State v. Stackhouse

• Decision Date: 03 March 1998
• Docket Number: No. 15646-0-III,15646-0-III
• Citation: 957 P.2d 218,90 Wn.App. 344
• Court: Washington Court of Appeals
• Parties: STATE of Washington, Respondent, v. Tobias Robert STACKHOUSE, Appellant.

Page 344

90 Wn.App. 344

957 P.2d 218

STATE of Washington, Respondent, v. Tobias Robert STACKHOUSE, Appellant.

No. 15646-0-III.

Court of Appeals of Washington,

Division 3,

Panel Three.

March 3, 1998.

Lorraine A. Parlange, Spokane, for Appellant.

James R. Sweetser, Prosecuting Attorney, and Larry D. Steinmetz, Deputy Prosecuting Attorney, Spokane, for Respondent.

SWEENEY, Judge.

This is a first degree murder case. In response to Tobias Stackhouse's motion in limine, the trial judge ruled there would be no mention and no evidence of another recent prior murder by Mr. Stackhouse in Pend Oreille County (Roscoe murder). The court found that such evidence would be highly prejudicial and serve no legitimate evidentiary purpose, i.e., motive, intent, opportunity. But the court later denied Mr. Stackhouse's challenges for cause to two jurors who knew that he had been involved in the Roscoe murder. The question here is whether the refusal to excuse these two jurors was an abuse of discretion. We conclude it was and reverse and remand for retrial.

FACTS

On January 11, 1995, Mr. Stackhouse and Jason Kukrall were arrested on Pend Oreille County charges for residential burglary and the murder of Steven Roscoe. They were arrested in Spokane and held in the Spokane County jail overnight. The following day, Spokane County deputies transported Mr. Stackhouse and Mr. Kukrall in separate vehicles to the Pend Oreille County jail. As Mr. Kukrall was being transported to Pend Oreille County, two Spokane police detectives rode in the car and questioned him about the murder of Linda Jaramillo-Guillen that occurred in Spokane County on November 30, 1994. Mr. Kukrall implicated himself and Mr. Stackhouse in that murder.

At the Pend Oreille County jail, Mr. Stackhouse was ushered into the jail library. There two Spokane detectives advised him of his Miranda ¹ rights. He waived them, agreed to speak and confessed to the murder of Ms. Guillen in Spokane County.

Mr. Stackhouse was then taken from the jail library and arraigned for the murder of Mr. Roscoe. At the preliminary hearing, the court appointed counsel to represent Mr. Stackhouse on the Roscoe murder charges. Both Spokane detectives attended the preliminary hearing. Mr. Stackhouse's attorney told him in court not to speak to anyone, including police.

Mr. Stackhouse was taken back to the Pend Oreille County jail. There the Spokane detectives asked for a taped confession on the Guillen murder. He agreed. On the tape, the detectives again read him his constitutional rights. He again waived them and admitted murdering Ms. Guillen.

As Mr. Stackhouse's confession was being recorded, his appointed attorney (on the Roscoe murder charges) tried to contact him. The jail supervisor told him that Mr. Stackhouse was unavailable. The lawyer assumed Mr. Stackhouse was being transported from the hearing. He waited for about 15 minutes. When the attorney became aware that Mr. Stackhouse was being interviewed, he demanded that the supervisor stop the interview. The jail supervisor left and returned a couple of times. The Spokane detectives finished taping the confession and left.

Mr. Stackhouse murdered Mr. Roscoe about five weeks after Ms. Guillen. Mr. Kukrall and Mr. Stackhouse were convicted of the Roscoe murder prior to this trial on Ms. Guillen's murder.

Mr. Stackhouse and Mr. Kukrall were charged with one count of first degree murder and in the alternative felony first degree murder during the commission of the robbery of Ms. Guillen. Prior to trial, the court severed an unrelated burglary charge from the murder charge. The court, however, denied Mr. Kukrall's motion to be tried separately from Mr. Stackhouse. Mr. Kukrall agreed to plead guilty to second degree murder and testify against Mr. Stackhouse.

In response to Mr. Stackhouse's motion in limine, the court ordered there be no mention or evidence of Mr. Kukrall's or Mr. Stackhouse's prior conviction for the murder of Mr. Roscoe. The trial court reasoned that to simply say to the jury "he's a murderer, therefore he must be a murderer, is a jerkitude factor. [It d]oesn't invite them to look at the facts of this case and make their decision on this case. It overwhelms. That's the 403 factor." Report of Proceedings at 251. The trial court agreed, however, to allow the State to tell the jury that both Mr. Kukrall and Mr. Stackhouse had prior unnamed felonies.

During voir dire, two jurors admitted knowing that Mr. Stackhouse and Mr. Kukrall were involved in the Roscoe murder. Mr. Stackhouse challenged both for cause. The court denied both challenges. And both jurors were impaneled.

The jury found Mr. Stackhouse guilty of first degree murder.

DISCUSSION

The right to trial by a jury assumes the right to an unbiased and unprejudiced jury. Accordingly, if one or more members of the jury panel are biased or prejudiced, the constitutional right to trial by jury is denied. State v. Parnell, 77 Wash.2d 503, 507, 463 P.2d 134 (1969). But a defendant assigning error to the court's denial of a challenge for cause must show more than the mere possibility that the juror was prejudiced. State v. Noltie, 116 Wash.2d 831, 840, 809 P.2d 190 (1991) (citing 14 LEWIS H. ORLAND & KARL B. TEGLAND, WASHINGTON PRACTICE, TRIAL PRACTICE § 202, at 331 (4th ed. 1986)). And therefore, unless it is very clear, the court's denial of a challenge for cause must be sustained. Noltie, 116 Wash.2d at 839, 809 P.2d 190; State v. Witherspoon, 82 Wash.App. 634, 637, 919 P.2d 99 (1996), review denied, 130 Wash.2d 1022, 930 P.2d 1231 (1997).

The trial judge here appropriately prohibited the State from introducing evidence of Mr. Stackhouse's recent prior conviction for the murder of Mr. Roscoe. He concluded that evidence of this recent prior conviction for murder--the same type of crime Mr. Stackhouse was on trial for--would be overwhelmingly prejudicial and had no probative value. The judge was correct. State v. Pam, 98 Wash.2d 748, 762, 659 P.2d 454 (1983) (Utter, J., concurring) ("strong presumption against the admission of evidence of a prior conviction identical to that for which the defendant is on trial"), overruled on other grounds by State v. Brown, 111 Wash.2d 124, 761 P.2d 588 (1988), aff'd on reh'g, 113 Wash.2d 520, 782 P.2d 1013, 80 A.L.R.4th 989 (1989). "Where multiple convictions of various kinds can be shown, strong reasons arise for excluding those which are for the same crime because of the inevitable pressure on lay jurors to believe that 'if he did it before he probably did so this time.' " Pam, 98 Wash.2d at 761, 659 P.2d 454 (Utter, J., concurring) (quoting Gordon v. United States, 383 F.2d 936, 940 (D.C.Cir.1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 1029, 88 S.Ct. 1421, 20 L.Ed.2d 287 (1968)). The court, however, refused to dismiss two jurors who knew of Mr. Stackhouse's involvement in the Roscoe murder.

Juror No. 6 responded in his jury questionnaire that he knew "[t]hey have been implicated in one other murder and one or the other may have confessed while in custody." In response to voir dire questioning, that same juror responded that "presumably because the average person would, yeah, I think, would think that maybe a person was more predisposed if they had been convicted, especially recently."

Juror No. 32 responded in her questionnaire that "Jason Kukrall and Tobias Stackhouse were also involved in another murder in or around Deer Park and that Jason Kukrall was guilty in that role." Again during voir dire, the juror responded "[t]hey were doing it together. I would think. That's how I would say involved." When asked how she would feel if the same two individuals were implicated in this murder, she responded: "I would feel the same way I did with that one. That they were both involved in whatever it was that--they're accused of." The responses are evidence of the very prejudicial taint which prompted the court's refusal to permit evidence of the previous recent murder. Pam, 98 Wash.2d at 761, 659 P.2d 454 (Utter, J., concurring).

The State relies on those cases that discuss the standards and appropriate analysis for gauging the effect of pretrial publicity. Patton v. Yount, 467 U.S. 1025, 1029, 104 S.Ct. 2885, 2887, 81 L.Ed.2d 847 (1984) (court upheld decision to impanel jurors who had knowledge from the press about the case, including defendant's confession which was not admissible at trial); State v. Rupe, 108 Wash.2d 734, 750, 743 P.2d 210 (1987) (juror impaneled on the retrial of a defendant previously sentenced to death not biased by knowledge from the media about the case), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1061, 108 S.Ct. 2834, 100 L.Ed.2d 934 (1988). Those cases focus on a different question. The question there is whether the jurors can set aside information about the case under consideration and decide the case impartially on the facts presented at trial.

Much like the State's position in Parnell, the State here compares the impressions by the two jurors gained "with the reading of newspaper accounts or hearing radio reports of the offense for which a defendant is placed on trial." Parnell, 77 Wash.2d at 505-06, 463 P.2d 134. And like the court in Parnell, "[w]e cannot agree. The setting and the purpose are entirely different." Id. at 506, 463 P.2d 134. In Parnell, it was a preliminary hearing where witnesses are under oath. Here, it is knowledge of Mr. Stackhouse's involvement in another recent murder. A conviction that the trial court appropriately recognized was highly prejudicial to jurors deciding Mr. Stackhouse's involvement in a totally unrelated murder.

We conclude that the trial judge abused his discretion in denying Mr. Stackhouse's challenges to Juror No. 6 and Juror No. 32 for cause. See State v. Brett, 126 Wash.2d 136, 158, 892 P.2d 29 (1995) (denial of challenge for cause reviewed for abuse of discretion), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1121, 116 S.Ct. 931, 133 L.Ed.2d 858 (1996); Parnell, 77 Wash.2d at 508, 463 P.2d 134 (new...