and (3) multiple punishments for the same offense. State v. Howell, 254 Neb. 247, 575 N.W.2d 861 (1998).
In Franco, supra, a criminal defendant was charged with a crime and faced the forfeiture of personal property seized during his arrest. The district court concluded However, we then noted that the Blockburger test, enumerated in Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 52 S.Ct. 180, 76 L.Ed. 306 (1932), which is applied to prevent double punishment in situations where the Legislature intended to provide only for a single punishment, did not prevent the State from seeking a criminal prosecution and a forfeiture in the same proceeding if there was legislative intent to do so. We concluded that the Nebraska Legislature intended for punishments pursuant to §§ 28-416(1)(a) and 28-431 to be imposed cumulatively. Where the Legislature has demonstrated an intent to permit cumulative punishments, the Double Jeopardy Clause is not violated as long as the cumulative punishments are imposed in a single proceeding. Franco, supra.
that the crime and the actions leading to forfeiture constituted separate criminal offenses, so that the prosecution of both was not barred by double jeopardy. On appeal, we disagreed and stated that a forfeiture action pursuant to § 28-431 necessarily required...
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State v. Ryan
...reaches a conclusion independent of the lower court's ruling. State v. Louthan, 257 Neb. 174, 595 N.W.2d 917 (1999); State v. Spotts, 257 Neb. 44, 595 N.W.2d 259 (1999). Whether a claim raised in a postconviction proceeding is procedurally barred is a question of law. See, State v. Bennett,......
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