State v. Lynch
Decision Date | 02 November 2009 |
Docket Number | No. S09A1402.,S09A1402. |
Citation | 286 Ga. 98,686 S.E.2d 244 |
Parties | The STATE v. LYNCH. |
Court | Georgia Supreme Court |
Gwendolyn Keyes Fleming, Dist. Atty., Leonora Grant, Asst. Dist. Atty., Thurbert E. Baker, Atty. Gen., for appellant.
Alden W. Snead, Gerard B. Kleinrock, Decatur, for appellee.
After Kory Gore was stabbed to death in DeKalb County and his vehicle taken, law enforcement officers in Nash County, North Carolina spotted the vehicle being driven by Patrick Lynch, and a high-speed chase ensued. Lynch eventually left the vehicle and fled. The DeKalb County Police Department was notified, and Detectives Kevin Farmer and Shane Cheek traveled to Nash County to investigate. After a brief manhunt, Lynch was found, taken into custody, and transported to the Nash County Sheriff's Department. He was interviewed there by the DeKalb County detectives, and gave them an inculpatory statement.
Lynch was charged with malice murder, felony murder, aggravated assault, and theft by taking. At pre-trial hearings, during which Lynch and Detective Cheek testified, the trial court denied the State's motion to present similar transaction evidence, suppressed Lynch's pre-trial statement on voluntariness grounds, granted his motion to suppress fingerprint evidence, and denied the State's motion to reconsider and reopen the evidence at the hearing held pursuant to Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 84 S.Ct. 1774, 12 L.Ed.2d 908 (1964). In extensive oral comments, the trial court found that the conduct of Nash County officers prior to the interview by the DeKalb County detectives included beating, use of a taser, removal of Lynch's clothes, and withholding of medical attention, constituted duress and coercion, and caused Lynch to give a statement in order to leave Nash County and obtain medical attention.
After the State requested a written order on the suppression of the fingerprint and the statement, the trial court stated that "the record speaks for itself" and never entered a written order. The State directly appeals pursuant to OCGA § 5-7-1(a)(4) from the orders suppressing Lynch's pre-trial statement and the fingerprint evidence, although the State concedes that the latter issue is now moot. See State v. Morrell, 281 Ga. 152(2), 635 S.E.2d 716 (2006) ( ); State v. Stanfield, 290 Ga.App. 62, 63(1), 658 S.E.2d 837 (2008) ( ). Even though oral orders normally cannot be appealed, the State nevertheless was authorized to bring this appeal because "the transcript affirmatively shows that the State requested the trial court to put the oral order[s] in written form and that the trial court refused to do so." State v. Morrell, supra at 153(2), 635 S.E.2d 716.
1. The State contends that the trial court erred in suppressing Lynch's pre-trial statement, because it was made freely and voluntarily without hope of benefit or threat of injury. In addressing this contention, we bear in mind that a trial court's determination as to the voluntariness of a statement State v. Ritter, 268 Ga. 108, 485 S.E.2d 492 (1997). The State v. Tye, 276 Ga. 559, 562(2), 580 S.E.2d 528 (2003).
State v. Ritter, supra at 109(1), 485 S.E.2d 492. State v. Ritter, supra at 109-110(1), 485 S.E.2d 492. In order for an incriminatory statement to be admissible pursuant to OCGA § 24-3-50, it must have been made freely and voluntarily, Mangrum v. State, 285 Ga. 676, 677(2), 681 S.E.2d 130 (2009). See also State v. Ritter, supra at 109(1), 485 S.E.2d 492.
Although the trial court mentioned "hope of benefit," it repeatedly based its ruling upon a finding of coercion and duress. If that finding was authorized by the evidence, it clearly was sufficient to support exclusion of Lynch's pre-trial statement. The "remotest fear of injury" that renders an incriminating statement involuntary and inadmissible under OCGA § 24-3-50 is "physical or mental torture" or coercion by threats. Mangrum v. State, supra; Wilson v. State, 285 Ga. 224, 228(3), 675 S.E.2d 11 (2009); Vergara v. State, 283 Ga. 175, 178(1), 657 S.E.2d 863 (2008). This determination must be based on the totality of the circumstances. Wright v. State, 285 Ga. 428, 432(2), 677 S.E.2d 82 (2009). See also Vergara v. State, supra.
The State argues that the trial court erroneously considered events occurring after the initial interrogation when it stated that "all of that is the totality of the circumstances." However, a close examination of that portion of the transcript indicates that the trial court was summarizing its analysis to that point and was not including post-interview events, especially in light of the trial court's specific acknowledgment that those events occurred after Lynch gave his statement. That acknowledgment strengthens the presumption that the trial court considered only relevant evidence. Welborn v. State, 166 Ga.App. 214, 215, 303 S.E.2d 755 (1983). See also Jones v. State, 194 Ga.App. 356, 357(1), 390 S.E.2d 623 (1990) (Jackson-Denno hearing).
The State relies on certain testimony by Detective Farmer from the preliminary hearing which, when construed in favor of the trial court's order, does not support the State's argument that the interview by the DeKalb County detectives was conducted immediately after Lynch's arrest. Moreover, that evidence was contradicted by Lynch's testimony that he was left in a cell without clothes for a couple of hours prior to the interview. Lynch also testified that he had visible injuries from being beaten and that the detectives promised that he would receive medical attention and be taken from Nash County only if he gave them a statement.
If an officer or anyone else should testify that a confession was freely and voluntarily made, and then testify that the defendant was given a severe beating [or subjected to mental torture], but when the assault was over he freely and voluntarily confessed, no court, in our opinion, would have any trouble in reaching the conclusion that a confession thus obtained was inadmissible.
Coker v. State, 199 Ga. 20, 24(2), 33 S.E.2d 171 (1945).
Lynch's testimony regarding statements made by North Carolina officers expressing anger at him and blaming him for damage to a police car and the death of police dogs did not constitute inadmissible hearsay, as those statements were not offered to prove the truth of the facts asserted therein, but rather to show Lynch's fear of injury by the North Carolina officers. The evidence was admissible to prove Lynch's motives and conduct, which were directly relevant to the issue in the Jackson-Denno hearing, Brown v. State, 179 Ga.App. 280, 281, 346 S.E.2d 85 (1986).
Contrary to the State's remaining arguments, Lynch's testimony fully supported the trial court's findings. Those findings, as well as the court's credibility determinations, were neither inherently contradictory nor absurd.
In a motion to suppress, "" [Cit.]
Anderson v. State, 267 Ga. 116, 118-119(2), 475 S.E.2d 629 (1996). Moreover, a portion of Detective Cheek's testimony was successfully impeached, none of the North Carolina officers testified, and the State did not offer them as witnesses until the motion for reconsideration was filed.
State v. Tye, supra. The trial court did not err
in believing [Lynch's] testimony over that of [Cheek].... [Its] factual and credibility determinations must be accepted by this Court unless clearly erroneous. [Cits.] And since the trial court's findings were supported by [Lynch's] testimony—though contradicted [in part] by other evidence— they are not clearly erroneous and must be affirmed. [Cit.]
State v. Johnson, 273 Ga.App. 324, 327, 615 S.E.2d 163 (2005).
Furthermore, we find absolutely no basis for reversal in the State's contention that prior to jury selection and in the absence of any motion to recuse, the trial court abandoned its role as a neutral, detached and unbiased arbiter primarily by engaging in extensive debate with the prosecutor. See Butts v. State, 273 Ga. 760, 762(3), fn. 4, 546 S.E.2d 472 (2001) (); Ingram v. State, 286 Ga.App. 662, 663(2), 650 S.E.2d 743 (2007); Johnson v. State, 250 Ga.App. 245, 246(1), 550 S.E.2d 113 (2001). Compare Cousins v. Macedonia Baptist Church of Atlanta, 283 Ga. 570, 573(1), 662 S.E.2d 533 (2008) ( ).
2. The State also enumerates as error the trial court's rulings on the state's motion to present similar transaction evidence and on the motion to...
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