State v. Steenhoek

• Decision Date: 15 December 1970
• Docket Number: No. 53555,53555
• Citation: 182 N.W.2d 377
• Parties: STATE of Iowa, Appellant, v. Henry STEENHOEK, Jesse Wright and Gary Wright, Appellees.
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

Page 377

182 N.W.2d 377

STATE of Iowa, Appellant, v. Henry STEENHOEK, Jesse Wright and Gary Wright, Appellees.

No. 53555.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

Dec. 15, 1970.

Rehearing Denied Feb. 9, 1971.

Richard C. Turner, Atty. Gen., Roxanne Barton Conlin, Asst. Atty. Gen., and Lester C. Johnson, County Atty., Newton, for appellant.

Scalise, Scism, Gentry & Brick, Des Moines, for appellees.

MASON, Justice.

The cases consolidated here arose by indictments returned against Henry Steenhoek, Jesse Wright and Gary Wright by a Jasper County grand jury accusing them of the crime of destroying food products to increase the price thereof in violation of section 734.1, Iowa Code, 1966, in that they did willfully destroy food products to-wit: killing of hogs with the intent to raise the price thereof without first obtaining the consent or authority of the Jasper County Board of Health.

Defendants file motions for bills of particulars and demurrers. They assert in one division of their demurrers live hogs are not food products within the purview of the statute and in the other division allege section 734.1 is unconstitutional because: (1) it delegates to a non-legislative body powers legislative in nature; (2) it fails to fix criteria or guidelines for exercise of the power putatively delegated; (3) it is vague, and void as a consequence; (4) it purports to vest in boards of health power to permit or deny--that is, issue or withhold--licenses which authorize destruction of food products for the purpose of affecting the price of those products.

The court sustained the demurrers on the basis the indictments returned contained matters which constituted a legal bar to the prosecution, dismissed and discharged the defendants.

Defendants had slaughtered 100 or more hogs by shooting and dumping their carcasses in an open ditch which they then covered. The intent of the defendants was to raise hog prices.

The State appeals from this ruling.

Section 734.1 Code, 1966, was amended by Acts of the Sixty-second General Assembly, chapter 163 section 64 effective before the date of the offense charged. It now provides:

'Waste of food products to increase prices: It shall be unlawful for any person, firm, or corporation to willfully destroy, or negligently suffer to go to waste, with intent to increase the price thereof, any food products of any nature or description, without the authority or consent of the local board of health in whose jurisdiction the food products are located.'

I. The first issue presented by this appeal is whether live hogs are food products within the meaning and intent of the statute.

Ordinarily, where the legislature defines its own terms and meanings in a statute, the common law and dictionary definitions which may not coincide with the legislative definition must yield to the language of the legislature. Young v. O'Keefe, 246 Iowa 1182, 1186, 69 N.W.2d 534, 537 and citations. However, when the legislature has not defined words used in the statute the court must then determine as best it can the meaning of the language in accordance with the legislative intent so as to prevent absurdities and incongruities that may prevent justice. 2 Sutherland Statutory Construction, Third Ed., (Frank E. Horack, Jr.), section 4814.

The key words in the statute are 'any food products.' Thus, we must look to the common law and dictionary definitions to determine what 'any food products' means since the legislature has seen fit not to define the terms contained within the statute. The word 'product' is defined in the Random House Dictionary of the English Language, at page 1148, (Unabridged Edition, 1966) as 'a thing produced by labor.' Another definition of the word 'product' is found in Funk and Wagnalls, New Standard Dictionary of the English Language, at page 1977, (1933) where the word is defined as 'anything obtained as a result of some operation of work, as by generation, growth, labor, chemical reaction, study, or skill; anything produced; products of the soil.' In sum, then, the word 'product' means anything produced. Brown v. Cummins Distilleries Corporation, 53 F.Supp. 659, 664 (W.D.Ky., 1944).

The word 'food' has generally been interpreted to mean 'that which is eaten or drunk for nourishment,' 36A C.J.S. Food § 1, or 'all that is eaten for nourishment of the body.' 35 Am.Jur.2d, Food, section 1. Thus, food is anything consumable which is capable of sustaining life processes. Meaning of the word 'any' has been considered by this court in Iowa-Illinois Gas & Elec. Co. v. City of Bettendorf, 241 Iowa 358, 363--364, 41 N.W.2d 1, 4--5 and Herman v. Muhs, 256 Iowa 38, 41, 126 N.W.2d 400, 402, 7 A.L.R.3d 1199, 1203 and determined to be synonymous with 'every' and 'all.'

Where a statute, as here, has not previously been before this court for interpretation we must ascertain and give effect to the intention of the legislature. '* * * Under these circumstances we are obliged to examine both the language used and the purpose for which the legislation was enacted.' Dobrovolny v. Reinhardt, 173 N.W.2d 837, 840 (Iowa 1970) and citations. See also Janson v. Fulton, 162 N.W.2d 438, 442--443 (Iowa 1968), Hedges v. Conder, 166 N.W.2d 844, 852 (Iowa 1969) and State v. Hanna, 179 N.W.2d 503, 506--507 (Iowa 1970) where the fundamental rules of statutory construction and interpretation are discussed with further citation of authorities.

In interpreting 'a statute this court has time and again said that the courts are required to interpret the language used by the legislature, fairly and sensibly in accordance with the plain meaning of the words used.' Green v. Brinegar, 228 Iowa 477, 479--480, 292 N.W. 229, 230.

Smith v. City of Fort Dodge, 160 N.W.2d 492, 497 (Iowa 1968) contains this statement: 'In reading a statute we are required to give words of common usage their commonly-understood meaning unless it is clear from a reading of the statute that a different meaning was intended, or unless such construction would defeat the manifest intent of the legislature. * * * (citing authorities).'

The plain, ordinary, sensible interpretation of the phrase 'any food products' is that anything being produced or produced to sustain life's processes falls within the commonly-understood and used meaning of the words contained in this statute. The words 'any nature or description' appearing in the statute after the phrase being considered indicate a clear legislative intent that the phrase 'any food products' should have the broadest possible meaning consistent with good canons of statutory construction.

In view of our interpretation of the statute we find a hog, live or dead, is a thing being produced or produced to sustain life's processes and the killing of the hog falls within the proscription of the statute.

II. In its second error the State challenges correctness of the trial court's ruling sustaining defendants' demurrers upon the basis urged in division II thereof, that is, unconstitutionality of section 734.1.

This assignment presents the issue whether this section exceeds the State's policing powers.

Before considering the grounds alleged in the demurrers we state 'some thoroughly established principles which must be followed in all cases where questions of constitutionality are involved.'

They are summarized in Danner v. Hass, 257 Iowa 654, 661, 134 N.W.2d 534, 539 in this manner: 'all presumptions are indulged in favor of constitutionality; one who attacks the statute, alleging unconstitutionality, must prove its invalidity beyond a reasonable doubt; that a law may work hardship does not render it unconstitutional; if any reasonable basis may be conceived which supports the statute, it will be upheld, and the challenger must negative all possible bases; the courts are not concerned with the wisdom, justice, policy, or expediency of a statute; and we will adopt a liberal interpretation of the constitution in favor of the constitutionality of legislation.'

III. Defendants, in support of their claim of unconstitutionality, first contend the section delegates legislative powers to a non-legislative body, namely, the local board of health.

Before a court may be justified in holding a statute unconstitutional as a delegation of legislative power, it must clearly appear that the power involved is purely legislative in nature--that is, one appertaining exclusively to the legislative department. Montana-Dakota Utilities Co. v. Johanneson, 153 N.W.2d 414, 421 (N.D. 1967); Annot., 79 L.Ed. 474, 484--487 and 16 Am.Jur.2d, Constitutional Law, section 242 and cases cited in support of the text.

Legislative power is defined in Am.Jur.2d, supra, in this manner:

'Purely legislative power, which can never be delegated has been described as the authority to make a complete law--complete as to time when it shall take effect and as to whem it shall be applicable--and to determine the expediency of its enactment.

'* * *. While a legislative body cannot abdicate its general lawmaking powers it may authorize others to do things which it might properly do, but which it cannot conveniently or advantageously perform.'

If the power delegated be properly restricted so that it carries out the plan after the legislature has layed down an intelligible goal and complete declaration of policy which is definite in describing the subject to which it relates or the field wherein it shall apply, then this would be a proper delegation of powers. Lee Enterprises, Inc. v. Iowa State Tax Comm'n, 162 N.W.2d 730, 742 (Iowa 1968) and authorities cited.

Examination of the nature of the powers delegated to the local board of health in the statute establishes the legislature has clearly defined the policy in that no one shall destroy food products with the intent of driving up prices without the approval of a local health board. Obviously, the legislature contemplated a large destruction of food products would be necessary in order to have effect upon farm...