State v. Stanfield

• Decision Date: 05 March 2008
• Docket Number: No. A07A2363.,A07A2363.
• Citation: 290 Ga. App. 62,658 S.E.2d 837
• Parties: The STATE v. STANFIELD.
• Court: Georgia Court of Appeals

290 Ga. App. 62

658 S.E.2d 837

290 Ga.App. 62

The STATE v. STANFIELD.

No. A07A2363.

Court of Appeals of Georgia.

March 5, 2008.

Cecilia Marie Cooper, Dist. Atty., Americus, for Appellant.

James N. Finkelstein, Albany, for Appellee.

ADAMS, Judge.

The appellee, Wesley Brian Stanfield, was indicted for the offenses of rape, false imprisonment and child molestation.¹ At the time the offenses allegedly occurred, Stanfield was employed as a deputy by the Sumter County Sheriff's Department. Prior to trial, Stanfield moved to suppress his statements made to an agent of the Georgia Bureau of Investigation on the basis that the statements were involuntarily made because he feared losing his law enforcement job and he was coerced by the law enforcement officer who obtained the statement. The trial court granted Stanfield's motion, and the State filed this appeal pursuant to OCGA § 5-7-1.

1. At the outset we address the State's right to bring this appeal. Stanfield has moved to dismiss the State's appeal, asserting that the exclusion of a defendant's statement on voluntariness grounds is not within the scope of OCGA § 5-7-1(a)(4).² We disagree. "Even under a strict construction of OCGA § 5-7-1(a)(4), the State has a direct right of appeal where the trial court grants a pre-trial motion to exclude evidence on the ground that it was obtained illegally." (citation omitted.) Anderson v. State, 267 Ga. 116, 117(1), 475 S.E.2d 629 (1996). An appeal involving the exclusion of a statement on voluntariness grounds is no exception to this rule. See, e.g., State v. Morrell, 281 Ga. 152(2), 635 S.E.2d 716 (2006).

2. "In reviewing a trial court's determination regarding whether a statement is voluntary, we defer to the trial court's findings of fact unless clearly erroneous, but we review de novo the trial court's application of the law to [the] undisputed facts." State v. Aiken, 282 Ga. 132, 136(2), n. 21, 646 S.E.2d 222 (2007). Applying the "totality of the circumstances" test recently adopted by our Supreme Court in Aiken for determining whether the statements that a public employee makes during an investigation into his activities are voluntary, we hold that the trial court properly excluded Stanfield's statement. See Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493, 87 S.Ct. 616, 17 L.Ed.2d 562 (1967).

In applying that test,

[f]actors that a court may consider include . . . whether the State actor made an overt threat to the defendant of the loss of his job if he did not speak with investigators or whether a statute, rule, or ordinance of which the defendant was aware provided that the defendant would lose his job for failing to answer questions. If no express threat is present, the court may examine whether the defendant subjectively believed that he could lose his job for failing to cooperate and whether, if so, that belief was reasonable given the State action involved. In determining whether the defendant's belief was objectively reasonable, the court may examine whether the defendant was aware of any statutes, ordinances, manuals, or policies that required cooperation and provided generally, without specifying a penalty, that an employee could be subject to discipline for failing to cooperate. The court may also consider whether the investigator implicitly communicated any threat of dismissal either in written or oral form; whether, before the interrogation began, the defendant was told he was free to leave at any time; and whether the defendant was told he had the right to have a lawyer present. A trial court, of course, is free to consider any other factor that it determines is relevant to the determination of voluntariness. (Footnotes omitted.) State v. Aiken, 282 Ga. at 135-136(2), 646 S.E.2d 222.

The trial court in this case found that Stanfield had a subjective belief that he would be terminated if he did not cooperate with the GBI agent conducting the investigation. The court found that Sheriff Pete Smith confirmed that his policies and procedures required Stanfield to cooperate with the investigation and that he would be terminated if he did not give the statements as requested. Thus, the trial court concluded that Stanfield's subjective belief that he would be terminated was objectively reasonable in light of the state's action in implementing the policies and requiring his cooperation. The State concedes that Stanfield had a subjective belief that he would be fired if he did not cooperate, but argues that his belief was not objectively reasonable. The facts support the trial court's decision.

The policies referred to by the trial court were embodied in a policies and procedures manual promulgated by Sheriff Smith when he took office in January 2005. The manual was distributed to all deputies, including Stanfield. Rule of Conduct 32 in the manual, which on its face applies to internal not external investigations, provided: "Employees are to cooperate with all internal investigations in accordance with the provisions outlined in the Internal Investigations policy. Failure to cooperate with any internal investigation will result in immediate termination."

Sheriff Smith testified that Rule 32 could, and as a "general rule" did, apply to investigations other than internal investigations. Sheriff Smith also testified that it was accurate to characterize the investigation against Stanfield as both an external investigation in terms of...